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THREE ESSAYS ON INFORMATION TRANSMISSION GAMES AND BELIEFS
IN PERFECT INFORMATION GAMES
Yun Wang, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two chapters study strategic information
transmission. The third chapter studies beliefs in perfect information games.
The first chapter examines strategic information transmission with interacting decision-makers.
I analyze a cheap-talk game between an informed agent and two uninformed decision-makers who
coordinate their actions. I compare public communication with private communication. I find
that the agent responds to the decision-makers’ coordination by providing less precise information.
Conditions that support a full information revelation equilibrium in private communication also
support the same type of equilibrium in public communication; but the reverse is not true.
The second chapter investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making.
A persuasion mechanism consists of a family of conditional distributions over the underlying state
space. A biased, perfectly informed sender adopts a persuasion mechanism to provide a group
of uninformed receivers with signals about the unknown state of the world. I compare public
persuasion with private persuasion. I find that the sender can always reach the convex upper
bound of the set of expected payoffs under public persuasion, regardless of the number of signals
or the signals’ correlation structure. The sender is worse off under private persuasion. Moreover, I
show that private persuasion is always more informative than its public counterpart. As a result,
the receivers make better decisions under private persuasion.
The third chapter experimentally explores people’s beliefs behind the failure of backward in-
duction in the centipede games. I elicit players’ beliefs about opponents’ strategies and 1st-order
beliefs. I find that subjects maximize their monetary payoffs according to their stated beliefs
less frequently in the Baseline Centipede treatment where an efficient non-equilibrium outcome
exists; they do so more frequently in the Constant Sum treatment where the efficiency property
iv
is removed. Moreover, subjects believe their opponents’ maximizing behavior and expect their
opponents to hold the same belief less frequently in the Baseline Centipede treatment and more
frequently in the Constant Sum treatment.
v
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1.0 GOING PUBLIC OR GOING PRIVATE? CHEAP-TALK WITH
INTERACTING DECISION-MAKERS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies strategic communication with interacting decision-makers. In many economic
settings, decision-makers get informed from a certain information source before taking actions that
affect each other’s payoffs. Morris and Shin (2002, 2007) investigate a situation where each decision-
maker wants an action close to both the underlying state and the average of all others’ choices.
The authors examine the role of public information that comes from a non-strategic social planner.
Yet in reality the information source that the decision-makers consult is often biased. Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) consider a game of information transmission between a self-interested agent and
two uninformed decision-makers. The authors compare the conditions that support an informative
equilibrium under public communication versus that under private communication. But their
framework omits the strategic complementarity between decision-makers’ actions. In this paper we
intend to bring the two approaches together.
We analyze an agent’s cheap talk communication with interacting decision-makers (hereafter
“principals”). There are two major departures from Morris and Shin (2002, 2007): first, we allow
heterogeneity for the principals’ desire to adapt to the underlying state and for their coordination
motives; whereas Morris and Shin consider only homogeneity among the principals. Second, we
investigate the information transmission from a self-interested agent, who privately observes the
underlying state of the world. The agent can either send cheap talk messages to both principals
publicly, or to each principal privately, but not both. While Morris and Shin (2002) assume that the
public information is from a benevolent planner who maximizes the social welfare and the private
information is from another un-biased information source. We compare public communication
with private communication. We show, in the latter environment, that the agent responds to
1
the principals’ strategic complementary actions by providing less precise information. For any
partition equilibrium with the same number of partition elements, the agent faces tighter incentive
compatibility constraints under private communication. Moreover, Morris and Shin (2002) show
that the principals strictly benefit from public information only when no private information is
of high precision. We find that both the agent and the principals are better off under public
communication. This is true even when the equilibrium under each type of communication have
the same level of information precision.
Our finding regarding the agent’s information revelation incentives appears to be similar to
Farrell and Gibbons (1989). They show that whenever there exists an equilibrium in which the
agent communicates informatively under private communication, there is an equilibrium under
public communication in which the agent does the same; but not vice versa. We also find that
the agent’s incentive compatibility constraints are more restrictive under private communication
than that under public communication. Nevertheless, the underlying reason of our result is different
from that of Farrell and Gibbons (1989). In our model with strategic complementarity in principals’
actions, under public communication the principals take actions based on the same posterior belief.
This is because public information induces common belief. Here public messages from the agent
serve as a coordination device for the principals and enhance both principals’ welfare. On the
other side, in our model private communication still does not allow the agent to tell different lies to
different principals. The principals’ actions are not completely uncorrelated even though the agent
communicates with each principal separately. Any change in the agent’s “talking” strategy with one
principal will also affect the other principal’s best response. For the agent’s incentive compatibility
in any informative equilibrium, all possible deviations and the consequent changes in the principals’
induced actions need to be excluded. Therefore, the agent is more tightly constrained under private
communication.
Meanwhile, we rank the agent’s and the principals’ welfare over the two types of communication
for equilibria with the same number of partition elements. We show, by a numerical example, that
both the agent and the principals are better off under public communication. The agent’s ex-ante
expected utility under public communication weakly dominates that under private communication;
while for both principals’ the dominance relation is strict. Moreover, the gap between the agent’s
expected utilities under the two types of communication shrinks as one principal’s coordination
motive grows. On the other hand, the gap between the principals’ expected utilities may either
shrink or expand depending on that principal’s relative weight on the strategic complementary term
2
in his utility.
We also show, under both types of communication, that equilibria take the partition form as
characterized by Crawford and Sobel (1982). The agent partitions the continuous state space into
finite number of elements and sends only one message representing the partition element in which
the true underlying state lies. For any given equilibria, the higher the number of partition elements,
the more precise information the agent’s messages convey. We show, under public communication,
that the maximum number of partition elements decreases monotonically with the principals’ biases,
i.e. the larger the biases, the smaller the incentives for the agent to provide more precise information.
Moreover, it changes non-monotonically with the principals’ coordination motives. The pattern of
the change depends on principals’ relative bias in preferences. In other words, as the coordination
need of a principal whose interest is less misaligned with the agent grows larger, the effectiveness
of communication reduces. Intuitively, coordinating with somebody else who stands further from
the agent’ ideal position undermines the agent’s well-being.
Additionally, we investigate possible communication improvement compared to the cheap talk
game without the principals’ strategic complementarity in actions (Goltsman and Pavlov (2011)).
We say communication improves if in our model there exists a least informative equilibrium sup-
ported by a range of the parameters which does not support any informative equilibrium in Golts-
man and Pavlov (2011). We find that communication improvement exists under public communi-
cation but not under private communication. Moreover, communication improvement under public
communication only happens when the principals attach different weights on the strategic comple-
mentary terms in their actions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model, strategies,
and equilibrium concept. Section 1.3 provides the conditions that support full revealing equilib-
rium under public and private communication, respectively. Section 1.4 proves the existence of
partition equilibrium and derives the maximum size of partition equilibria under public and private
communication, respectively. This section also compares the agent’s incentives to partially reveal
information under both types of communication. Section 1.5 compares the agent’s welfare and
the principals’ welfare under both types of communication, respectively. We show, by a numerical
example, that both the agent and the principals are better off under public communication. Section
1.6 reviews the related literature on strategic information transmission and on organization design.
Section 1.7 concludes.
3
1.2 THE MODEL
Suppose there are three players, one agent(S, “she”) and two principals (R1 and R2, “he”). A
random variable, t, denotes the underlying state of the world. As the game starts, nature determines
the realization of t ∈ T = [0, 1]. The prior probability distribution t ∼ F over T is commonly known
to all participants. The agent observes the state of the world, t, while the principals do not. Each
receiver i takes an action ai ∈ Ai = R, i = 1, 2 simultaneously and independently. The receivers’
actions and the realized state of the world determine all players’ utilities:
• The agent’s utility:
US(a1, a2, t) = −`1(|a1 − t|)− `2(|a2 − t|)
where `i ∈ C2, `′i(·) ≥ 0, `′′i (·) > 0,∀i = 1, 2
• Each principal’s utility:
URi (a1, a2, bi, t) = −Li(|ai − t− bi|)− Λi(|a1 − a2|)
where Li ∈ C2, L′i(·) ≥ 0, L′′i (·) > 0,Λ′i(·) > 0,Λ′′i (·) > 0, bi ∈ R,∀i = 1, 2
The utility functions indicate that the players’ interests are not perfectly aligned. In every state
t, the agent’s objective is to induce a1 and a2 that exactly coincide with the current state. But the
two principals have two-fold concerns: on one hand, each principal has an ideal action, t+ b1 and
t+ b2 respectively; on the other hand, each receiver cares about the distance between the induced
actions. The closer the two actions, a1 and a2, the smaller the losses for both principals. We call
this effect the “coordination concern” and model it with a twice differentiable concave function
Λi(·)1. We allow the Λ(·) function to be different to capture heterogenous coordination concerns
across different principals.
A special case of this model is the uniform-quadratic form which are widely employed by the
literature: assuming t ∼ U [0, 1], `i(·), Li(·) functions to be of the quadratic form, and Λi(|a1−a2|) =
λi · (a1 − a2)2, λi ∈ R+, ∀i = 1, 2. A simple algebra shows that attaching strictly positive λi to the
quadratic utility loss is equivalent to attaching weights 1/(1 + λi) and λi/(1 + λi) to principal i’s
own preferred action and the coordination concern, respectively.
1Here, by “coordination” we refer to tacit coordination, namely, coordination without explicit conversation be-
tween the two principals. There are some work investigating coordination with the decision-makers’ explicit commu-
nication, a topic of which we do not discuss in this paper.
4
1.2.1 Public Communication
Under public communication, the agent sends costless and nonverifiable messages m ∈ M to
the principals. The agent is only allowed to send a message publicly, i.e. she is bound to send
messages that will be publicly observed by both principals.
1.2.1.1 Strategies and Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We now specify each player’s strategy and the principals’ beliefs upon receiving the agent’s signal,
under the public communication protocol:
• The agent’s strategy, τ : T → ∆M , is a mapping from the state space to the set of distributions
over the message space. The message she finally chooses can be observed by both principals
publicly.
• Each principal’s strategy, αi : M → Ai, i = 1, 2, is a mapping from the message space to
his action space. Potentially a principal could mix over the action space Ai, but he has a
unique best response to each belief. Therefore, we replace ∆Ai with Ai. Upon observing the
agent’s message, each principal chooses his action separately, which determines the utilities of
all players.
• Each principal’s belief, µi : M → ∆T, i = 1, 2, is a mapping from the message space to the set of
distributions over the state space. Upon receiving the agent’s message, each principal updates
his belief about the true state t.
We adopt Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as the equilibrium concept throughout
the rest of the paper. Such equilibrium requires that the agent’s strategy maximizes her ex-ante
expected utility in every possible state given each principal’s strategy, that each principal’s strategy
maximizes his expected utility given the agent’s revelation strategy and the other principal’s best
response, and that each principal makes inferences about the realized value of t based on observed
messages via the Bayes’ Rule wherever possible, i.e. at every information set along every on-
equilibrium paths with ∀m ∈M within the support of τ(·):
• Equilibrium Strategy Profile (τ∗, α∗1, α∗2)
• For all t ∈ [0, 1], define τ(m|t) as the agent’s talking strategy given t. ∫ 10 τ(m|t)dm = 1 and
m ∈ arg max
m′
US(a∗1(m
′
), a∗2(m
′
); t, b1, b2, λ1, λ2)
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• For all m ∈M and i = 1, 2, let ai, i = 1, 2 denote the pure strategy according to αi
a∗i (m) = arg max
a′
∫ 1
0
URi(a
′
1, a
′
2; t, b1, b2, λ1, λ2)µ
∗
i (t|m)dt
• Each receiver’s belief µ∗i (t|m) is derived from Bayes’ Rule whenever possible: µ∗i (t|m) = τ
∗(m|t)f(t)∫ 1
0 τ
∗(m|t)f(t)dt
1.2.2 Private Communication
Under private communication, the agent can send messages to each principal separately and
privately. Each principal observes only the messages that are designated for him, but not the ones
for his counterpart.
1.2.2.1 Strategies and Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Again, we specify each player’s strategy and the principals’ beliefs upon receiving the agent’s
signals, under the private communication protocol:
• The agent’s strategy, τ : T → ∆(M ×M), is a mapping from the state space to the set of
distributions over the message space. Denote τ(·) = (τ1(·), τ2(·)). Privately informed about t,
she chooses two messages and communicates with each principal separately.
• Principal i’s strategy, αi : M → Ai, i = 1, 2, is a mapping from the message space to the set
of probability distributions over his action space. Each principal has a unique best response to
each belief. Therefore, we can replace ∆Ai with Ai.
• Principal i’s belief, µi : M → ∆T, i = 1, 2, is a mapping from the message space to the set of
distribution over the state space. Upon observing the agent’s message, principal i updates his
expectation about the true state variable t.
Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium requires that the agent’s strategy maximizes her ex-
pected utility in every possible state given each principal’s strategies, that each principal’s strategy
maximizes his expected utility given the agent’s strategy and the other principal’s best response,
and that each principal makes inference about the realized value of t based on observed messages
via Bayes’ Rule wherever possible, i.e. at every information set along every on-equilibrium paths
with ∀mi ∈M, i = 1, 2 within the support of τ(·):
• Equilibrium Strategy Profile (τ∗1 , τ∗2 , α∗1, α∗2)
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• For all t ∈ [0, 1], define τ∗i (mi|t), i = 1, 2 as the agent’s talking strategies given t.
∫ 1
0 τi(mi|t)dmi =
1, i = 1, 2 and
m1 ∈ arg max
m′
US(a∗1(m
′
), a∗2(m
′
); t, b1, b2, λ1, λ2)
m2 ∈ arg max
m′
US(a∗1(m
′
), a∗2(m
′
); t, b1, b2, λ1, λ2)
• For all mi ∈M and i = 1, 2, let ai, i = 1, 2 denote the pure strategy according to αi
a∗i (mi) = arg max
a′
∫ 1
0
URi(a
′
1, a
′
2; t, b1, b2, λ1, λ2)µ
∗
i (t|mi)dt
• Each principal’s belief µ∗i (t|m) is derived from Bayes’ Rule whenever possible: µ∗i (t|mi) =
τ∗i (mi|t)f(t)∫ 1
0 τ
∗
i (mi|t)f(t)dt
1.3 FULL INFORMATION REVELATION
In this section we derive conditions that support separating equilibria under public and private
communication, respectively. In any such equilibrium, each agent type separates herself by sending
distinct messages which can be interpreted as and only as from the true type; and each principals
knows the agent’s exact type and makes decision with complete information. Thus we call a
separating equilibrium full-revealing. The following proposition establishes the conditions under
which full-revealing can be supported under each type of communication. Moreover, it shows that
the incentive compatibility constraints are tighter for the agent to reveal full information under
private communication than that under public communication.
Proposition 1. Conditions for full information revelation
1. In the cheap-talk game with interacting principals, full information revelation under private
communication implies full revelation under public communication; but not vice versa.
2. When the common prior is the uniform distribution t ∼ U [0, 1], the utility loss `i(·), Li(·),∀i =
1, 2 are quadratic functions, and the principal’s utility loss from mis-coordination is Λi(|a1 −
a2|) = λi · (a1 − a2)2, λi ∈ R+, ∀i = 1, 2
a. Under public communication, a separating equilibrium in which every agent type reveals the
true realization of t to both principals publicly, exists if and only if
(1 + 2λ2)b1 + (1 + 2λ1)b2
1 + λ1 + λ2
= 0
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b. Under private communication, a separating equilibrium in which every agent type reveals
the true realization of the state variable t to each principal separately, exists if and only if
b1 = b2 = 0.
The proof of this proposition is included in the Appendix. The underlying intuition is two-
fold. The first part is similar to the reason underlying Farrell and Gibbons’ (1989) main result:
under public communication the agent’s messages are observed by the principals at the same time;
while private communication allows the agent to send different messages to different principals.
Thus, in the latter case the agent’s strategy changes from one mapping to a pair of mappings from
the state space to the message space. A separating equilibrium imposes stronger restrictions on
the parameter space in order to exclude all possible profitable deviations, compared to the non-
deviation restriction imposed in the public communication. These profitable deviations include
lying to Principal 1, lying to Principal 2, and lying to both principals at the same time. As the
incentive compatibility constraints become tighter, the range of the parameters that support the
separating equilibrium shrinks to b1 = b2 = 0.
The second reason is from the interacting term in the principals’ utility functions in our model:
the principal’s utility functions are interdependent through the coordination term. Suppose, under
private communication, agent type t deviates from full-revealing with Principal 1 while remains
full-revealing with Principal 2. The direct consequence is that Principal 1’s best response changes.
Moreover, there is an indirect consequence. Since both principals care about coordination, Principal
2’s best response function will also change accordingly. Even though the agent sends messages to
each principal separately, any change in the “talking” strategy with one principal will also affect
the other principal’s best response. Therefore, the agent is more tightly constrained under private
communication.
Part 2.a of Proposition 1 provides the condition for full information revelation under public
communication. In Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) a parallel condition requires b1 + b2 = 0, which
means the “aggregate bias” equals zero. In other words, if there is only one “representative”
principal whose bliss action is the average of the two principals’, separating equilibrium exists only
when this principal’s interest is perfectly aligned with the agent. In our model, the truth-telling
condition (1+2λ2)b1+(1+2λ1)b21+λ1+λ2 = 0 can be rewritten as b1 +
λ2−λ1
1+λ1+λ2
b1 = −(b2 + λ1−λ21+λ1+λ2 b2). The
parameter bi can be interpreted as principal i’s “absolute bias” and the term
λj−λi
1+λ1+λ2
bi as “relative
bias.” Notice that the latter is the absolute bias times the weighed differences in coordination needs
λi.Therefore, part 2.a states that when one principal’s relative bias offsets with the others’, there
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exists separating equilibrium in public communication.
Part 2.b of Proposition 1 shows the tightened condition that support a separating equilibrium
under private communication. Here we have two remarks. First, b1 = b2 = 0 means that the
principals do not have bias any longer. Their ideal actions are to coincide with the current state
and with their co-decision-maker. Therefore all players’s interests are perfectly aligned and the
message(s) become a device to coordinate actions. Second, b1 = b2 = 0 implies (1 + 2λ2)b1 + (1 +
2λ1)b2 = 0, the condition for the existence of separating equilibrium in the public communication,
but not vice versa. Hence, if there is separating equilibrium under private communication protocol,
there exists one in the public communication, but the converse is not true.
1.4 PARTIAL INFORMATION REVELATION
1.4.1 Partition Equilibria
In this section, we investigate non-full revealing equilibria. Section 1.3 indicates that full reve-
lation can be supported under very restricted conditions. When these conditions are not satisfied,
the principals’ actions a1 and a2 will not coincide with each other, nor will they coincide with the
true state, t, as the agent wishes. Thus the agent is better off by not always revealing the true
state. In the most extreme case, the agent adopts the same strategy τ(·) in all states; the princi-
pals interpret all messages in the same way and take actions that maximize the expected utilities
based on the prior probability distribution F (·). This type of “babbling” equilibrium conveys no
information regarding the true state. The principals’ posterior beliefs after receiving any message
remains the same as the common prior belief. We formally define:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is informative if at least one principal’s posterior belief is different
from the common prior belief with positive probability.
As shown in Crawford and Sobel (1982), in a one-sender one-receiver cheap talk game all equilib-
ria take the partition form as long as there is misalignment between the agent’s and the principals’
interests. A babbling equilibrium, an equilibrium with the coarsest partition, is uninformative. In
contrast, any partition equilibrium with at least two partition elements is informative. In such an
equilibrium the principals’ posterior belief(s) has incorporated the probability that the true state
variable falls in one of the partition elements.
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Next, we characterize all non-separating equilibria. Similar to Crawford and Sobel (1982), we
demonstrate that all partial-revealing equilibria are of the partition form; the set of action pairs
induced in equilibrium is finite. The agent adopts semi-pooling revelation strategy, partitioning
the state space [0, 1] into finitely many elements, in which all agent types pool to send the same
message.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium Characterization
1. For all t ∈ [0, 1], if the action pair (a∗1, a∗2) that solves ∂US(a1, a2, t)/∂a1 = 0 and ∂US(a1, a2, t)/∂a2 =
0 does not coincide with the one (a′1, a′2) that solves
∂URi (a1, a2, bi, t)/∂ai = 0, i = 1, 2, then there exists a vector  such that if two action pairs
~u = (aˆ1, aˆ2) and ~v = (a˜1, a˜2) are induced in equilibrium, ||~u − ~v|| > . Moreover, the set of
action pairs induced in equilibrium is finite.
2. Under public communication there exists a positive integer NM , such that for every n ∈ N and
1 ≤ n ≤ NM , there exists at least one equilibrium in which all agent types within t ∈ [ti, ti+1]
with i = 0, ..., n − 1 send the same message. Denote the principals’ action pair induced by all
agent types within [ti, ti+1] as (a1([ti, ti+1]), a2([ti, ti+1])):
- The agent type on each boundary, namely, ti, i = 1, ...n is indifferent between inducing the
action pair (a1([ti, ti+1]), a2([ti, ti+1])) and (a1([ti−1, ti]), a2([ti−1, ti])) where i = 1...n
- The principals’ best response profile upon receiving each message is a pair of actions
(a1([ti−1, ti]), a2([ti−1, ti]))
- The first and last boundary agent types are t0 = 0 and tn = 1 respectively.
- When the common prior is the uniform distribution t ∼ U [0, 1], the utility loss `i(·), Li(·),∀i =
1, 2 are quadratic functions, and the principal’s utility loss from mis-coordination is Λi(|a1−
a2|) = λi · (a1 − a2)2, λi ∈ R+, ∀i = 1, 2, the size of each partition element changes by
2(b1+b2+2b1λ2+2b2λ1)
1+λ1+λ2
The proof of this result is in the Appendix. Equilibria with the partition form can be interpreted
as imprecise information revelation when all player rationally account others’ best responses and
consistently update their beliefs. Although the agent is allowed to send any cheap-talk messages, she
will not lie in equilibrium; rather, the agent speaks in an imprecise manner: instead of revealing the
exact value of the true state variable t, she sends out a message representing the interval where t lies.
Moreover, the finer the partition, the more precise the agent’s communication is. So it is natural
to ask how finest the partition could be. We investigate this question under public communication.
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The following corollary provides the upper bound of the number of partition elements NM as a
function of b1, b2, λ1, λ2, when the common prior is the uniform distribution and the players’ utility
functions all take the quadratic form:
Corollary 1. The number of equilibrium partition elements for given parameter values (b1, b2, λ1, λ2)
is bounded by
NM = 〈1
2
+
[(b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2)× (b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2 + 4(1 + λ1 + λ2))] 12
2(b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2)
〉
where 〈x〉 represents the largest integer below the value of x.
The proof of this corollary is in the Appendix. NM is a measure for the maximum degree of
information precision given the parameters (b1, b2, λ1, λ2). Examining the marginal effects with
respect to the parameters, we have
- ∂NM/∂bi < 0, i = 1, 2.
- ∂NM/∂λi > 0 if bi > bj ; while ∂NM/∂λi < 0 if bi < bj , i = 1, 2
The first partial derivative indicates that the value of NM decreases monotonically with the prin-
cipals’ biases. Given λ1, λ2, bj , the higher one principal’s bias is, the smaller the maximum number
of partition elements. In contrast, the second partial derivative shows a non-monotonic relation
between NM and the principals’ coordination concerns: if principal i has a relatively larger bias,
an increase in i’s coordination need leads to an increase in the value of NM ; on the contrary, if
i’s bias is relatively smaller, the higher i’s coordination concern, the smaller the value of NM . In
other words, when comparing the information precision with respect to the principals’ coordination
concerns, the agent cares more about the relative bias rather than absolute biases. Principal i with
a larger bias seems undesirable for the agent, yet if he has a greater need to coordinate with the
other principal whose bias is smaller, the agent is willing to share more precise information pub-
licly. On the other hand, if principal i is originally less biased compared with the other principal
but develops greater need to coordinate with his highly-biased co-decision-maker, the precision of
communication will decrease. In a nutshell, coordinating with somebody else who stands farther
away from the agent’ ideal position undermines the agent’s well-being.
Under public communication, for given values of (b1, b2, λ1, λ2), the number of partition elements
is bounded by the NM as derived above. A natural question is how close is the finest partition
equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. The next result provides the condition under which the
finest partition equilibrium is sufficiently close to a full-revealing equilibrium.
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Proposition 3. In the four-dimensional parameter space, when the values of (b1, b2, λ1, λ2) get
arbitrary close to the subspace (1+2λ2)b1+(1+2λ1)b21+λ1+λ2 = 0, i.e. the condition for separating equilibrium,
we have NM → ∞. That is, the equilibrium with NM partition elements gets arbitrarily close to
the separating equilibrium when the above expression approaches 0.
Next, we investigate partial information revelation under private communication. From Section
1.3 we know that the conditions supporting a separating equilibrium under private communication
also support a separating equilibrium under public communication; but the converse is not true.
In other words, the incentive compatibility constraints are tighter for the agent to reveal full
information under private communication than that under public communication. Here for partition
equilibrium under private communication we establish a similar result.
Observation 1. 1. In the cheap talk game with interacting principals, given any partition equi-
librium under public communication and any partition equilibrium with the same number of
partition elements under private communication, the sender has more restrictive incentive com-
patibility constraints under private communication.
2. Moreover, under private communication, compared to the cheap talk game with no interde-
pendence between principals’ actions, the sender has more restrictive incentive compatibility
constraints in our model.
The proof of this observation is included in the Appendix. Similar to proposition 1, this ob-
servation results from two effects: the tightened incentive compatibility constraint under private
communication and the interdependence between principals’ actions. We shall illustrate the two ef-
fect by considering a two-step partition equilibrium between the agent and each principal, as shown
in Figure 1.1. Suppose the agent adopts the following strategy: sending message m1 if t ∈ [0, t1]
and message n1 if t ∈ [t1, 1] to Principal 1, while sending m2 if t ∈ [0, t2] and n2 if t ∈ [t2, 1]
to Principal 2. Denote Principal 1’s two induced actions aˆ1 and a˜1 and Principal 2’ two induced
actions aˆ2 and a˜2. Since the communication is private between the agent and one principal on each
side, it is not necessarily t1 = t2. Without loss of generality, we examine the case when t1 ≤ t2.
The first part of this observation comes from the fact that more non–profitable–deviation re-
strictions needs to be satisfied under private communication than that under public communication.
Specifically, this two-by-two partition equilibrium under private communication should exclude all
possible deviations of the boundary types from (t1, t2) to (t
′
1, t2), from (t1, t2) to (t1, t
′
2), and from
(t1, t2) to (t
′
1, t
′
2):
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Figure 1.1: A Partition Equilibrium under Private Communication
1. Fix the boundary type t2:
−`1(|aˆ1 − t1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|) ≥ −`1(|aˆ1 − t′1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|), ∀t′1 > t1
−`1(|a˜1 − t1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|) ≥ −`1(|a˜1 − t′1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|), ∀t′1 < t1
2. Fix the boundary type t1:
−`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t2|) ≥ −`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t′2|), ∀t′2 > t2
−`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|a˜2 − t2|) ≥ −`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|a˜2 − t′2|),∀t′2 < t2
3. For all t′1 ∈ [0, 1] and t′2 ∈ [0, 1]
EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) ≥ EUSPRI(t′1, t′2; b1, b2),∀t′1, t′2 ∈ [0, 1]
where EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) =
∫ t1
0 −`1(|aˆ1− t|)− `2(|aˆ2− t|)dt+
∫ t2
t1
−`1(|a˜1− t|)− `2(|aˆ2− t|)dt+∫ 1
t2
−`1(|a˜1 − t|)− `2(|a˜2 − t|)dt
In contrast, under public communication there is only one boundary type t¯ which satisfies
−`1(|a1 − t¯|)− `2(|a2 − t¯|) ≥ −`1(|a1 − t′|)− `2(|a2 − t′|),∀t′ > t¯
−`1(|a11 − t¯|)− `2(|a22 − t¯|) ≥ −`1(|a11 − t′)− `2(|a22 − t′|),∀t′ < t¯
where (a1, a2) and (a11, a22) are the two action pairs induced in a two-step partition equilibrium
under public communication. Thus the agent faces less restrictive incentive compatibility constraint
under public communication. She is better disciplined under private communication: the principals’
equilibrium actions reveal more information to each other than what the agent can control directly.
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The second part of this observation results from the principals’ interdependent actions. In the
cheap talk model without such interaction terms (Goltsman and Pavlov (2011)), receiver i’s induced
actions are functions of only i’s own related parameters ti, bi, i.e. aˆ1 = aˆ1(t1, b1), a˜1 = a˜1(t1, b1) and
aˆ2 = aˆ2(t2, b2), a˜2 = a˜2(t2, b2). Thus a decomposition of incentive compatibility condition 3 above
shows this condition is not binding as long as conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Nevertheless, this is
not true in our model. The above condition 3 requires the agent’s expected utility with boundary
types t1 and t2 to be greater than her expected utility from deviations to any (t
′
1, t
′
2). From the
interacting term Λi(|a1−a2|), we know that the principals’ induced actions are also interdependent:
aˆ1 = aˆ1(t1, t2, b1, b2), a˜1 = a˜1(t1, t2, b1, b2) and aˆ2 = aˆ2(t1, t2, b1, b2), a˜2 = a˜2(t1, t2, b1, b2). Any
type of deviation will result in a change in all the four induced actions. Thus condition 3 is not
necessarily satisfied even when conditions 1 and 2 hold. Inductively, we can show that in any
partition equilibrium with more than two steps, conditions 1 and 2 do not suffice for the agent’s
incentive compatibility. Therefore, we conclude that under private communication, the agent faces
more restrictive constraints in equilibrium than she does in Goltsman and Pavlov (2011).
1.4.2 Comparative Statics
In this section we construct the least informative partition equilibrium under each type of
communication. Assuming the state t is from a uniform distribution and the players’ utility func-
tions are quadratic, we derive the comparative statics of the equilibrium conditions with respect to
parameters in our model.
Under public communication, informative communication requires at least two partition ele-
ments in the equilibrium. Denote the boundary type t¯. In such an equilibrium, all agent types
t ∈ [0, t¯] sends message m1 while all t ∈ [t¯, 1] m2. In the uniform-quadratic case, the boundary type
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equals2
t¯ =
(1 + 2λ2)(4b1 + 1) + (1 + 2λ1)(4b2 + 1)
4(1 + λ1 + λ2)
It is easy to see that within a certain range of the parameters there exists partition equilibrium
with at least two steps. No parameter values beyond this range support any non-babbling equilib-
rium. In a two-step equilibrium, as the parameter values increase to the boundary of this range,
the value of t¯ decreases to 0 or increases beyond 1. So we first investigate how t¯ changes with the
the bias parameters bi, i = 1, 2. Taking partial derivative with respect to |bi|, i = 1, 2, we have:
∂t¯
∂|bi| =
1 + 2λj
1 + λi + λj
> 0, i, j = 1, 2
The larger the bias, the higher the value of t¯. When t¯ exceeds 1, the two-step equilibrium reduces
to babbling equilibrium and informativeness diminishes.
Second, we examine the impact of the principals’ interaction on the change of t¯. Taking cross-
effect with regard to the coordination parameters, λi, i = 1, 2, we have
∂2t¯
∂bi∂λi
= − 1 + 2λj
(1 + λi + λj)2
≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2
∂2t¯
∂bi∂λj
=
2
1 + λi + λj
− 1 + 2λj
(1 + λi + λj)2
≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2
This result shows that an increase in different principals’ coordination concerns exerts opposite
effects on the marginal effect of ∂t¯∂|bi| . The higher principal i’s coordination concern, the smaller the
bi’s marginal effect on t¯; on the contrary, the higher the other principal j’s coordination concern,
the larger the marginal effect. Since this marginal effect measures the speed of change of t¯, a
principal’s greater coordination concern decreases the speed while the other principal’s greater
concern increases the speed.
Under private communication, the least informative equilibrium involves the agent’s partitioning
the state space into two steps in the private communication with Principal 1 while babbles in the
2It is easy to see that in such an equilibrium the principals’ best response functions are
ai =
1
1 + λi
(t¯/2 + bi) +
λi
1 + λi
aj , i = 3− j
upon receiving m1 and
aii =
1
1 + λi
((t¯+ 1)/2 + bi) +
λi
1 + λi
ajj , i = 3− j
upon receiving m2.The agent type t¯ is indifferent between inducing action pairs (a1, a2) and (a11, a22). Solving the
following equation, we get the indifferent type
−(a1 − t¯)2 − (a2 − t¯)2 = −(a11 − t¯)2 − (a22 − t¯)2
15
private communication with Principal 2. We are interested in the range of the parameters that
supports a two-step partition equilibrium between the agent and one principal. Suppose the agent
sends m1 if t ∈ [0, t1] and n1 if t ∈ [t1, 1] to Principal 1. It is easy to see that the boundary type t1
is given by3:
t1 =
1 + (2 + 4b2)λ
2
1 + λ2 + 4b1(1 + λ1)(1 + λ2) + λ1(3 + 4b2 + 2λ2)
2(1 + 2λ1)(1 + λ1 + λ2)
So we first investigate how the boundary type t1 changes with the the bias parameters bi, i = 1, 2.
Taking partial derivative with respect to |bi|, i = 1, 2, we have:
∂t1
∂|b1| =
2(1 + λ1)(1 + λ2)
(1 + 2λ1)(1 + λ1 + λ2)
> 0
Second, we examine the impact of the principals’ interaction on the change of t1. Taking
cross-effect with regard to the coordination parameters, λ1, λ2, we have
∂2t1
∂b1∂λ1
= −2(1 + λ2)(2 + 4λ1 + 2λ
2
1 + λ2)
(1 + 2λ1)2(1 + λ1 + λ2)2
≤ 0
∂2t1
∂b1∂λ2
=
2λ1(1 + λ1)
(1 + 2λ1)(1 + λ1 + λ2)2
≥ 0
The interpretation is similar to the previous subsections: the higher principal Principal 1’s coor-
dination concern, the lower the marginal effect of the boundary type with respect to Principal 1’s
bias. On the contrary, the larger Principal 2’s coordination concern, the greater the marginal effect.
In summary, under both public and private communication, the agent’s incentive to reveal
information changes non-monotonically in response to the principals’ desire to coordinate. The
3In such an equilibrium R1’s best response functions are:
a1 =
1
1 + λ1
(t1/2 + b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a11 =
1
1 + λ1
((t1 + 1)/2 + b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
upon receiving m1 and n1 respectively. R2’s best response function is:
a2 =
1
1 + λ2
(1/2 + b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
(t1a1 + (1− t1)a11)
Agent type t1 is indifferent between inducing action pairs (a1, a2) and (a11, a2):
−(a1 − t1)2 = −(a11 − t1)2
The boundary type t1 is the solution to the following equation:
−(a1 − t1)2 − (a2 − t1)2 = −(a11 − t1)2 − (a2 − t1)2
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pattern of the change depends on the decision-makers’ relative heterogeneous biases. In other
words, as the coordination need of a principal whose interest is less misaligned with the agent
grows larger, the effectiveness of communication reduces. Intuitively, coordinating with somebody
else who stands further from the agent’ ideal position undermines the agent’s well-being.
1.4.3 Communication Improvement
In this section we present results on communication improvement. We focus on the two-step
equilibrium under each type of communication when the state t is generated from a uniform dis-
tribution and the players’ utility functions are quadratic. We compare our results to Goltsman
and Pavlov (2011). If there exists a two-step equilibrium supported by a range of the parameters
which does not support any informative equilibrium in Goltsman and Pavlov (2011), we say there
is communication improvement in our model.
Notice that in Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) under public communication, when the parameters
b1, b2 fall in the following range: |(b1 + b2)/2| < 1/4, there exists a two-step equilibrium. The
following examples fix the value of coordination concerns, λi, i = 1, 2 and compare the range of bi’s
to Goltsman and Pavlov (2011).
Example 1: λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0
In this case, the boundary agent type is t¯ = b1+3b2+12 . When the bi’s fall within the shaded
range on Figure 1.2, we have t¯ = b1+3b2+12 ∈ (0, 1) while | b1+b22 | > 1/4. This means under public
communication there exists a two-step equilibrium in our model, but not in Goltsman and Pavlov
(2011).
Example 2: λ1 = λ2 = k where k ∈ R is any positive real number
In this case t¯ = 1+2(b1+b2)2 . The inequalities 0 < t¯ =
1+2(b1+b2)
2 < 1 and | b1+b22 | > 1/4 yield no
solution. There is no range of the bias parameters b1, b2 that supports informative communication
in our model but only babbling equilibrium in the benchmark case. For all symmetric coordination
concerns, communication improvement becomes impossible.
The examples show the impact of the coordination parameters on communication improvement:
Observation 2. When the principals’ coordination concerns are positive and different, communi-
cation improves in terms of the existence of informative communication under higher principals’
biases. In contrast, when the two principals have symmetric coordination needs, such improvement
no longer exists.
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Parameter values: λ1 = 1, λ2 = 0. The horizonal axis represents b1 and the vertical axis b2. The shaded areas
represent the ranges such that t¯ = b1+3b2+1
2
∈ (0, 1) while | b1+b2
2
| > 1/4.
Figure 1.2: Communication Improvement under Public Communication
Now we move to the private communication. Goltsman and Pavlov (2011), when the parameters
b1, b2 fall in the following range: |bi| < 1/4, i = 1, 2, there exists a two-step equilibrium under private
communication. The following example shows that, at least under special values, communication
improvement is not possible in our model.
Example 1: λ1 = k, λ2 = 0
We derive the two-by-two partition equilibrium as described in Figure 1.1. Assuming b1 = 0 and
the two boundary types t1 ≤ t2. Informative equilibrium requires 0 < t1 ≤ t2 < 1. For all k ∈ R,
the range of b2 that allows an informative equilibrium is equal to or smaller than [0, 0.25]. This
means there is no communication improvement compared to Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) under
private communication.
Observation 3. Compared to the cheap talk game without the principals’ interdependent actions,
in our model there is communication improvement under public communication, while there is no
such improvement under private communication.
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1.5 WELFARE COMPARISON
In this section we rank the players’ welfare between public and private communication. There
are two circumstances which will yield the same expected payoffs in both types of communication
for each player: (1) separating equilibria in both types of communication, and (2) uninformative
equilibria in both types of communication. In the following part, we skip these generic cases
and provide comparison results for the more interesting partial revelation equilibria. Specifically,
we compare a two-step partition equilibrium under public communication with a two-by-two step
partition equilibrium under private communication with the boundary types t1 ≤ t2. The equilibria
under investigation are of the same number of partition elements. Thus our results show, even in
the partition equilibrium with the same level of information precision, that the players are strictly
better off under one type of communication.
We shall focus on the uniform-quadratic case and derive our comparison results for fixed pa-
rameter values. Namely, we look into the case when λ1 = k, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0, k = 1, 2, 3
4. In other
words, principal 1’s bias is zero; principal 2’s utility does not depend on how well the coordination
is. We derive the agent’s and principals’ utilities as functions of principal 2’s bias, b2.
Figure ?? draws the agent’s expected utility functions as functions of b2 under each type of
communication, respectively. The blue line represents EUS under public communication and the
purple line the one under private communication. We have three observations: first, the agent’s
expected utility is decreasing in b2, in either type of communication. Second, the agent’s expected
utility under public communication weakly dominates that under private communication. So the
agent is better off under public communication. Third, the gap between the utilities from each type
of communication shrinks as λ1 increase. So the agent’s marginal benefit from public communication
decreases as principal 1’s coordination concern becomes larger.
Figure ?? draws principal 1’s expected utility functions as functions of b2 under each type of
communication, respectively. The blue line represents EUR1 under public communication and the
purple line the one under private communication. We also have three observations here: first,
principal 1’s expected utility is decreasing in b2, in either type of communication. Second, principal
1’s expected utility under public communication is higher than that under private communication.
Hence, principal 1 is also better off under public communication. Third, the gap between principal
1’s utilities from each type of communication expands as λ1 increase. This means principal 1’s
4Also, we choose the parameter values to be comparable to Goltsman and Pavlov’s (2011) comparison results.
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Figures: Agent’s ex-ante expected utility as a function of b2. EU
S
PUB (blue curve) weakly dominates EU
S
PRI (purple
curve). As λ1 increases, the difference between EU
S
PUB and EU
S
PRI shrinks. Parameter values: (left top) λ1 = 1, λ2 =
0, b1 = 0; (left bottom) λ1 = 2, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0; (right bottom) λ1 = 3, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0.
Figure 1.3: Agent’s Expected Utility in b2
marginal benefit from public communication becomes larger as his coordination concerns grows.
Figure ?? draws principal 2’s expected utility functions as functions of b2 under each type of
communication, respectively. The blue line represents EUR2 under public communication and the
purple line the one under private communication. Again, there are three observations here: first,
principal 2’s expected utility is decreasing in b2, in either type of communication. Second, principal
2’s expected utility under public communication is higher than that under private communication.
Thus principal 2 is also better off under public communication. Third, the gap between principal
2’s utilities from each type of communication expands as λ1 increase. This means principal 2’s
marginal benefit from public communication declines as his partner’s coordination concerns rises.
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Figures: Principal 1’s ex-ante expected utility as a function of b2. EU
R1
PUB (blue curve) dominates EU
R1
PRI (purple
curve). As λ1 increases, the difference between EU
R1
PUB and EU
R1
PRI expands. Parameter values: (left top) λ1 =
1, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0; (left bottom) λ1 = 2, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0; (right bottom) λ1 = 3, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0.
Figure 1.4: Principal 1’s Expected Utility in b2
1.6 RELATED LITERATURE
Out paper intends to link two strands of literature: the literature on strategic information
transmission and the literature on organization design under incomplete information. The seminal
cheap-talk model by Crawford and Sobel (1982) studies a better-informed agent sends a message to
an uninformed principal, who takes an action that affects the welfare of both players. They show
that as long as the agent’s and principal’s interests are not perfectly aligned, there is only finite
number of actions induced in equilibrium. The agent partitions the type space into finite number of
elements and all agents’ types within one partition element pool to send one signal representing the
element where the true type lies. The construction of partition equilibrium relies on indifference
conditions of the agent’s types on the boundaries of each partition element. This help us to find
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Figures: Principal 2’s ex-ante expected utility as a function of b2. EU
R2
PUB (blue curve) dominates EU
R2
PRI (purple
curve). As λ1 increases, the difference between EU
R2
PUB and EU
R2
PRI shrinks. Parameter values: (left top) λ1 = 1, λ2 =
0, b1 = 0; (left bottom) λ1 = 2, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0; (right bottom) λ1 = 3, λ2 = 0, b1 = 0.
Figure 1.5: Principal 2’s Expected Utility in b2
the key equilibrium condition in this model, too.
There are a few models that extend the CS model into a one-agent multiple-principal frame-
work. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) study a two-principal framework with discrete state space and
discrete action space. In their model the agent can send messages either publicly or privately but
not both. They show that whenever there exists an equilibrium in which the sender communicates
informatively under private communication, there is an equilibrium under public communication
in which the sender does the same. But the converse is never true. Goltsman and Pavlov (2011)
generalize Farrell and Gibbons (1989) framework into concave and differentiable payoff functions
over a continuous type space and a continuous action space. They derive conditions under which
public communication dominates private communication. They also show that the sender is willing
to reveal more information if she combines the two messaging channels together. Koessler (2006)
22
investigates the relation between public and private communication with certifiable messages. He
shows that, under a type-dependent message space, restrictions on the principals’ off-equilibrium
beliefs exclude the circumstance when informative equilibrium exists in public but not private
communication. He also shows that private communication strictly dominates public communi-
cation. There exists equilibrium with full information revelation in private communication when
no public communication is possible. Nonetheless, all these work assumes no interactions between
the principals’ actions. The novelty of our model is that we allow the principals’ utilities to be
interdependent.
Related works addressing multi-principal communication issues include Newman and Sansing
(1993) and Gigler (1994). Both investigate an incumbent firm’s information disclosure to two
audience groups: its competitor and the capital market/shareholders. There exists no private dis-
closure ever and all public disclosure equilibria are partition equilibria. Similarly, Ainsworth and
Sened (1993) study an interest group’s lobbying two separate groups: the congressmen and gov-
ernment officials. They compare the collective decisions with versus without a lobbyist in public
communication. Koessler and Martimort (2008) study optimal communication mechanisms in a
two-dimensional action space. When action on each dimension is controlled by a different principal
and the coordination between two principals enters the agent’s utility jointly, in private communi-
cation there is an asymmetric contractual externality between the two principals. They also show
that public communication gives rise to mutual discipline or subversion effects according to the
principals’ biases. Johns (2007) examines a bureaucrat’s public cheap-talk communication with
two policymakers who then bargain for the final policy choice. He shows that the two policymak-
ers are better off in the follow-up bargaining if they encounter a moderate bureaucrat instead of
somebody else that biases towards one of them. Board and Dragu (2008) also study two-principal
cheap-talk followed by an ultimatum bargaining between the principals for a final decision. They
find that the additional principal with veto power might get lower welfare; nevertheless the original
principal is better off than in the case without veto threat.
Another strand of literature includes works on players’ coordination under incomplete infor-
mation. Morris and Shin (2002) study the social value of public information provision. They
investigate the setting where each decision maker, with a private noisy signal, aims at a decision
appropriate to the underlying state and coordinating with the majority. They show that when
none of the members holds any socially valuable private information, public information revelation
always leads to welfare improvement. However, when every organization member receives a pri-
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vate signal besides the commonly observed message, greater provision of public information does
not always enhance welfare. Morris and Shin (2007) emphasize the trade-off between information
precision and common understanding among group members in designing the optimal communica-
tion mechanisms. In both papers the decision-maker’s private information is exogenous; and the
provision of public information is through a benevolent social planner who aims at maximizing the
aggregated utility of all decision-makers. In our model the messages come from a biased agent
whose preferred action does not completely coincide with the decision-makers’ interests.
Alonso et. al.(2008) compare centralized communication and decentralized communication with
coordination in a multi-division organization. They analyze a multi-agent single-principal cheap-
talk setting. Each informed division observes its own type and sends a message to a head-quarter
who chooses the final action (vertical communication). Alternatively, the two divisions can commu-
nicate with each other directly and then make two separate decisions (horizonal communication).
A division is concerned not only about its own ideal action regarding the underlying state, but also
the coordination with the other division. The authors show that higher coordination need improves
horizontal communication but worsens vertical communication when the decision right is controlled
by the uninformed principal. Kawamura (2010) considers the same mechanism with more than two
informed agents. He points out that as the number of informed agents grows, information precision
diminishes. The difference in our setting is that we consider a single-agent multi-principal setting.
We aim at showing how the agent’s incentive to reveal information changes in response to the
principals’ interactions.
Two other papers address the issue of cheap-talk with multiple decision-makers located on a
network. Galeotti et. al. (2009) investigate a cheap-talk model in which each decision-maker’s
payoff depends on the cumulative distance between every other’s action choice and his own bliss
point. They show that information revelation to another player decreases when some opponents
with highly misaligned interest also communicate with that player. Hagenbach and Koessler (2010)
study information transmission within a network with coordinating decision-makers. Each decision-
maker has his own preferred action plus the need for coordination, weighted inversely by the number
of players. They show that larger groups tend to effectively share information even when there is
no information flow in smaller groups. Different from our setting, every group member in their
model observes a private noisy signal and is only allowed for public communication.
Our model highlights a few new features: first, compared to the existing multi-principal cheap
talk literature, we incorporate the principals’ coordination problem into the game situation. Second,
24
we consider heterogeneous coordination concerns so as to capture the principals’ different weights
attached to their most preferred actions and coordination. Third, we analyze how the informed
agent’s information revelation incentives change in different types of communication.
1.7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we investigate a cheap-talk communication setting with one informed agent and
two coordinating uninformed principals. We show that under both the public communication and
the private communication equilibria have the partition form characterized in Crawford and Sobel
(1982). The agent partitions the continuous state space into finite number of elements and sends
out only one message representing the partition element in which the true underlying state lies. The
number of partition elements for given parameter values decreases monotonically with the princi-
pals’ biases, but changes non-monotonically with the principals’ coordination concerns, in a pattern
that depends on principals’ relative instead of the absolute biases. Moreover, we show that with the
additional coordination concerns in the principals’ utility functions, there exists communication im-
provement compared to Goltsman and Pavlov (2011). Informative communicative equilibrium can
be supported with the principals’ more extreme biases. In addition, we discuss the relation between
public and private communications. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and the benchmark model both
emphasize that the presence of two principals mutually discipline the agent’s incentives in informa-
tion revelation, even if there is no such revelation privately. Here we find similar communication
improvement in private asymmetric communication. The agent’s signal becomes more informative
if she sends out less precise signals to the other. In the most extreme case of such asymmetric reve-
lation, the agent babbles with the principal whose bias is larger while communicates informatively
with the principal whose bias is moderate. There exists such informative asymmetric equilibrium
within the parameters’ range where all equilibria in the public communication are uninformative.
There are two additional issues to mention. Firstly, we attach heterogeneous coordination con-
cerns, λ1 and λ2, to the principals’ utility functions. An alternative way to incorporate principals’
different weights on the most preferred actions and on coordination is to attach 1−αi and αi where
αi ∈ [0, 1]. Simple algebra shows that it is equivalent to our setting once we normalize λi1+λi = αi.
Secondly, we do not add the coordinating term onto the agent’s payoff function explicitly; yet
the agent has to take the principals’ coordination into account before delivering her message(s).
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To be robust, we also check two possibilities: the agent derives utility solely from principals’
coordination US(a1, a2) = −(a1 − a2)2 and she also wants her own bliss point to be implemented
US(a1, a2, t) = −(a1 − t)2 − (a2 − t)2 − (a1 − a2)2. Notice the agent’s utility does not depend on
t in the former case, thus the agent aims at inducing two actions as close as possible regardless of
the true state of the world. In equilibrium, the agent knows the best response of each principal on
receiving the signals, thus the message transmitted to one principal is tailored towards the action of
the other principal, unlike in the main model where message(s) is tailored to induce actions in exact
coincidence with the underlying state. The essence of the problem does not change and the main
results hold. In the latter case, the agent’s utility function satisfies all conditions of Proposition 2
so similar results will follow, though the positions of the boundary types each partition equilibrium
may be different.
The model can be extended to endogenous coordination concerns. By changing the two param-
eters λ1, λ2 to λ1(t), λ2(t), the principals’ desire for minimize the disparity between actions varies
with each realization of the state variable t. In reality, there are circumstances in which principals
value their favorite actions more when the underlying state is “moderate,” while feel greater needs
to coordinate when the underlying state becomes more extreme.
1.8 APPENDIX
1.8.1 Proofs
1.8.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof for Part 1
The existence of separating equilibrium requires every agent’s type having incentive to reveal the
true t. The principals knows the value of t, so the best response functions are
a1 = h1(a2, b2, t), a2 = h2(a1, b2, t)
Agent’s type t’s utility is US(a1, a2, t) = −`1(|h1(a2, b2, t)− t|)− `2(|h2(a1, b2, t)− t|).
Under public communication, suppose the agent type t deviates to the mimic type t˜. Both prin-
cipals observe the same messages from the agent and believe she is type t˜ with probability 1. Thus
the agent type t’s utility from such an deviation becomes US(a˜1, a˜2, t˜) = −`1(|h1(a˜2, b2, t˜) − t|) −
`2(|h2(a˜1, b2, t˜)− t|). The non-profitable deviation condition requires US(a1, a2, t) ≥ US(a˜1, a˜2, t˜).
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Under private communication, we need to check three non-profitable deviation conditions: the
condition should exclude unilateral deviation with R1, unilateral deviation with R2, and bilateral
deviation with R1 and R2. The first two cases are symmetric. Suppose the agent type t deviates to
mimic type s with R1 while remains truth-telling with R2. The principals’ best response functions
become
a1 = g1(a2, b2, s), a2 = g2(a1, b2, t)
Thus non-profitable bilateral deviation requires
US(a1, a2, t) ≥ US(a′1, a′2, t) = −`1(|g1(a2, b2, s)− t|)− `2(|g2(a1, b2, t)− t|)
The last case is to exclude the agent type t’s bilateral deviation. Suppose that the agent type t
deviates to mimic type s with R1 and deviates to mimic type r with R2. The principals’ best
response functions become
a1 = f1(a2, b2, s), a2 = f2(a1, b2, r)
Non-profitable deviation requires
US(a1, a2, t) ≥ US(a′′1, a′′2, t) = −`1(|f1(a2, b2, s)− t|)− `2(|f2(a1, b2, r)− t|)
Therefore, the non-profitable deviation constraints are tighter under private communication.
Proof for Part 2.a
In a separating equilibrium under public communication, every agent type t sends a distinct message
and both principals interpret correctly on every observed message as the agent type from whom this
message comes. Without loss of generality, let us assume the separating strategy for each t ∈ [0, 1]
is a report m = t. Upon receiving m, both principals believe it comes from type t.
Each principal solves the optimization problem:
max
ai∈A
URi(ai, aj , bi, bj , t) = −(ai − (t+ bi))2 − λi(a1 − a2)2, i, j = 1, 2
From the interacting term in utility function, we get two best response functions, showing the
interdependence of their actions:
a1(a2) =
1
1 + λ1
(t+ b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a2(a1) =
1
1 + λ2
(t+ b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
a1
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Solving the best response functions yields:
at1 =
(1 + λ2)(t+ b1) + λ1(t+ b2)
1 + λ1 + λ2
at2 =
(1 + λ1)(t+ b2) + λ2(t+ b1)
1 + λ1 + λ2
Type t agent’s utility is USt = −(at1 − t)2 − (at2 − t)2 = −( b1+λ2b1+λ1b21+λ1+λ2 )2 − ( b2+λ1b2+λ2b11+λ1+λ2 )2.To check
the incentive compatibility, we need to prove that type t agent’s expected utility from mimicking
any other type would not exceed USt .
Now suppose pretending to be another type t˜ is a profitable deviation for type t. Given the two
principals’ beliefs same as above, namely, they believe that the agent is type t˜ with probability 1.
Therefore, the induced action pair change to:
at˜1 =
(1 + λ2)(t˜+ b1) + λ1(t˜+ b2)
1 + λ1 + λ2
at˜2 =
(1 + λ1)(t˜+ b2) + λ2(t˜+ b1)
1 + λ1 + λ2
The agent’s utility change to US
t˜
= −(at˜1− t)2− (at˜2− t)2. Type t agent’s incentive compatibility in
separating equilibrium implies USt > U
S
t˜
for all the parameter values b1, b2, λ1, λ2. The inequality
holds if and only if (1+2λ2)b1+(1+2λ1)b21+λ1+λ2 = 0. Thereby the conclusion follows.
Proof for Part 2.b
Suppose under private communication there exists separating equilibrium, in which every agent type
t sends a distinct message to each principal separately and each principal interprets the message
properly as the type from whom this message comes.
Each principal solves the optimization problem:
max
ai∈A
URi(ai, aj , bi, bj , t) = −(ai − (t+ bi))2 − λi(a1 − a2)2, i, j = 1, 2
From the interacting term in utility function, we get two best response functions, showing the
interdependence of their actions:
a1(a2) =
1
1 + λ1
(t+ b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a2(a1) =
1
1 + λ2
(t+ b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
a1
Solving the best response functions yields:
at1 =
(1 + λ2)(t+ b1) + λ1(t+ b2)
1 + λ1 + λ2
at2 =
(1 + λ1)(t+ b2) + λ2(t+ b1)
1 + λ1 + λ2
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Type t agent’s utility is USt = −(at1 − t)2 − (at2 − t)2 = −( b1+λ2b1+λ1b21+λ1+λ2 )2 − ( b2+λ1b2+λ2b11+λ1+λ2 )2.
Incentive comparability constraints for the agent require no-profitable deviation unilateral with
R1, no-profitable deviation unilateral with R2, and no-profitable deviation with both principals
bilaterally. We will exclude all of the three cases below.
Deviation 1 : The type t agent pretends to be type s to R1 while truthfully reveals t to R2
given the belief pair (µ1(t|·), µ2(t|·)) such that each principal interprets the message(s) as truthful
information revelation.
In this case the principals’ best response functions become:
a1(a2) =
1
1 + λ1
(s+ b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a2(a1) =
1
1 + λ2
(t+ b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
a1
Solving the best response functions yields:
as1 =
−s− b1 − tλ1 − b2λ1 − sλ2 − b1λ2
1 + λ1 + λ2
at2 =
−t− b2 − tλ1 − b2λ1 − sλ2 − b1λ2
1 + λ1 + λ2
Denote agent type t’s utility in this case as USst = −(as1 − t)2 − (at2 − t)2. No-profitable deviation
requires USst−USt ≤ 0. This equality holds if and only if −b2(λ1+λ2+2λ1λ2)−b1(1+2λ2+2λ22) = 0.
Deviation 2 : The type t agent pretends to be type r to R2 while truthfully reveals t to R1
given the belief pair (µ1(t|·), µ2(t|·)) such that each principal interprets the message(s) as truthful
information revelation.
Similar to the above case, the principals’ best response functions are:
a1(a2) =
1
1 + λ1
(t+ b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a2(a1) =
1
1 + λ2
(r + b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
a1
All derivations are the same. Denote the agent type t’s utility in this case as USrt. No-profitable
deviation requires USrt − USt ≤ 0. This equality holds if and only if −b1(λ1 + λ2 + 2λ1λ2)− b2(1 +
2λ1 + 2λ
2
1) = 0.
Deviation 3 : The type t agent pretends to be type s to R1, type r to R2 given the belief
pair (µ1(t|·), µ2(t|·)) such that each principal interprets the message(s) as truthful information
revelation.
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The principals’ best response functions become:
a1(a2) =
1
1 + λ1
(s+ b1) +
λ1
1 + λ1
a2
a2(a1) =
1
1 + λ2
(r + b2) +
λ2
1 + λ2
a1
Denote the agent type t’s utility in this case as USsr. No-profitable deviation requires U
S
sr−USt ≤ 0.
USsr − USt = b22(1 + 2λ1 + 2λ21) + b21(1 + 2λ2 + 2λ22) + 2b1b2(λ1 + λ2 + 2λ1λ2)
−[(r + b2)(1 + λ1) + (s+ b1)λ2 − t(1 + λ1 + λ2)]2 − [(r + b2)λ1 + (s+ b1)(1 + λ2)− t(1 + λ1 + λ2)]2
Thus we have the following incentive compatibility constraints to excludes all non-profitable
deviation:
−b2(λ1 + λ2 + 2λ1λ2)− b1(1 + 2λ2 + 2λ22) = 0
−b1(λ1 + λ2 + 2λ1λ2)− b2(1 + 2λ1 + 2λ21) = 0
USsr − USt ≤ 0
Since λ1, λ2 > 0, these conditions holds only when b1 = b2 = 0. Thus we conclude: if and only if
b1 = b2 = 0 there exists separating equilibrium in private communication.
1.8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The partition form of equilibria and finite actions induced in such equilibria result from a key
property of the players’ utility functions. So first we prove this critical single-crossing property
for an extended two-dimension action space. It implies the agent’s incentive compatibility, i.e. all
agent types on one side of the indifferent type strictly prefer one induced action pair to the other.
We first prove the result when the common prior is the uniform distribution and the players’
utility functions are of the quadratic form. In any equilibrium of public communication, upon
receiving a message m, principal i solves
max
ai
∫
t∈[0,1]
−(ai − (t+ bi))2 − λi(a1 − a2)2dFm(t), i = 1, 2
Each i′s first-order condition is a reaction function ai(aj). Parallelize the two f.o.c’s and substitute
variables, we get
(1 + λ1 + λ2)a1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)a2 − b2 (1.1)
which means “common message induces common beliefs” for both principals.
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Now given any two pair of actions (aˆ1, aˆ2) and (a˜1, a˜2) where all the a
′
is are fixed numbers.
Consider the agent’s utility with different pairs, UˆS and U˜S . Single crossing condition requires
UˆS = U˜S for exactly one type t ∈ [0, 1]. For all other types, the agent should have strict preference
of one pair over the other.
UˆS − U˜S = [−(aˆ1 − t)2 − (aˆ2 − t)2]− [−(a˜1 − t)2 − (a˜2 − t)2]
= (aˆ1 + a˜1 − 2t)(a˜1 − aˆ1) + (aˆ2 + a˜2 − 2t)(a˜2 − aˆ2)
= (a˜1
2 − aˆ12) + (a˜22 − aˆ22)− 2t(a˜1 − aˆ1 + a˜2 − aˆ2)
This is a linear function of t. Therefore, for all actions pairs (aˆ1, aˆ2) and (a˜1, a˜2) such that a˜1 −
aˆ1 + a˜2− aˆ2 6= 0, the agent’s indifference condition yields a unique solution to the “boundary” type
t¯:
t¯ =
(a˜1
2 − aˆ12) + (a˜22 − aˆ22)
2(a˜1 − aˆ1 + a˜2 − aˆ2)
If a˜1 − aˆ1 + a˜2 − aˆ2 = 0, we have the following two cases:
Case 1: (a˜1
2− aˆ12) + (a˜22− aˆ22) 6= 0. This means all agent types t ∈ [0, 1] has strict preference.
Either (aˆ1, aˆ2) S (a˜1, a˜2) or (a˜1, a˜2) S (aˆ1, aˆ2) ∀t 6= t¯. No “indifference” type in between implies
violation of single-crossing condition.
Case 2: (a˜1
2 − aˆ12) + (a˜22 − aˆ22) = 0. In this case, UˆS = U˜S ∀t ∈ [0, 1], the single-crossing
condition does not hold either.
Next we shall prove the following claim:
Claim: Within the entire range of the bias parameters (b1, b2) such that b1 6= b2, for any two
different action pairs, neither case 1 or case 2 is possible given same belief for both principals and
best response functions described in equation (1), thus the single-crossing condition is not violated.
For Case 1, in a˜1 − aˆ1 + a˜2 − aˆ2 = 0 we can write aˆ2 = a˜1 − aˆ1 + a˜2 (2). Suppose there are two
action pairs induced in equilibrium such that a˜i 6= aˆi, i = 1, 2. From equation (1) we have:
(1 + λ1 + λ2)aˆ1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)aˆ2 − b2
(1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜2 − b2
Insert (2) and simplify the system of equations, we get:
2(1 + λ1 + λ2)aˆ1 − b1 = 2(1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜1 − b1
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Which implies aˆ1 = a˜1, a contradiction.
For Case 2, plug aˆ2 = a˜1− aˆ1 + a˜2 into (a˜12− aˆ12)+(a˜22− aˆ22) = 0, we get aˆ1 = a˜2 and aˆ2 = a˜1,
i.e. the two pairs are symmetric about the 45◦-line. On the other hand, if such action pairs (aˆ1, aˆ2)
and (a˜1, a˜2) are induced in equilibrium upon observing any public message m, equation (1) yields:
(1 + λ1 + λ2)aˆ1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)aˆ2 − b2
(1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜2 − b2
Plug aˆ1 = a˜2 and aˆ2 = a˜1 into the above we get:
(1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜1 − b1 = (1 + λ1 + λ2)a˜1 − b2 + b1 − b2
The equation only holds when b1 = b2. Hence for all b1 6= b2, such actions pairs cannot be induced
at the same time in any equilibrium.
Next, we check the concavity of all three players’ utility functions to guarantee there exists a
unique solution for every utility maximization problem given each agent type t.
• ∂US(a1, a2, t)/∂a1 = 0 and ∂US(a1, a2, t)/∂a2 = 0 at point a1 = a2 = t
• The matrix
 ∂2US∂a21 ∂2US∂a1∂a2
∂2US
∂a1∂a2
∂2US
∂a22
 =
 −2 0
0 −2
 is negative definite. Thus US is concave for
every (a1, a2). The solution is the unique maximum point
• For Ri, ∂URi(a1, a2, t)/∂ai = 0 yields ai = (1+λj)(t+bi)+λi(t+bj)1+λi+λj , i, j = 1, 2, so that ai =
(1+λj)(t+bi)+λi(t+bj)
1+λi+λj
• The matrix
 ∂2URi∂a21 ∂2URi∂a1∂a2
∂2URi
∂a1∂a2
∂2URi
∂a22
 =
 −2− 2λi 0
0 −2− 2λi
 is negative definite since λi > 0.
Thus URi is concave for every (a1, a2). The solution is the unique maximum point.
As shown in Proposition 1, for each agent type t ∈ [0, 1], the agent’s optimal strategy is to
induce an action pair (a1, a2) such that a1 = a2 = t. And for the principals, if the true agent type
t were known, the actions at1 =
(1+λ2)(t+b1)+λ1(t+b2)
1+λ1+λ2
and at2 =
(1+λ1)(t+b2)+λ2(t+b1)
1+λ1+λ2
would maximize
their utilities. Proposition 2 assumes ∀b1, b2, λ1, λ2, (1+λ2)b1 +λ1b2 6= 0 and (1+λ1)b2 +λ2b1 6= 0.
Hence t 6= (1+λ2)(t+b1)+λ1(t+b2)1+λ1+λ2 = at1 and t 6=
(1+λ1)(t+b2)+λ2(t+b1)
1+λ1+λ2
= at2.
Suppose ~u = (aˆ1, aˆ2) and ~v = (a˜1, a˜2) are two pairs of actions induced in equilibrium. Then
by the generalized single-crossing property, there exist tu and tv such that U
S(~u, tu) ≥ US(~v, tu)
and US(~u, tv) ≤ US(~v, tv). Since US is continuous on a1, a2, there exists t¯ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. tu < t¯ < tv
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and US(~u, t¯) = US(~v, t¯). All agent types t > t¯ prefer ~v to ~u and types t < t¯ prefer ~u to ~v. Hence
aˆ1 < t¯ < a˜1 and aˆ2 < t¯ < a˜2. And for the agent type t¯, the most preferred action pair is a1 = a2 = t¯.
Now for the principals, their utilities are maximized at at¯1 =
(1+λ2)(t¯+b1)+λ1(t¯+b2)
1+λ1+λ2
and at¯2 =
(1+λ1)(t¯+b2)+λ2(t¯+b1)
1+λ1+λ2
. As tu < t¯ < tv, we have aˆ1 < a
t¯
1 < a˜1 and aˆ2 < a
t¯
2 < a˜2.
From above we know t¯ 6= at¯1 and t¯ 6= at¯2 as long as (1+λ2)b1 +λ1b2 6= 0 and (1+λ1)b2 +λ2b1 6= 0.
Specifically, ∀ > 0, |at¯1 − t¯| > /
√
2 and |at¯2 − t¯| > /
√
2. Therefore |a˜1 − aˆ1| > /
√
2 and
|a˜1 − aˆ1| > /
√
2. It follows that
||~u− ~v|| =
√
(a˜1 − aˆ1)2 + (a˜1 − aˆ1)2 > 
Moreover, the agent’s utility satisfies concavity and single-crossing condition, USait > 0 implies
G′(t) = USt (v, t) − USt (u, t) =
∫ v
u U
S
ait > 0. Therefore, G(t) > 0 for t > t¯, while G(t) < 0 for t < t¯.
Therefore, the set of action pairs induced in equilibrium is finite.
For each boundary type ti, the induced action pair (a1([ti−1, ti]), a2([ti−1, ti])) increases with
ti−1 and ti in both dimensions. The generalized single-crossing property guarantees the agent’s
incentive capability:
US(a1([ti, ti+1]), a2([ti, ti+1]), t) = U
S(a1([ti−1, ti]), a2([ti−1, ti]), t)
Now consider the two nearby partition elements, [ti−1, ti] and [ti, ti+1]. Principals’ best responses
and agent type ti−1, ti, ti+1’s indifference gives the following condition:
ti−1 + ti+1 = 2ti − 2(b1 + b2 + 2b1λ2 + 2b2λ1)
1 + λ1 + λ2
This implies the size of each partition elements decreases step by step, at the length 2(b1+b2+2b1λ2+2b2λ1)1+λ1+λ2 .
1.8.1.3 Proof of Corollary 1
From Proposition 2, we know the size of each partition element dn decreases with
2(b1+b2+2b1λ2+2b2λ1)
1+λ1+λ2
.
Denote the size of the first partition element as d1. We have d1 + d2 + ...+ dN = 1. This implies
N × dN + 2(b1 + b2 + 2b1λ2 + 2b2λ1)
1 + λ1 + λ2
× N(N − 1)
2
= 1
N is solvable in terms of dN and all parameters. Since dN > 0,
N ≤ NM = 〈1
2
+
[(b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2)× (b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2 + 4(1 + λ1 + λ2))] 12
b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2
〉
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Take partial derivatives with respect to b1 and λ1(the marginal effect with respect to b2 and λ2 are
in the same spirit) we get the following results:
∂NM
∂b1
= − 2(1 + λ1 + λ2)(1 + 2λ2)
Λ[Λ(Λ + 4(1 + λ1 + λ2))]
1
2
< 0
where Λ = b1 + b2 + 2b2λ1 + 2b1λ2 > 0
∂NM
∂λ1
=
2(b1 − b2)(1 + 2λ2)
Λ[Λ(Λ + 4(1 + λ1 + λ2))]
1
2
Hence ∂NM∂λ1 < 0 if b1 < b2 while > 0 b1 > b2.
1.8.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the subspace (1+2λ2)b1+(1+2λ1)b21+λ1+λ2 =  where  is arbitrarily small. As  → 0, from
Corollary 3 we have:
NM =
1
2
+
[(1 + λ1 + λ2)((1 + λ1 + λ2) + 4(1 + λ1 + λ2))]
1
2
2(1 + λ1 + λ2)
=
1
2
+
√
2 + 4
2
Applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule we have:
lim
→0
NM =
1
2
+ lim
→0
2(+ 2)√
2 + 4
Therefore, as → 0, NM →∞.
1.8.1.5 Proof of Observation 1
We prove this result by first considering a two-by-two partition equilibrium. As shown in the
following figure, suppose the agent adopts the following strategy: sending message m1 if t ∈ [0, t1]
and message n1 if t ∈ [t1, 1] to Principal 1, while sending m2 if t ∈ [0, t2] and n2 if t ∈ [t2, 1]
to Principal 2. Denote Principal 1’s two induced actions aˆ1 and a˜1 and Principal 2’ two induced
actions aˆ2 and a˜2. Since the communication is private between the agent and one principal on each
side, it is not necessarily t1 = t2. Without loss of generality, we look into the case where t1 ≤ t2.
The agent’s incentive compatibility constraints under private communication involve the following
three conditions:
- For the boundary type t1 (fix the boundary type t2) to be indifferent between the induced action
pairs (aˆ1, aˆ2) and (a˜1, aˆ2), t1 solves the following equation
−`1(|aˆ1 − t1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|) = −`1(|a˜1 − t1|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t1|) (1.2)
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Figure 1.6: A Two-by-Two Partition Equilibrium under Private Communication
which implies −`1(|aˆ1−t1|) ≥ −`1(|aˆ1−t′1|), ∀t′1 > t1 and −`1(|a˜1−t1|) ≥ −`1(|a˜1−t′1|),∀t′1 < t1.
- For the boundary type t2 (fix the boundary type t1) to be indifferent between the induced action
pairs (a˜1, aˆ2) and (a˜1, a˜2)
−`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t2|) = −`1(|a˜1 − t2|)− `2(|aˆ2 − t2|) (1.3)
which implies −`2(|aˆ2−t2|) ≥ −`2(|aˆ2−t′2|), ∀t′2 > t2 and −`2(|a˜2−t2|) ≥ −`2(|a˜2−t′2|),∀t′2 < t2
- For all t′1 ∈ [0, 1] and t′2 ∈ [0, 1], the agent’s expected utility is the highest when she chooses the
two boundary types as t1 and t2 and induces aˆ1 and a˜1 from Principal 1 and aˆ2 and a˜2 from
Principal 2.
EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) ≥ EUSPRI(t′1, t′2; b1, b2),∀t′1, t′2 ∈ [0, 1] (1.4)
where EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) =
∫ t1
0 −`1(|aˆ1− t|)− `2(|aˆ2− t|)dt+
∫ t2
t1
−`1(|a˜1− t|)− `2(|aˆ2− t|)dt+∫ 1
t2
−`1(|a˜1 − t|)− `2(|a˜2 − t|)dt
In contrast, under public communication in any two-step partition equilibrium, the agent have
boundary type t¯ ∈ [0, 1] and principals have two induced pairs of actions (a1, a2) and (a11, a22)
which solves:
max
ai
∫ t¯
0
−Li(|ai − t− bi|)− Λi(|a1 − a2|)dt
max
aii
∫ 1
t¯
−Li(|aii − t− bi|)− Λi(|a11 − a22|)dt
So the agent’s incentive compatibility for boundary type t¯ requires:
−`1(|a1 − t¯|)− `2(|a2 − t¯|) = −`1(|a11 − t¯|)− `2(|a22 − t¯|)
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when this one condition holds, the global incentive compatibility constraint EUSPUB(t¯; b1, b2) ≥
EUSPUB(t
′; b1, b2), ∀t′ ∈ [0, 1] is always satisfied, as proved in the proof of proposition 2. So under
public communication the incentive compatibility constraints for the agent are less tighter. Thus
we prove the first part of this observation.
Now we move to the second part of the observation. In a cheap talk game without inter-
dependent principals’ actions (Goltsman and Pavlov (Goltsman and Pavlov 2011)), under pri-
vate communication the principals’ best response functions don’t have interacting terms. Namely,
aˆ1 = aˆ1(t1, b1), a˜1 = a˜1(t1, b1) and aˆ2 = aˆ2(t2, b2), a˜2 = a˜2(t2, b2). This helps us to reduce Equation
1.4 to
EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) =
∫ t1
0
−`1(|aˆ1(t1, b1)− t|)dt+
∫ 1
t1
−`1(|a˜1(t1, b1)− t|)dt
+
∫ t2
0
−`2(|aˆ2(t2, b2)− t|)dt+
∫ 1
t2
−`2(|a˜2(t2, b2)− t|)dt
≥ EUSPRI(t′1, t′2; b1, b2) =
∫ t′1
0
−`1(|aˆ1(t′1, b1)− t|) +
∫ 1
t′1
−`1(|a˜1(t′1, b1)− t|)dt
+
∫ t′2
0
−`2(|aˆ2(t′2, b2)− t|)dt+
∫ 1
t′2
−`2(|a˜2(t′2, b2)− t|)dt
as long as the boundary types t1 and t2 solves equations 1.2 and 1.3, the above inequality always
holds. That is, in a cheap talk game without interacting principals, incentive compatibility condi-
tions 1.2 and 1.3 implies condition 1.4. Therefore it suffices check the first two conditions for the
private communication.
In our model with principals’ interacting actions, however, checking only conditions 1.2 and 1.3
is not sufficient. To see this, notice that the principals’ best response functions are interdependent:
aˆ1 = max
a1
∫ t1
0
−L1(|a1 − t− b1|)− Λ1(|a1 − a2|)dt
a˜1 = max
a1
∫ 1
t1
−L1(|a1 − t− b1|)− Λ1(|a1 − E(a2)|)dt
aˆ2 = max
a2
∫ t2
0
−L2(|a2 − t− b2|)− Λ2(|E(a1)− a2|)dt
a˜2 = max
a2
∫ 1
t2
−L2(|a2 − t− b2|)− Λ2(|a1 − a2|)dt
where the values of a2 (a1) and E(a2) (E(a1)) depend on t2, b2 (t1, b1). Therefore we have
aˆ1 = aˆ1(t1, t2, b1, b2), a˜1 = a˜1(t1, t2, b1, b2)
aˆ2 = aˆ2(t1, t2, b1, b2), a˜2 = a˜2(t1, t2, b1, b2)
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Therefore the agent’s expected utility from deviating to having boundary type t′1, t′2 is
EUSPRI(t
′
1, t
′
2; b1, b2) =
∫ t′1
0
−`1(|aˆ1(t′1, t′2, b1, b2)− t|) +
∫ 1
t′1
−`1(|a˜1(t′1, t′2, b1, b2)− t|)dt
+
∫ t′2
0
−`2(|aˆ2(t′1, t′2, b1, b2)− t|)dt+
∫ 1
t′2
−`2(|a˜2(t′1, t′2, b1, b2)− t|)dt
which is not necessarily less than or equal to EUSPRI(t1, t2; b1, b2) merely under condition 1.2 and
1.3. In this case the incentive compatibility condition 1.4 is also binding. Therefore compared with
Goltsman and Pavlov (2011), the agent faces tighter constraints under private communication in
our model.
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2.0 BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH MULTIPLE RECEIVERS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In many social or economic situations, a group of decision-makers receives advice from an
informed agent. Examples include financial consulting, product advertising, and lobbying1. All
these cases involve a biased agent: she wants the decision-makers to take the same action regardless
of the state of the world. To attenuate the decision-makers’ information disadvantage, in reality
the agent’s behavior is subject to certain restrictions. Not only is she prohibited from mis-reporting
whatever information she has, but she also has to truthfully reveal the investigation process that
leads her to discover the information. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) examine the case between
one self-interested agent (“sender” thereafter) and one decision-maker (“receiver” thereafter). They
show, despite her state-independent preference, that the sender can always be strictly better off
than no persuasion by committing to a persuasion mechanism that provides noisy signals to the
receivers. They also point out that this result does not easily extend to a multiple-receiver situation
in which the receivers care about each other’s decisions2.
This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in multiple-receivers’ collective deci-
sions. We answer Kamenica and Gentzkow’s open question: the persuasion environment matters to
a great extent for the attainability of the sender’s optimal payoffs. We compare public persuasion
with private persuasion. In the former environment all receivers observe the sender’s choice of the
mechanism and the generated signals simultaneously. In the latter environment only the sender’s
mechanism is commonly known; each receiver gets a separate signal draw. We show, under public
1DellaVigna and Gentzkow’s (2009) survey summarizes empirical studies on persuasion. Examples includes but
not limited to persuading consumer of merchandise, persuading voters before elections, persuading donors to NPOs
or charities, or persuading investors on financial markets. This survey also discusses persuader’s incentives and
roles, such as advertisers’, financial analysts’, and the Media’s. Some persuasion channels are public while others
are private; for instance, newspaper advertisements are to target all ages while propaganda through internet mainly
attracts young citizens.
2See Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) section 7.2.
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persuasion, that the sender can always achieve the concave closure of the set of expected payoffs,
no matter how many signals are drawn or what correlation structure they have. Under private
persuasion the sender’s payoff declines. From the sender’s perspective a combination of both types
of persuasion is also worse than a pure public one. In fact, any persuasion channel into which
some private elements are introduced yields the sender less than her optimal payoff. For instance,
a lobbyist might be better off if she holds a public meeting with all the legislators instead of ap-
proaching them privately. A salesman might benefit more if she makes a public disclosure about
the product’s quality to all consumers instead of persuading each of them separately3.
We compare our results to Farrell and Gibbons (1989), the first discussion about public versus
private information transmission. They show that whenever there exists an equilibrium in which
the sender communicates informatively under private communication, there is an equilibrium under
public communication in which the sender does the same. But the reverse is never true. We find,
on the contrary, that private persuasion is always more informative than its public counterpart. If
the signals are informative under public persuasion, the sender’s optimal mechanism will generate
more precise signals under private persuasion. Furthermore, Farrell and Gibbons (1989) does not
have sharp welfare implications for the sender. We show, in contrast to their result, that the sender
always gets a higher expected payoff under public persuasion. Moreover, this “higher payoff” is
indeed the highest among all possible payoffs. It is also worth noting that private persuasion still
yields the sender strictly positive payoff as compared to the one without persuasion, though the
payoff level no longer reaches the upper bound of the set of all possible payoffs.
The key difference between two types of persuasion lies in their different impacts on receivers’
beliefs. Signals from public persuasion lead to common belief about the unknown state of the
world for all receivers; but signals from private persuasion do not. Thus similar to Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), under public persuasion the sender can appropriately choose a state-dependent
persuasion mechanism to manipulate these posterior beliefs. The mechanism generates noisy signals
so that the posterior belief upon a “favorable” signal realization is just above the threshold doubt
of a voting-pivot receiver4. Nevertheless, under private persuasion manipulating the receivers’
posterior beliefs becomes more difficult for the sender. Each receiver forms his posterior belief
not only according to his private signal, but also conditional on his vote being decisive. In such a
3One may argue that it increases the sender’s cost to prepare different information packages for different people.
However, we show that even without the additional cost in approaching the receivers separately, the sender still
strictly prefers public persuasion.
4The receivers’ votes are aggregated through a q-rule. As we shall show later, our results are robust to any q-rule,
including majority, supermajority, and unanimity voting.
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situation the sender’s choice of the mechanism is subject to (1) the uncertainty of the distribution of
all generated signals, and (2) belief interactions inherited in the receivers’ strategic voting behavior.
The result that the sender benefits more from public persuasion is robust to the number of
signals and the signals’ correlation structure. The driving force underlying the welfare differences
is not due to the number of trials. For example, the receivers may ask for N independent signal
draws under public persuasion instead of only one. We show that the sender’s payoff does not
decrease to her payoff level under private persuasion, though the number of signals equals the one
in a private environment. The reason is that the sender will adopt a different mechanism if she
knows that multiple trials will be examined. Multiple trials are more likely to help the receivers to
discover the true state, including the sender’s least-favored state; sender’s optimal mechanism thus
becomes much less informative to offset the increased probability incurred by those unfavorable
signals.
Finally, we demonstrate that the receivers’ decision quality remains the same under public
persuasion, regardless of the signals’ structures. For instance, drawing N independent signals does
not make the receivers better off. As discussed above, each signal becomes much less informative
in this situation. This is because the receivers form the same posterior beliefs as long as the
persuasion environment remains public. Thus the beliefs are under direct control of the sender by
her appropriately choosing a signal-generating mechanism. In contrast, the sender’s mechanism
generates much more informative signals under private persuasion than under public persuasion.
As a result, the receivers make better decisions under private persuasion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model, strategies,
and equilibrium concept. Section 2.3 compares the informativeness of the optimal mechanism
under public persuasion with that under private persuasion, respectively. Section 2.4 presents the
sender’s and the receivers’ welfare rankings over the two types of persuasion. Section 2.4.1.1 and
2.4.1.2 shows that the sender achieves the same level of expected payoffs under public persuasion,
irrespective of the number of draws or the signals’ correlation structure. And this level of expected
payoffs are higher under public persuasion than that under private persuasion. Section 2.4.1.3
provides a stronger result that the sender does not only get “higher” expected payoffs under public
persuasion; in fact the payoff under public persuasion serves as an upper bound for the sender’s
possible payoffs from any type of persuasion. Section 2.4.2 demonstrates that the receivers are
better off under private persuasion; and drawing multiple signal draws under public persuasion
fails to help them to reduce decision errors. Section 2.5 discusses two extensions of the model.
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Section 2.6 provides detailed discussion on related literature, including literature on persuasion
games and voting. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 MODEL
2.2.1 Setup
We analyze a Bayesian persuasion model with one sender (“she”) and n receivers (“he”). Play-
ers’ payoffs depend on the state of the world t ∈ T = {α, β}, and and the receivers’ collective
decision. We assume the common prior probability distribution over T are: prob(α) = p,prob(β) =
1 − p, where p ∈ [0, 1]. The collective decision is determined by voting, with alternatives denoted
by {A,B}. Each receiver i casts a vote vi ∈ {A,B}. Votes are aggregated by q-rule, which
characterizes the minimum number of votes m ∈ {1, ..., n} needed to implement alternative B5:
v(v1, ..., vn;m) =
 B, if |{j : vi = B}| ≥ m;A, otherwise.
Let uS(v, t) and uRi (v, t), i = 1, ..., n denote the utility that the sender and each receiver derive from
the implementation of the collective decision v in state t, respectively. We assume the sender’s utility
is state-independent:
uS(B, t) > uS(A, t), ∀t ∈ T
which means the sender always prefers alternative B to be implemented irrespective of the state t.
The receivers, on the other hand, have state-dependent utilities.
uRi (B, β) > u
R
i (A, β), u
R
i (A,α) > u
R
i (B,α),∀i = 1, ..., n
Receiver i prefers alternative A in state α and B in state β. And we allow heterogeneous preferences
for different receivers, who might derive different levels of utility from each of the implemented
alternatives, and assign different levels of utility loss to incorrect decisions. Namely, given the state
t and final decision v, uRj (v, t) 6= uRi (v, t), for j 6= i. Notice that all players’ payoff structures are
common knowledge; nevertheless, the receivers do not observe the true state of the world.
5We discuss all possible q-rules, where q = m
n
, including simple majority (m = n+1
2
), super-majority (n+1
2
< m <
n), and unanimity (m=n). Notice that under the q-rule, final decision is A if and only if at least n−m+ 1 receivers
vote for A. A receiver consider others’ votes to be a tie when there are m− 1 votes for B and n−m votes for A
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The timing of the game is as follows. The sender sets up a signal-generating mechanism,
which consists of a family of conditional distributions {pi(·|t)}t∈T over a space of signal realizations
S = {a, b}6. The receivers get informed of {pi(·|t)}t∈T . Then Nature determines the true state t,
which is privately observed by the sender. The sender applies the conditional distribution in state
t to generate noisy signal(s) and truthfully reveals the generated signal(s) to the receivers. Upon
observing the signal(s), receivers cast votes simultaneously and the final decision is determined by
a q-rule specified above. The timeline of the game is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The Timeline of the Game
Note that different from traditional persuasion-game models, the sender does not have direct
control over what the receivers might observe; instead, she tries to influence the receivers’ decision
by setting up a signal-generating mechanism. This can be interpreted as the revelation of the
whole investigation process, such as conducting experiments, performing data analysis, or inter-
viewing witnesses. Both the investigation process being employed and the evidence emerged are
communicated to the decision-makers truthfully.
We compare the impacts of the sender’s persuasion in two different institutions. Specifically,
we are interested in the channel through which the generated signal realization(s) are transmitted,
once the persuasion mechanism is established. We investigate two types of persuasion:
- Public persuasion: the sender’s choice of {pi(·|t)}t∈T is commonly known to all receivers. The
generated signal realization s ∈ S, is also public information. All receivers observe the same
signal.
- Private persuasion: the sender’s choice of {pi(·|t)}t∈T is commonly known to all receivers. The
signal realizations, drawn from the mechanism independently, are observed by each receiver
separately and privately. A receiver will observe either s = a or s = b, but not both.
6Notice that the sender chooses this set of conditional distributions before she observes the true state. We
generalize the signal realization space to S = [0, 1] in Section 2.5.
42
2.2.2 Strategies and Equilibrium
This section specifies each player’s strategy and the receivers’ beliefs upon being informed of
the signal-generating mechanism and observing the signal realization.
- The sender’s strategy is to choose a family of conditional distributions {pi(·|t)}t∈T from F =
{{pi(·|t)}t∈T |pi : T → ∆S}, each element of which is a mapping from the state space to the
simplex over the signal realization space.
- Each receiver’s strategy, σi : F×S → ∆{A,B}, is a mapping from the Cartesian product of the
collection of conditional distributions and the signal realization space to a simplex over voting
alternatives7.
- Each receiver’s belief, µi : F × S → ∆T, i = 1, ..., n, is a mapping from the Cartesian product
of the collection of conditional distributions and the signal realization space to a simplex over
the state space.
Similar to in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we adopt subgame perfect equilibrium as the
equilibrium notion here:
Definition 2. A subgame perfect equilibrium of the multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion model is a
strategy profile ((pi∗(·|α), pi∗(·|β)), σ∗1, ..., σ∗n) such that
- Given (σ∗1, ..., σ∗n), ∀t ∈ T , (pi∗(·|α), pi∗(·|β)) is the maximizer of EUS(v, t)
- Given the sender’s choice of (pi∗(·|α), pi∗(·|β)),
- Each receiver’s vote, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},∀s ∈ S, σ∗i (pi∗(·|t), s) = arg maxvi Eµ∗i (URi (v, t)), where
v is aggregated from vi, i = 1, ..., n via a q-rule
- The receivers’ posterior beliefs, µ∗i (t|s) = pi(s|t)p(t)∑
t′∈T pi(s|t′)p(t′) , where p(t) denotes the common
prior over T
We assume that a receiver votes for B when he is indifferent between the two alternatives under
the measure of his posterior belief µi. Thus with a binary signal realization space we can restrict
our attention to pure strategy voting profile (v∗1, ..., v∗n). More discussion about the voting behavior
when space S is continuous is in Section 2.5.
7It is worth noting that the strategy space in our setting is different from the one(s) in cheap-talk games (Crawford
and Sobel (1982), Green and Stokey (2007)). In the latter, the sender also chooses a family of signalling rules, which
specifies a probability distribution over the message space in each state. The key difference is that in cheap-talk
models the receiver(s) only observes the realized message(s), not the sender’s choice of the family of signalling rules;
whereas in our model the receivers observe both.
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2.2.3 Preliminaries
This section provides preliminary analysis for the receivers’ and the sender’s problems, respec-
tively. Two assumptions are specified before we proceed to the equilibrium characterization. One
is on the receivers’ collective preferences; the other is the monotone likelihood ratio property of the
sender’s signal-generating mechanism.
First, we simplify a receiver’s problem under the measure of his posterior belief µi. Denote his
posterior beliefs µαi , µ
β
i for a given s induced by {pi(·|t)}t∈T . This receiver’s expected payoffs from
voting for each of the alternatives are:
B : µβi · ui(B, β) + µαi · ui(B,α)
A : µβi · ui(A, β) + µαi · ui(A,α)
where µβi + µ
α
i = 1 given s. Thus this receiver votes for B if and only if
µβi ≥
ui(A,α)− ui(B,α)
ui(A,α) + ui(B, β)− ui(B,α)− ui(A, β)
.
= qi
We define, for receiver i, a threshold doubt qi as a threshold value for the posterior belief above
which this receiver will vote for B. We write the order statistics of the receivers’ threshold doubts
as q1 ≤ ... ≤ qn and relabel the corresponding receivers as R1, ..., Rn.
As assumed above, the sender prefers B to be implemented regardless of the state t. To
demonstrate the sender’s net benefit from either type of persuasion, we focus on the more interesting
scenario in which the receivers’ collective decision without the sender’s persuasion is always v = A.
It means that at least n −m + 1 receivers’ threshold doubts are sufficiently high such that they
would always vote for A based on their common prior. Formally, we assume:
Assumption 1. Without the sender’s persuasion, if the receivers were to cast a vote based on the
common prior probability distribution over T , there will be less than m votes for option B, i.e.
(1− p) · ui(A, β) + p · ui(A,α) ≥ (1− p) · ui(B, β) + p · ui(B,α), i ∈ {m,m+ 1, ..., n}
This is equivalent to a more convenient notation, qi ≥ 1− p, for all m ≤ i ≤ n. We call A the
receivers’ default collective choice.
Next, we simplify the sender’s problem. The sender derive utilities from each of the final decision
v ∈ {A,B} as:
EUS = uS(B, t) · Prob(v = B) + uS(A, t) · Prob(v = A),∀t ∈ T
44
where Prob(v = A) = 1 − Prob(v = B) for each t. Thus the sender’s problem reduces to choose
{pi(·|t)}t∈T to maximize the probability that the voting outcome is B, since:
max
{pi(·|t)}t∈T
EUS = uS(A, t) + (uS(B, t)− uS(A, t)) · Prob(v = B), ∀t ∈ T (2.1)
where all other terms besides Prob(v = B) are constant. Note that the voting rule and Assumption
1 implies that this event occurs only when at least m receivers are persuaded to change their vote
to the non-default alternative B.
The following assumption restricts our attention to a specific family of signal-generating mech-
anisms:
Assumption 2. The signal-generating mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T satisfies Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property if
pi(s|t)
pi(s|t′) >
pi(s′|t)
pi(s′|t′)
for every s > s′ and t > t′8.
With a binary state space T = {α, β}, the sender’s choice of a family of conditional distributions
{pi(·|t)}t∈T is equivalent to finding densities (pi(s|α), pi(s|β)). Assumption 2 implies the CDF Π(·|β)
first order stochastic dominates Π(s|α), i.e. Π(s|β) < Π(s|α), ∀s ∈ S9. Note that this assumption is
not particularly restrictive: for any persuasion mechanism that does not satisfy MLRP, there exists
another mechanism which satisfies the MLRP property and is outcome equivalent to the former.
Before proceeding to the main results of the paper, we have two remarks on the model setup.
First, it does not matter whether the sender first chooses the investigation or Nature determines
the true state, as long as the investigation process is truthfully revealed to the receivers and is
verifiable ex-post. The sender’s investigation specifies a family of conditional distributions over
all possible states. Second, it is crucial that the investigation is reported to the receivers and is
verifiable ex-post. The model reduces to a cheap-talk framework if the receivers only observe the
generated signals but can never discover the signal-generating mechanism. In that case the sender
would adopt a mechanism that would generate signal s = b with probability 1 in both states and
the receivers would rationally ignore any signal observation in equilibrium.
8The notion adopted here is strictly monotone likelihood ratio with the strict inequality held. Notice that a
mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T with pi(s|t)pi(s|t′) = pi(s
′|t)
pi(s′|t′) generates each signal s ∈ S with the same probability in every state. It
can be easily show that the receivers vote according to the prior probability distribution in this case.
9A brief proof is included in Appendix 2.8.1. And we will discuss the equilibrium characterization under this
property more extensively in Section 2.5.
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2.3 EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION: PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE
PERSUASION
In this section we first discuss the receivers’ voting behavior upon observing signal realizations,
taking the sender’s persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T as fixed. Then we characterize the equilibrium
of the persuasion game under public and private persuasion, respectively. Specifically, we compare
the precision of signals generated by the sender’s optimal mechanism under both types of persuasion.
2.3.1 Receivers’ Voting Behavior
The receivers’ voting behavior is described in terms of the threshold doubt qi. Receiver i
compares his posterior belief µi with qi as shown in Section 2.2.3. We first define two terms that
help us describe the voting strategies below.
Definition 3. A receiver votes sincerely when he maximizes expected payoff conditional on his own
signal observation only.
Definition 4. A receiver’s vote is informative if his vote changes according to his own signal
observation.
Under Assumption 2, informative voting is equivalent to receiver i voting for B upon observing
s = b and voting for A upon observing s = a. We call a voting strategy uninformative if this
receiver always votes for B (or A) regardless of the signal realization.
Lemma 1. Under public persuasion, if Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then given any persuasion mech-
anism {pi(·|t)}t∈T the sender has chosen:
- Every receiver votes sincerely; and
- There exists a cutoff value q¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that all receiver j’s with threshold doubt qj ∈ [q¯, 1]
votes for A irrespective of his signal observation
The proof of this lemma is included in the Appendix. The first statement is obvious. Under
public persuasion all receivers have the same signal observation. So everybody casts vote conditional
on his own observation. The second statement indicates that there are always a portion of the
receivers whose threshold doubts are too large to be convinced by a signal realization s = b. So
these receivers will always vote for A regardless of the signal observation generated by the persuasion
mechanism. Note that if the number of these receivers exceeds n−m, the final decision will remain
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as the default A. Thus the sender has to appropriately choose the signal-generating mechanism so
as to convince at least m receivers to vote informatively, as we shall show in the next section.
Next, we describe the receivers’ voting behavior under private persuasion, when each of them
observes independent signals draw separately. Sincere voting is no longer optimal. A rational
receiver updates his posterior belief not only according to his own signal observation, but also
according to the distribution of other receivers’ observations. We define the following:
Definition 5. A receiver votes strategically when he maximizes expected payoff conditional on his
own observation and the event in which his vote is pivotal.
Note that one’s vote being pivotal is the only situation in which his vote will ever affect the voting
outcome and his utility. Thus a receiver will infer the distribution of other receivers’ observations
from the event that his vote is pivotal and cast vote optimally. Denote γ(k, r) the receiver’s posterior
belief µβi when k out of r signals are s = b:
γ(k, r) =
(1− p)(pi(b|β))k(1− pi(b|β))r−k
p(pi(b|α))k(1− pi(b|α)r−k) + (1− p)(pi(b|β))k(1− pi(b|β))r−k
We have the following result:
Lemma 2. Under private persuasion, fix any persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T the sender has
chosen. When each receiver votes strategically, there exists 0 ≤ qk ≤ qr ≤ 1 such that
- A receiver i with threshold doubt qi ∈ [0, qk] votes for B irrespective of his signal realization
- A receiver i with threshold doubt qi ∈ [qk, qr] votes informatively
- A receiver i with threshold doubt qi ∈ [qr, 1] votes for A irrespective of his signal realization
And the two cutoff values satisfy
γ(m− k − 1, r − k) ≤ qk ≤ γ(m− k, r − k + 1) ≤ qr ≤ γ(m− k, r − k).
The proof of this result is included in the Appendix. Compared to Lemma 1, under private
persuasion each receivers becomes more skeptical when casting his vote. This is because he updates
his posterior belief upon the inferred distribution of signals from all informative-voters, not merely
upon his own signal observation. Upon observing s = a, the event that one’s vote being pivotal
indicates some others’ observing opposite signals s = b; thus µβi , receiver i ’s posterior belief of the
true state being β, increases. On the other hand, upon observing s = b, one’s vote being decisive
affects µβi in a reversed manner: the presence of signals s = a from some other receivers declines
µβi ; thus this receiver i becomes more “skeptical” when casting a vote for B.
47
It is also worth noting that for receivers with heterogeneous preferences, strategic voting does
not imply informative voting; nor vice versa. A receiver who votes uninformatively ignores his
private signal rationally: his vote being decisive suggests that votes from the receivers who vote
informatively constitute a tie. Upon observing either signal, a comparison between his updated
posterior and threshold doubt might still lead to voting for one alternative irrespective of his own
observation.
2.3.2 Informativeness of Sender’s Optimal Mechanisms
2.3.2.1 Public Persuasion
Under public persuasion, all receivers observe the same signal realization. Since nobody has any
private information, the distribution of their votes reveals no additional information regarding the
true state t. Moreover, depending on the value of q¯, only the receivers with threshold doubts qi ≤ q¯
vote informatively. The final decision is B when at least m receivers do so upon observing a signal
realization s = b. Therefore the sender’s problem is to choose (pi(b|α), pi(b|β)) ∈ F to maximize the
probability of the voting outcome being v = B:
max
pi(b|α),pi(b|β)
p · pi(b|α) + (1− p) · pi(b|β) (2.2)
subject to the receivers’ voting behavior described in lemma 1. Then we have the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 4. Under public persuasion, the sender’s optimal persuasion mechanism generates
signal s = b with positive probability in state α and generates signal s = b with probability 1 in state
β, i.e.
pi∗PUB(b|α) =
(1− qm) · (1− p)
qm · p , pi
∗
PUB(b|β) = 1
which holds for all m ≤ n. Moreover, there are at most m receivers who will vote informatively,
i.e. q¯ = qm.
The proof for this result is included in the Appendix. We make two remarks here. First, this
proposition is true for all voting rules m, including majority rule m = (n + 1)/2, super-majority
rule (n + 1)/2 < m < n, and the unanimity rule m = n. Second, under public persuasion there
are n −m receivers who has high threshold doubt voting uninformatively for A. This is because
the sender only needs to convince m receivers to vote for B upon observing an s = b observation.
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Convincing more than m receivers is unnecessary; the sender’s expected payoff will be lower if the
sender produces more precise signals to convince an additional receiver.
2.3.2.2 Private Persuasion
Under private persuasion, the receivers observe independent draws of signal realizations sepa-
rately. Compared to Section 2.3.2.1, both the receivers’ voting behavior and the sender’s problem
change: as described in Section 2.3.1, the receivers take into account the distribution of other re-
ceivers’ private signals as described. A receiver casts a vote according to his own signal observation
as well as the probability of this vote being pivotal, the latter of which is the only event that his
action might affect his utility. Thus each receiver updates posterior belief based on information be-
yond what his own private signal reveals. Consequently, the sender has to incorporate the receivers’
strategic voting into her choice of the mechanism. Formally, the sender chooses (pi(b|α), pi(b|β)) ∈ F
to maximize:
max
pi(b|α),pi(b|β)
p·(
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
(pi(b|α))j(1−pi(b|α))r−k−j)+(1−p)·(
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
(pi(b|β))j(1−pi(b|β))r−k−j)
(2.3)
subject to the receivers’ strategic voting behavior described in lemma 2. Note that the sender’s
problem differs from the one under public persuasion (Equation 2.2) in two aspects: (i) the proba-
bility of generating enough b signal realizations is written as a Binomial distribution function; and
(ii) the maximization problem is constrained by the receiver’s strategic-voting behavior. To better
explain out result, we first discuss an intermediate case which only involves aspect (i) – we suppose
the receivers vote sincerely. Sincere voting is not optimal for the receivers, but the result serves as
a good benchmark as we compare public with private persuasion later on.
Now suppose each receiver observes independent draws of private signal realization and votes
sincerely. The sender still chooses (pi(b|α), pi(b|β)) ∈ F to maximize the probability of the voting
outcome v = B. Nevertheless, she can no longer ensure that all receivers observe the same signal
realization. For example, if the sender adopts a mechanism the same as in Section 2.3.2.1 such
that exact m receivers will vote for B upon getting signal s = b, she will not always get the voting
outcome as v = B upon a b signal: some among these m receivers are very likely to observe an
independent draw s = a instead of s = b. Thus she will be better off by adopting another mechanism
such that more than m receivers, i.e. receivers {R1, ..., Rt}, are willing to vote informatively:
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max
pi(b|α),pi(b|β)
p · (
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
(pi(b|α))j(1− pi(b|α))t−j) + (1− p) · (
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
(pi(b|β))j(1− pi(b|β))t−j)
subject to
y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) ≥ qt
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
Then we have the following observation10:
Observation 4. Under private persuasion, when all receivers vote sincerely, the sender’s optimal
persuasion mechanism generates signals with probabilities:
piSIN(b|α) = (1− qt) · (1− p)
qt · p , piSIN(b|β) = 1
where q¯ = qt ≥ qm. There are less than n−m receivers who vote uninformatively for A. Moreover,
this result holds for any voting rule m.
The proof of this observation is in the Appendix. It says that under private persuasion the sender
will choose the conditional distributions {pi(·|t)}t∈T to convince t receivers, where m ≤ t ≤ n, to
vote for B upon observing a private signal s = b, if she knows that the receivers are going to vote
sincerely. The intuition is that the sender does so to compensate the loss in probability when some
receivers observe a signal s = a instead of s = b, an event unfavorable to the sender. Moreover, the
probability that a “wrong” signal is generated is lower under private persuasion than under public
persuasion, i.e. piSIN(b|α) ≤ pi∗PUB(b|α) since qt ≥ qm. In other words, under private persuasion,
the optimal mechanism generates signal with higher precision in the state where the sender’s and
the receivers’ interests are mis-aligned.
Now we move to solve the sender’s maximization problem with rational voting behavior under
private persuasion. We have the following result:
Proposition 5. Under private persuasion with any voting rules m ≤ n, when all receivers vote
strategically, the sender’s optimal persuasion mechanism generates signal realizations with proba-
bility pi∗PRI(b|α), pi∗PRI(b|β) that satisfy:
pi∗PRI(b|α) < piSIN(b|α), pi∗PRI(b|β) ≤ 1
The proof of this proposition is included in the Appendix. The first inequality shows that
the probability that the optimal mechanism generates a “wrong” signal in state α is lower when
10As mentioned in section 2.3.1, sincere voting under private persuasion is not rational. Thus we write this result
as an Observation, not a Proposition. And we do not attach ∗ to the sender’s persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T .
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receivers behave strategically. This is a positive effect of the receivers’ pivotal voting: inferring
others’ information from their votes makes a receiver more skeptical. Thus it forces the sender to
reduce the probability of a “wrong” signal being generated. The second inequality, on the other
hand, indicates that the optimal mechanism no longer generates signal s = b with probability 1 even
in the state with perfect interests alignment. This is from negative effect of the receivers’ strategic
interaction: some receivers are too skeptical to believe in their own signal observations. All in all,
the inferred distribution of others’ observations might not coincide with the real distribution of all
signal realizations.
2.3.2.3 Comparison between the Two Institutions
This section compares the sender’s optimal mechanism under public persuasion with the one
under private information. We use the term informativeness to represent the probability that the
signal representing the true state is generated in that state. Summarizing the results in Section
2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For all voting rules m ≤ n, in equilibrium the informativeness of the persuasion
mechanism satisfies:
pi∗PRI(a|α) > pi∗PUB(a|α)
pi∗PRI(b|β) ≤ pi∗PUB(b|β) = 1
This result shows that, in state α where players’ interests are mis-aligned, the informativeness
of the sender’s optimal mechanism is higher under private persuasion than that under public per-
suasion. On the other side, in state β, the mechanism generates a favorable signal s = b with
probability 1 under public persuasion, but with a probability less than 1 under private persuasion
when the receivers voting strategically. In other words, the mechanism generate an unfavorable
signal s = a with positive probability even in the state where the players’ interests are perfectly
aligned.
These key differences result from differences in the sender’s tradeoffs under each type of per-
suasion. Since less than m receivers would vote for alternative A based on the common prior,
the sender adopts a mechanism such that more receivers will be convinced to vote informatively,
i.e. vote for B instead of A upon observing a favorable signal s = b. Under public persuasion,
the sender adjusts the precision of the signals so as to convince at least m receivers to vote for B
upon observing s = b. But convincing more receivers with higher threshold doubts requires higher
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information precision in state α. This in turn increases the probability that the receivers discover
the true state; thus the sender’s benefit from the persuasion declines. We call this the information
precision effect. Under private persuasion, the sender faces two additional tradeoffs: first, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.2.2, increasing the information precision and convincing more receivers with
higher threshold doubts compensates the sender for the loss from the uncertainty associated with
separate signal draws. The probability of observing at least m favorable signals out of a total of
m+j independent draws is always greater than the one of observing m such signals out of exactly m
independent draws. This probability increment effect is irrelevant under public persuasion; yet
it exists under private persuasion, no matter the receivers vote sincerely or strategically. Second,
under private persuasion with strategic-voting receivers, as shown in lemma 2 and proposition 5,
convincing more receivers to vote informatively provides them with additional information on the
distribution of others’ private signals. This makes each receiver more skeptical than if he were to
vote sincerely. With one’s own observation fixed, a receivers’ posterior belief µβi decreases when
there is one more receiver who votes informatively, i.e. conditional on one’s vote being pivotal,
γ(m, r) > γ(m, r + 1). We call it pivotal-voting effect.Eventually it forces the sender to choose
pi∗PRI(b|β) ≤ 1.
It is also worth noting that the follow corollary holds in equilibrium under both public and
private persuasion.
Corollary 3. Under both public and private persuasion there is no equilibrium in which all receivers
vote uninformatively.
This corollary excludes two cases in any subgame perfect equilibrium: first, eliminating dom-
inated strategies excludes the case in which all receivers ignore their observations and vote for
B uninformatively. Second, nor is it possible that all receivers vote for A irrespective of signal
observations in equilibrium. Under either type of persuasion, the sender optimally chooses the
signal-generating mechanism such that at least a portion of the receivers cast their votes based on
relevant information generated by the mechanism.
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2.4 WELFARE EFFECTS
2.4.1 Sender’s Benefit from the Persuasion
In this section we first compare the sender’s benefit from public persuasion with that from
private persuasion. Then we demonstrate that the sender’s welfare ranking is robust to the number
of signal draws. Last, we show a stronger and more general result that the sender can achieve the
upper bound of the set of her expected payoffs under public persuasion, regardless of the number
of signal draws or the signals’ correlated structure.
2.4.1.1 Comparing Sender’s Expected Payoffs: Public versus Private Persuasion
The sender’s expected utility from either type of persuasion is represented by Equation 2.1.
Maximizing her expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the summed probability of reaching
her preferred decision in each state, as described by the sender’s objective functions in Section 2.3.2.1
and 2.3.2.2. Given the sender’s optimal choice of the persuasion mechanism (pi∗(·|α), pi∗(·|β)) under
each type of persuasion, we have the following comparison result:
Proposition 6. The sender’s optimal mechanisms under public persuasion and under private per-
suasion yield the sender different levels of expected utilities:
EUSPRI < EU
S
PUB
The proof of this result is included in the Appendix. It shows that the sender’s expected utility
is higher under public persuasion and lower under private persuasion. Moreover, the latter term is
strictly greater than the sender’s utility when there is no persuasion and all receivers vote based
on the common prior, i.e. EUSPRI > u
S(A, t) since ProbPRI(v = B) > 0. Comparison between
the probability Prob(v = B)’s with no persuasion, public persuasion, and private persuasion as a
function of the common prior p is shown in the left part of Figure 2.2.
In short, compared to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the sender benefits from persuasion;
but but the benefit is smaller under private persuasion. This result describes the sender’s “cost”
of communicating in a private environment: the receivers’ strategic interactions in equilibrium
reveal extra information about each others’ private signals beyond what the sender’s mechanism
has transmitted. On the other hand, under public persuasion the same signal is observed by all
receivers simultaneously. The receivers, at best, can make use of what the sender’s mechanism has
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Parameter values: n = 60,m = 31 (majority rule), q′(·) > 0.
Figure 2.2: The sender’s expected utility as a function of p
generated and transmitted. So public persuasion helps the sender achieve a higher level of expected
utility.
2.4.1.2 Multiple Draws of Signals under Public Persuasion
In this section we address a potential problem associated with the above comparison between
persuasion environments: under public persuasion the sender sets up a mechanism to generate one
signal realization, whereas under private persuasion the sender chooses a mechanism to generate n
independent signal realizations for n receivers. Now we demonstrate that the comparison result is
robust to the number of signal draws.
Consider the institution which requires the sender to choose a mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T to draw n
independent signal realizations; all receivers observe these realizations publicly. Despite the number
of trials, all other elements of the game remain unchanged. Same as the public persuasion with one
signal draw, receivers hold common posterior belief. Denote γ(`, n) the posterior belief µb when
there are ` signals s = b out of all n signals. Assumption 2 implies that γ(`− 1, n) < γ(`, n), ∀` ∈
{1, ..., n}. A receiver i with threshold doubt qi will vote for B when there are more than ` favorable
signals (s = b) out of all n signals if and only if γ(`− 1, n) < qi < γ(`, n).
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The sender chooses a mechanism such that at least m receivers will vote for B upon observing
more than a threshold number (ˆ`) of favorable signals, i.e. γ(`, n) ≤ qm ≤ γ(`+ 1, n). The sender’s
objective is to maximize the probability that at least ˆ` favorable signals are generated in each state:
max
pi(b|α),pi(b|β)
p ·
n∑
j=`
(pi(b|α))j(1− pi(b|α))n−j
+(1− p) ·
n∑
j=`
(pi(b|β))j(1− pi(b|β))n−j
subject to γ(`, n) ≤ qm ≤ γ(`+ 1, n)
Solving the sender’s problem yields the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Under public persuasion with multiple independent signal draws, the sender’s
optimal mechanism generates signals with probabilities:
pi∗MD(b|α) = n
√
pi∗PUB(b|α), pi∗MD(b|β) = 1
Moreover, the sender’s expected utility is the same as that under public persuasion with a single
signal draw.
EUSMD = EU
S
PUB
The proof of this proposition are included in the Appendix. The first part can also be expressed
as pi∗MD(b|α) = n
√
(1−qm)(1−p)
qmp
= n
√
pi∗PUB(b|α), pi∗MD(b|β) = n
√
pi∗PUB(b|β). Since pi∗PUB(b|α) < 1, we
have pi∗MD(b|α) > pi∗PUB(b|α), which indicates that the optimal mechanism generates “wrong” signals
with higher probability in state α when multiple signals instead of a single one are drawn. In other
words, the signals become much less precise in the state where the players’ interests are mis-aligned.
Moreover, as n → ∞, pi∗MD(b|α) → 1, which means the informativeness of the mechanism drops
drastically as the number of trials grows. When the number of public draws increases towards
the number of independent draws under private persuasion, the signals do not become as precise
as those under private persuasion. Instead, they becomes even vaguer than the one under public
persuasion with a single draw.
The second part of the proposition shows that the sender achieves the same level of expected
utility as she does under public persuasion with a single trial. The reason is that as long as the
persuasion channel remains public, receivers have no private information which might be revealed by
the distribution of their votes in equilibrium. Drawing multiple signals increases the probability of
the receivers observing unfavorable signals (s = a). Therefore, once the sender knows that multiple
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trials would be examined, she will optimally choose a mechanism that generates unfavorable signals
much less frequently.
2.4.1.3 Public Persuasion and The Upper Bound of Sender’s Expected Payoffs
In previous sections we have shown that the sender’s expected utility is higher under public
persuasion. In this section, we present a stronger result: public persuasion helps the sender to
achieve the “highest possible payoff” for any given common prior p. Specifically, we shall drop
Assumption 1 and show that the sender can always attain the concave closure of the set of her
possible payoffs under public persuasion irrespective of the number of signal draws or the signals’
correlated structure.
The following figures illustrate the sender’s sets of possible payoffs as a function of the common
prior p. The blue line in Figure 2.3 represents the sender’s expected payoff without persuasion.
When at least m receivers’ threshold doubts are sufficiently low, i.e. p < 1 − qm, the collective
decision is B even without the persuasion. So the sender gets Prob(v = B) = 1. However, when
p > 1− qm, the sender gets Prob(v = B) = 0 as the probability of getting her preferred alternative
voted. Thus the sender’s expected payoff is discontinuous at p = 1− qm.
Figure 2.3: Sender’s expected payoffs without per-
suasion
Figure 2.4: Sender’s expected payoffs under public
persuasion: the convex hull
The dashed blue line in Figure 2.4 illustrates the sender’s payoff increment under public per-
suasion. To formally establish the result, we first define the concave closure of the graph of EUS
as:
Definition 6. Denote Λ as the concave closure of EUS:
Λ(p)
.
= sup{u : (p, u) ∈ co(EUS)}
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where co(EUS) is the convex hull of the graph of EUS.
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 8. For any voting rule m and any p˜ ∈ [0, 1], under public persuasion the sender
achieves an expected payoff on the concave closure of the set of all possible payoffs, i.e.
EUSPUB(p˜) = Λ(p˜)
Moreover, this result remains unchanged even if the sender is required to draw multiple signal
realizations, or to draw correlated signals.
The proof of this result is included in the Appendix. Compared with the sender’s payoff without
persuasion in Figure 2.3, it is easy to see that with public persuasion, ∀p˜ < 1 − qm, the sender’s
payoffs remain the same; while ∀p˜ > 1−qm, the sender’s expected payoffs lie on the dashed blue line
in Figure 2.4. The probability of getting her preferred voting outcome is Prob(v = B) = 1qm (1− p˜).
In other words, public persuasion helps the sender to achieve the concave closure of the convex hull
of the sender’s set of possible payoffs.
It is also worth noting that the uniqueness of the supremum guarantees the uniqueness of the
sender’s optimal payoff for each given p ∈ [0, 1] under public persuasion. This is also true for
the case in which multiple signal draws are generated, and/or the signals are correlated. This is
because signals under public persuasion always give rise to common belief about the unknown state
of the world. It does not matter whether all receivers observe a single signal draw, or observe a
series of signal draws, or observe a series of correlated signal draws. In this situation the sender can
appropriately choose a state-dependent persuasion mechanism to manipulate the common posterior
beliefs. Her optimal mechanism generates noisy signals so that the posterior belief upon a signal
realization s = b is just above the threshold doubt of receiver-m.
Notice that the concave closure of the convex hull of the payoff set is the highest possible
the sender is able to achieve. As shown in previous sections, adding private element worsens the
sender’s welfare. A combination of public and private persuasion also makes the sender worse off.
2.4.2 Receivers’ Decision Quality
In this section we compare the receivers’ decision quality under public persuasion to that under
private persuasion. Specifically, we compare the summed probabilities of two types of errors, i.e.
Prob(v = B|α) + Prob(v = A|β) as the voting outcome does not match the true state. Note that
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in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the first term is the probability that at least m receivers vote
for B in state α. The second term is the probability that at most m − 1 receivers vote for B in
state β so that the default alternative remains as the voting outcome.
Under public persuasion, the sum of two types of errors equals the probability that the sender’s
mechanism generates a favorable signal (s = b) in state α plus the probability that the mechanism
fails to generate such a signal in state β. Under private persuasion, it equals the probability that the
mechanism generates at least m−k favorable signals for receivers {Rk, ...Rr} who vote informatively
in state α plus the probability that the mechanism generates no more than m − k − 1 favorable
signals for {Rk, ...Rr} in state β.
Moreover, if the receivers are more prone to decision mistakes under public persuasion, a natural
question is whether the decision quality improves when more independent signals are drawn and
observed by all receivers. Particularly, when the number of such independent trials approaches n,
the number of separate draws under private persuasion, will the receivers’ collective decision be as
good as the one under private persuasion? We have the following result:
Proposition 9. The probabilities of the receivers’ decision errors is larger under public persuasion
than that under private persuasion
ψPRI < ψPUB
Moreover, the probability of receivers’ decision errors under public persuasion with multiple signal
draws is the same under public persuasion with a single signal draw.
ψMD = ψPUB
The proof of this result is included in the Appendix. The first part of the proposition shows that
the probability of receivers’ decision errors is higher under public persuasion and lower under private
persuasion. The lower the probability, the higher the decision quality. Note that the sender’s and
the receivers’ interests are perfectly-aligned in state β and completely mis-aligned in state α. From
previous sections we show that public persuasion maximizes the sender’s expected payoffs. In other
words, it maximizes the probability of s = b being generated in both states. Public persuasion
maximizes receivers’ type I error while minimizes their type II error. Nevertheless, in equilibrium
the sender’s optimal mechanism generates more precise signal realizations in the sender’s favorable
state β. Thus the receivers’ gain from public persuasion’s minimizing the type II error does not
compensate the loss from its maximizing the type I error. Therefore, under public persuasion the
receivers suffer from higher error probabilities overall.
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Parameter values: n = 60,m = 31 (majority rule), q′(·) > 0.
Figure 2.5: The receivers’ decision mistakes as a function of p
Figure 2.5 shows the comparison between the error probabilities without persuasion, with public
persuasion, and with private persuasion. The error probability under public persuasion, ψPUB, is
sometimes higher than the error probability when there is no persuasion and the receivers vote
based on their common prior. In the latter case, the error probability ψN = 1 − p. Specifically, if
the mth receiver’s threshold doubt is lower than the common prior, i.e. qm ≤ p, we have ψPUB ≥ ψN .
The second part of the proposition provides a negative answer to the question we raised above.
Increasing the number of trials does not help the receivers to reduce the probability of decision
errors. The reason is that as long as the persuasion channel remains public, receivers have no
private information which might be revealed by their votes in equilibrium. Drawing multiple signals
increases the probability of the receivers observing unfavorable signals (s = a). Therefore, once the
sender knows that multiple trials would be examined, she will optimally choose a mechanism that
generates unfavorable signals much less frequently.
In short, receivers make a better decision under private persuasion. This result captures the re-
ceivers’ “benefit” of communicating in a private environment: when the receivers vote strategically,
they update posterior beliefs based not only on their own private signals, but also on additional
information revealed by others’ equilibrium votes. On the other side, under public persuasion,
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publicly observed signal creates common belief among all. Difference in receivers’ votes results only
from their heterogeneous preferences, but do not reveal extra information regarding each others’
private signals. Thus public persuasion from a biased sender makes the receivers worse off.
2.5 DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
2.5.1 Correlated Private Signals
In this section we drop the assumption that the receivers’ signal observations are independent
under private persuasion. Instead, we consider a richer private persuasion environment which
allows the sender to generate correlated realizations conditional on each state t. Consider the
case in which the sender chooses a persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T to draw n correlated signal
realizations. Each receiver privately observe one signal realization.
Let ν Denote the number of s = b out of all n signals in each state. Denote the joint distribution
of the n signal realizations in the following way:
in state α:
P (ν = n|α) = ηn, P (ν = n− 1|α) = ηn−1, ..., P (ν = 0|α) = η0
in state β:
P (ν = n|β) = ξn, P (ν = n− 1|β) = ξn−1, ..., P (ν = 0|β) = ξ0
Marginalizing on the rest n− 1 signal realizations gives the marginal probability of each one signal
realization. Additionally, assume the receivers’ signal observations are interchangeable. Thus the
probability of all the event in which k receivers observe s = b and n − k observe s = a can be
written as
(
n
k
) · ηk in state α and (nk) · ξk in state β. For the joint probability we require:
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· ηk = 1,
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· ξk = 1
Similar to Section 2.3.1, we first derive the receiver’s posterior belief µβi when k out of r signals
are s = b (while the rest n− r receivers’ votes are uninformative) as:
γ(k, r) =
(1− p)∑n−(r−k)j=k (nj) · ξj
p
∑n−(r−k)
j=k
(
n
j
) · ηj + (1− p)∑n−(r−k)j=k (nj) · ξj
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All other analysis and results in Section 2.3.1 remain unchanged. We can write the sender’s
maximization problem as:
max
(η0,...ηn),(ξ0,...,ξn)
p · (
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
ηj) + (1− p) · (
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
ξj)
Incorporating correlation structure into the private persuasion allows us to link the two persua-
sion environments together. As the correlation between the signal realizations becomes larger, i.e.
ηn + η0 → 1 and ξn + ξ0 → 1, the private persuasion environment approaches the public persuasion
environment. Thus we have the following conjecture:
Conjectrure 1. When the joint distributions {(η0, ...ηn), (ξ0, ..., ξn)} satisfy
ξk
ξk−1
≤ ηk
ηk−1
,∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}
As ηn + η0 → 1 and ξn + ξ0 → 1, we have EUSPRI → EUSPUB.
A sketch of the proof of this conjecture is included in the Appendix. The underlying intuition
is that the receivers form common posterior belief once the persuasion environment become public.
Upon observing his own signal realization, a receiver believes, with higher probability, that others
also observe the same realization. This is a confirming effect that offsets the pivotal voting effect
under private persuasion with independent signal observations. Upon observing a sender’s favorable
signal s = b, a receiver now becomes less skeptical about the true state being β. The pivotal voting
effect forces the sender to generate more precise signal realizations and consequently decreases the
sender’s expected payoff; whereas this confirming effect drives the sender’s expected payoffs to the
opposite direction.
Moreover, as we show in previous sections, drawing multiple signal draws under public persua-
sion yields the sender the same expected payoff as drawing one signal draw, i.e. EUSPUB = EU
S
MD.
Thus we conclude that the sender’s expected payoff under private persuasion increases to that un-
der public persuasion with the same number of signal draws when the signals becomes perfectly
correlated.
2.5.2 Generalization of the Signal Realization Space
In this section we generalize the signal realization space to a continuous space, S = [0, 1].
We characterize the receivers’ voting behavior and then discuss the sender’s optimal persuasion
mechanisms in equilibrium.
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2.5.2.1 Receivers’ Voting Behavior A strategy for the sender is to choose a family of con-
ditional distributions from F = {pi(·|t)}t∈T each element of which maps from the state space T to
the simplex over S. A strategy for receiver i is a measurable mapping σi : F × S → ∆{A,B},
where σi(si;pi) denotes the probability that this receiver votes for β upon observing signal si from
[0, 1]. Specifically, we are interested in a class of voting profiles where each receiver adopts a cutoff
strategy :
Definition 7. A receiver’s voting strategy σi is called a cutoff voting strategy if ∃s¯i ∈ [0, 1] such
that
σi(s) =
 1, if s ≥ s¯i0, if s < s¯i
Next we show how the cutoff signal s¯i is determined and what properties it satisfies. Given
a voting strategy σi, the probability that receiver i votes for B in state α is
∫ 1
0 σi(s)µ(a|s)ds and
the probability that i votes for B in state β is
∫ 1
0 σi(s)µ(b|s)ds. The probabilities that receiver i is
pivotal in state α and in state β are as follows, respectively:
P−i(piv|α) =
∑
|M |=m−1,i/∈M
(
∏
j∈M
(
∫ 1
0
σi(s)µ(α|s)ds)
∏
j /∈M,j 6=i
(
∫ 1
0
(1− σi(s))µ(α|s)ds))
P−i(piv|β) =
∑
|M |=m−1,i/∈M
(
∏
j∈M
(
∫ 1
0
σi(s)µ(β|s)ds)
∏
j /∈M,j 6=i
(
∫ 1
0
(1− σi(s))µ(β|s)ds))
For receiver i, define
∆(σ−i, s) = P−i(piv|α) · pi(s|α) · qi · p− P−i(piv|β) · pi(s|β) · (1− qi) · (1− p)
Similar to Duggan and Martinelli (Duggan and Martinelli 2001), we have the following lemmas:
Lemma 3. Given the voting profile σ−i of all other receivers, a strategy σi is a best response for
receiver i if and only if
σi(s) =
 1, if ∆(σ−i, s) < 00, if ∆(σ−i, s) > 0
Moreover, it is equivalent to the following cutoff strategy
σˆi(s) =
 1, if s ≥ s¯i0, if s < s¯i
where s¯i = inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0}
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Lemma 4. The cutoff signal s¯i is monotone increasing in the receiver’s threshold doubt qi. More-
over, the cutoff signal s¯i is monotone increasing in the ratio of the conditional probability density
functions pi(s|α)pi(s|β) , ∀s ∈ [0, 1].
The proofs of both lemmas are given in the Appendix. It follows directly that the cutoff signal
values satisfy 0 ≤ s¯1 ≤ ... ≤ s¯n < 1. All receivers vote for A when s ∈ [0, s¯1] and vote for B when
s ∈ [s¯n, 1]. For signal realizations s ∈ [s¯1, s¯n], the number of receivers who vote for each alternative
varies. Thus under public persuasion the sender chooses a persuasion mechanism which maximizes
the probability of a signal realization s such that s¯m ≤ s < 1. Under similar lines of reasoning as
Proposition 2.3.2.1, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4. Under public persuasion with a continuous signal realization space S = [0, 1], suppose
the receivers adopt cutoff voting strategy described in Lemma 3. Then for any voting rule m and
any common prior p ∈ [0, 1], the sender can achieve the expected payoffs on the concave closure of
the set of all possible payoffs, i.e.
EUSPUB(p) = Λ(p)
where Λ(p) is defined in Section 2.4.1.3. The proof of this result is included in the Appendix.
2.6 RELATED LITERATURE
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) are the first to compare public and private information transmission.
They analyze a one-sender two-receiver cheap-talk game with binary state space. They show that
whenever there exists an equilibrium in which the agent truthfully reveals the underlying state
under private communication, there is an equilibrium under public communication in which the
agent does the same. However, the reverse is not true11. Our result shows, in contrast, that
the sender’s signalling mechanism is always more informative under private persuasion and less
informative under public persuasion.
There are three key differences between Farrell and Gibbons’ (1989) setting and ours, which
drive such differences in results. First, players’ conflict of interests are different. Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) adopt a cheap-talk model where not only the receivers’, but also the sender’s
11Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) extend Farrell and Gibbons’ (1989) results with continuous state space and contin-
uous action space. They also show that the sender is willing to reveal more information if she is allowed to combine
the two messaging channels together.
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utility is state-dependent. We analyze a persuasion game in which only the receivers prefer state-
contingent decisions; the sender always intends to induce one decision regardless of the state.
Second, we analyze different communication techniques. In Farrell and Gibbons (1989) the sender
uses costless and non-verifiable messages; whereas in our model the sender has no direct control
over what the receivers observe, though she can choose the signal-generating mechanism. Third,
the receivers follow different decision rules. In Farrell and Gibbons (1989) each receiver takes an
action separately, with no interaction of any form occurring between them. In our setting the final
decision is made through q-rule voting. The sender has to incorporate the strategic interactions
between receivers’ beliefs. The rest of this literature review will discuss previous research on each of
the three features, i.e. sender’s state-independent preferences, persuasion mechanism, and strategic
voting.
We first discuss the literature which involves a sender preferring one decision regardless of the
state while receiver(s) desire state-contingent decisions. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981)
analyze the information disclosure via verifiable messages between a seller (sender) and buyers
(receiver). Although babbling equilibria in which the receiver ignores any of the sender’s messages
always exists, in a sequential equilibrium a high-quality seller is able to distinguish herself by making
a full disclosure. This is because such equilibria imposes restrictions on the receiver’s off-equilibrium
beliefs; the receiver forms rational expectation about the sender’s true types. Chakraborty and Har-
baugh (2011) investigate a sender’s persuasion through cheap-talk messages. With one-dimensional
state space and state-independent preferences, no non-babbling equilibrium exists in the cheap-talk
model. Nevertheless, with a multidimensional state space a sender can convince a receiver by mak-
ing credible comparative statements over the two states. However, when there are two receivers to
make the decision, interactions between them might offset the benefit from the sender’s persuasion.
The second strand of literature discusses persuasion mechanisms. This paper extends the one by
Kamenica and Gentzkow12 (2011) to a multi-receiver framework. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
analyzes a Bayesian persuasion game between one informed sender and one uninformed receiver.
The sender chooses a state-dependent persuasion mechanism to provide signal realizations to the
receiver. Both the mechanism and the generated signal are known to the receiver. They derive
12Two more papers discusses similar mechanisms. Rosar and Schulte (2010) look into the design of a device
with which an imperfectly informed sender can generate public information about the underlying state. The set
of the generated information is a superset of the set of the sender’s private information. However, the designer’s
goal is to provide information as precise as possible, unlike in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and ours the sender
is biased towards one decision outcome. Rayo and Segal (2010) develop a sender’s optimal disclosure rule with a
multidimensional state space. In Rayo and Segal (2010) the receiver also has private information regarding the true
state; yet in our model the receivers do not possess any relevant information.
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necessary and sufficient conditions under which an optimal mechanism that yields the sender strictly
positive benefit exists. The key difference between Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and ours arises
from the strategic feature of the receivers’ collective decision-making. In Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) the sender faces a single receiver, who updates his belief upon observing one signal realization
and makes a decision on his own. The crux of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) is whether the sender
can commit to a persuasion mechanism so that the receiver will take the sender’s preferred action
upon receiving a more favorable signal. In our model multiple receivers vote for one final decision.
A receiver makes implicit inference about the distribution of others’ signal observations conditional
on his own vote being pivotal. In turn the sender incorporates this strategic effect into her choice
of mechanisms. The sender’s problem remains as convincing enough receivers to vote for the
sender-preferred alternative upon observing a favorable signal; but each receiver’s incentive to do
so changes13.
Third, the distinction between the two types of persuasion is the strategic consideration asso-
ciated with the receivers’ voting behavior. Existing voting literature has extensively discussed how
private information affects the quality of collective decisions. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) (and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)) point out, as a challenge to the Condorcet Jury Theorem14, that
it is not rational for each voter to vote only according his private signal. A rational voter has to take
into account the information revealed by the event of one’s vote being decisive15. Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997) analyze a general voting model in which voters have heterogeneous preferences
and receive noisy private signals from different information services. Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997) fully characterizes the voters’ equilibrium voting behavior and demonstrates that a q-rule
voting fully aggregates information despite that the fraction of voters who vote informatively de-
creases to zero as the electorate grows to infinity. Gerardi and Yariv (2007) consider a committee
13The discussion of “persuasion mechanism” is also related to a broader scope of literature on persuasion rules.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) study a persuasion game with one sender and one receiver, the latter of whom can
verify the former’s report for at most one of two aspects. The persuasion mechanism, with the objective to minimize
the probability of the receiver’s decision errors, specifies a set of cheap-talk messages for the sender to choose from,
a device for the receiver to select the aspect to be checked, and a rule for the receiver to take the final action. Glazer
and Rubinstein (2006) examine a similar setting but allow the receiver to randomize at the final stage of decision.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) shows that there exists a persuasion rule with no randomization and all optimal rules
satisfy ex-post optimality.
14Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if each voter’s noisy private signal is with precision greater than 1/2 and
if each votes according to this private signal, the probability of selecting the correct alternative approaches 1 as the
electorate turns to infinity.
15In defense of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, McLennan (1998) show that for any common interest voting game,
if with the sincere voting assumption collective decisions can successfully select the right alternative, there exists an
equilibrium voting profile with everyone responding strategically. More importantly, outcomes from all such Nash
equilibria are at least as good as the ones from sincere but non-optimal voting profiles.
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voting with deliberation. Sequential equilibria exists with committee members truthfully revealing
own private information and rationally adjust one’s vote according to other members’ information.
In this paper the information service from which private noisy signals are generated is from the
sender. The novelty is that the sender optimally chooses from a family of information service and
optimally adjust the strength of the signals in each state.
We close this section by comparing this paper with Caillaud and Tirole (2007), who also examine
a one-sender multiple-receiver model. In their paper, a sender, who lacks information regarding
each receiver’s type, approaches receivers in a group sequentially to get a project approved. The
receiver being approached can investigate with a fixed cost and get informed. The sender’s task is to
design a mechanism which is incentive compatible for the selected receiver(s) to costly acquire the
information and to approve the project if his type is high. The “persuasion mechanism” examined in
ours is different from Caillaud and Tirole (2007). In the latter the mechanism selects key receiver(s)
to conduct a costly investigation. The sender does not possess any relevant information regarding
the underlying state. This paper looks into the “investigation process” itself, the details of which
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) ignore. We show that as long as the sender can design the details of an
investigation, the difference in persuasion environments matters even though the receivers have no
investigation cost and are willing to examine the sender’s report.
2.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyze a Bayesian persuasion model with one sender persuading multiple
receivers. We compare two institutions: under public persuasion, both the sender’s choice of mech-
anism and the generated signals are observed by all receivers publicly; under private persuasion,
the former remains commonly known while the latter is drawn independently and separately for
each receiver. We show, in the state where hers and the receivers’ interests are mis-aligned, that
the sender’s optimal mechanism generates more informative signals under private persuasion than
under public persuasion. However, in the state where the players’ interests are perfectly-aligned,
the signal that represents the true state is not perfectly informative. This is because strategic
interactions among receivers reveal more information than the mechanism itself has transmitted;
and the sender incorporates this effect into her choice of the optimal mechanism.
It naturally follows that the sender achieves higher expected utility under public persuasion
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than under private persuasion while the receivers make a wrong decision with higher probability
under public persuasion than under private persuasion. This result captures the sender’s cost of
transmitting information in a private environment and the receivers’ benefit from getting informed
in a private environment. Apparently a private environment provides the sender with incentives
to tell different lies to different receivers; nevertheless it no longer benefits the sender in the same
manner when she loses direct control over receivers’ signal observations. It is also worth noting that
as long as the persuasion channel remains public, increasing the number of independent draws does
not help the receivers reduce decision errors. In fact, the sender’s optimal mechanism generates
very imprecise signals in the state where players’ interests are mis-aligned. This mechanism yields
the sender the same expected payoff as she can achieve under public persuasion with a single draw.
There are three effects underlying the difference between the two institutions: the information
precision effect, which means the mechanism generates more precise signals in the state where
interests are misaligned so as to convince more receivers to vote informatively; the probability
increment effect, which refers to the fact that convincing more receivers to vote informatively
offsets the decrement in probability caused by independent signal draws; and the stratetic voting
effect, which suggests that convincing more receivers to vote informatively enables the receivers
to learn more about each others’ signal observations than what has actually been transmitted by
the mechanism itself. Under public persuasion only the information precision effect is relevant, no
matter there is a single draw or multiple independent draws. In contrast, under private persuasion
the sender faces all three effects, the balance between which forces the mechanism to generate more
precise signals in the state where players’ interests are misaligned.
2.8 APPENDIX: PROOFS AND CALCULATIONS
2.8.1 The Implication from the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
Observation 5. For any signal-generating mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T that satisfies the Monotone Like-
lihood Ratio Property, with a binary state space T = {α, β}, the CDF Π(·|β) first order stochastic
dominates Π(·|α).
Proof The MLRP implies that for every s > s′ and t > t′,
pi(s|t)
pi(s|t′) >
pi(s′|t)
pi(s′|t′)
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given any s∗ ∈ S,
- if s∗ < s, we have
pi(s|β) · pi(s∗|α) > pi(s∗|β) · pi(s|α)
so that
∫
s∈S,s∗<s
pi(s|β) · pi(s∗|α)ds >
∫
s∈S,s∗<s
pi(s∗|β) · pi(s|α)ds
implies pi(s∗|α) · (1−Π(s∗|β)) > pi(s∗|β) · (1−Π(s∗|α))
- if s∗ ≥ s, similarly we have
pi(s∗|α) ·Π(s∗|β) < pi(s∗|β) ·Π(s∗|α)
Therefore we have ∀s∗ ∈ S,
Π(s∗|β)
Π(s∗|α) <
pi(s∗|β)
pi(s∗|α) <
1−Π(s∗|β)
1−Π(s∗|α)
implies Π(s∗|β) < Π(s∗|α)
The last inequality indicates that Π(·|β) FOSDs Π(s|α). We replace ∫ with ∑ in this exercise
when S is finite.
2.8.2 Proofs for Lemmas, Observations, and Propositions
2.8.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1 Fix a sender’s persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T . Let x = pi(b|α)
and y = pi(b|β). Assumption 2 is now equivalent to y > x. Receiver i ’s posterior belief µ(β|·) upon
observing each signal realization is
µ(β|a) = (1− y)(1− p)
(1− x)p+ (1− y)(1− p)
µ(β|b) = y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p)
First notice that µ(β|a) < µ(β|b) under Assumption 2. As shown in Section 2.2.3, a receiver i votes
for B if and only if µ(β|·) ≥ qi. Therefore take q¯ = µ(β|b) = y(1−p)xp+y(1−p) . It is obvious that q¯ ∈ [0, 1].
For all receivers with qi ≤ q¯, we have qi ≤ µ(β|b), which indicates that these receivers will vote for
B on signal s = b. For the receivers with qj > q¯, we have qj > µ(β|b), which means they votes for
A on signal s = b.
Note that this lemma does not exclude the possibility that some receivers vote uninformatively
for B after observing either s = a or b signal realization. For receivers whose qj ’s are sufficiently
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small, it is possible that µ(β|a) > qj . However, the following claim shows that the number of
receivers who always vote for B does not dominate the voting outcome:
Claim: Under Assumption 1 and 2, the number of receivers who vote for B regardless of the
signal observation is less than m.
To see this, we only have to show µ(β|a) < qm.
⇔ (1− y)(1− p)
(1− x)p+ (1− y)(1− p) < q1
⇔ x < y and qj ≥ 1− p,∀j ∈ {m, ..., n}
which is always true under Assumption 1 and 2.
2.8.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix a sender’s persuasion mechanism {pi(·|t)}t∈T . Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β). Denote γ(k, r)
the receiver’s posterior belief µβi when k out of r signals are s = b:
γ(k, r) =
(1− p)yk(1− y)r−k
pxk(1− x)r−k + (1− p)yk(1− y)r−k
Assumption 2 implies that ∀1 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ n, the following hold:
γ(k − 1, r) < γ(k, r)
γ(k, r + 1) < γ(k, r)
γ(k, r) < γ(k + 1, r + 1)
γ(k − 1, r) < γ(k, r + 1)
For any r independent draws, suppose receiver i knows that there are k − 1 signals s = b. Then
his posterior belief is µβi = γ(k, r) ∈ (0, 1) if himself observes s = b and γ(k − 1, r) ∈ (0, 1) if
himself observes s = a. There exist receivers with high threshold doubts q′js such that γ(k−1, r) <
γ(k, r) < qj , which means this receiver votes for A regardless of his signal observation. On the
other hand, unlike in lemma 1, γ(k, r) ≥ qi does not necessarily imply γ(k − 1, r) < qi. There
exist receivers with low threshold doubts q′is such that qi ≤ γ(k − 1, r) < γ(k, r), which means
this receiver votes for B irrespective of his own observation. So there are a portion of the receivers
{R1, ..., Rk} who vote for B uninformatively and a portion of receivers {Rr, ..., Rn} who vote for A
uninformatively. And notice that k ≥ 1, the equality holds depending on the value of x, y.
Next we show that k < m < r. Suppose k ≥ m. The voting outcome will be B in both
states, which is wrong with probability p. Thus voting for B irrespective of the signal observation
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becomes a weakly dominated strategy for some receivers in {R1, ..., Rk}. These receivers will be
better off if they switch to an informative voting strategy. Similar argument holds for the case
r ≤ m. Thus if all receivers adopt undominated strategies, in any subgame the voting outcome will
not be determined by the receivers who vote uninformatively for either alternative.
Now we consider the rational voting behavior in each subgame when every receiver acts strate-
gically. First, only receivers {Rk+1, ..., Rr} vote informatively, i.e. the distribution of their votes
reveals the distribution of their private signals. For these r−k receivers, observing s = a and being
pivotal indicate that there are m−k−1 signals that are s = b out of all r−k signals; and observing
s = b and being pivotal indicate that there are m− k signals that are s = b out of all r− k signals.
To have these receivers to vote informatively we need:
γ(m− k − 1, r − k) ≤ qj ≤ γ(m− k, r − k), j = k + 1, ..., r
For receivers {R1, ..., Rk} who vote for B irrespective of the signal observation, observing s = a
and being pivotal indicate that there are m − k signals that are s = b out of all r − k + 1 signals
(including his own); and observing s = b and being pivotal indicate that there are m−k+ 1 signals
that are s = b out of all r − k + 1 signals (including his own). To have these receivers to vote
uninformatively for B we need:
qj ≤ γ(m− k, r − k + 1), qj ≤ γ(m− k + 1, r − k + 1), j = 1, ..., k
For receivers {Rr+1, ..., Rn} who vote for A irrespective of the signal observation, observing
s = a and being pivotal indicate that there are m− k− 1 signals that are s = b out of all r− k+ 1
signals (including his own); and observing s = b and being pivotal indicate that there are m − k
signals that are s = b out of all r − k + 1 signals (including his own). To have these receivers to
vote uninformatively for A we need:
qj ≥ γ(m− k − 1, r − k + 1), qj ≥ γ(m− k, r − k + 1), j = r + 1, ..., n
Summing up, we have:
γ(m− k − 1, r − k) ≤ qk ≤ γ(m− k, r − k + 1) ≤ qr ≤ γ(m− k, r − k)
From above, it can be verified that for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], if qk is fixed, then there is a unique
cutoff value qr that satisfies γ(m − k, r − k + 1) ≤ qr ≤ γ(m − k, r − k); if qr is fixed, then there
is a unique cutoff value qk that satisfies γ(m − k − 1, r − k) ≤ qk ≤ γ(m − k, r − k + 1). But
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note that the two cutoff values may change simultaneously. Consider a three-receiver example with
q1 < q2 < q3. There exists values of (x, y) such that the conditions γ(2, 3) ≥ q3, γ(1, 3) < q1 (which
means it is incentive compatible for all three receivers to vote informatively) and the conditions
q1 ≤ γ(1, 2) ≤ q3, γ(0, 1) < q2 ≤ γ(1, 1) (which means R1 votes uninformatively for B, R2 votes
informatively, and R3 votes uninformatively for A) are both satisfied. Thus for these values of
(x, y)’s, there are multiple sets of best-response functions at the voting stage.
The above being mentioned, such multiplicity does not affect the conclusion of Lemma 2, nor
the subsequent equilibrium characterization and welfare effects. This is because Lemma 2 has
incorporated all the possible pairs of values {qk, qr} that characterizes the receivers’ best responses
at the voting stage, and the sender’s maximization problem under private persuasion in Equation
2.3 is well-defined for each pair of such {qk, qr}.
2.8.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities. Under
public persuasion, all receivers observe the same signal realization s. As shown in lemma 1, no
receiver votes for B upon observing signal realization s = a. Upon observing s = b, if at least
m receivers vote for B, the final decision is B. This requires the receivers’ posterior belief upon
observing s = b to satisfy:
µ(β|b) = y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) ≥ qm
since qm ≥ ... ≥ q1, this inequality implies that receivers {R1, ..., Rm} will vote for B upon observing
s = b. So the sender’s problem is:
max
x,y∈[0,1]2
g(x, y) = p · x+ (1− p) · y
subject to
y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) ≥ qm
where the objective function is the sum of the probabilities that signal s = b is generated in each
state.
First notice that the g(x, y) is continuous in (x, y). The constraint set,
{(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2| y(1−p)xp+y(1−p) ≥ qm} is closed and bounded in R2; thus it is compact. By Weier-
strass’s extreme value theorem, the maximum of the objective function is attainable. We form the
Lagrangian function
L(x, y, λ) = g(x, y)− λ(− y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) + qm)
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the Kuhn-Tucker condition yields the following equations and inequalities:
p+
λp(1− p)y
(px+ (1− p)y)2 = 0
(1− p) + λ p(1− p)x
(px+ (1− p)y)2 = 0
λ(− y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) + qm) = 0
λ ≥ 0
y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) ≥ qm
solving the equations and inequalities yields x∗ = (1−qm)·(1−p)qm·p , y
∗ = 1. In fact, the constraint is
binding, i.e. µ(β|b) = qm.
Now we show that there are exactly m receivers who vote for B upon observing s = b. Suppose
there are only m − 1 receivers who do so. In this case the voting outcome is always v = A in
each state, which yields the sender only uS(A, t). But the sender’s optimal mechanism yields
uS(A, t)+(uS(B, t)−uS(A, t)) ·g(x∗, y∗) > uS(A, t). Now suppose instead there are m+1 receivers
who vote for B upon observing s = b, which changes the constraint to µ(β|b) ≥ qm+1. Solving
the sender’s problem we get x′ = (1−qm+1)·(1−p)qm+1·p , y
′ = 1. Since qm+1 ≥ qm, g(x′, y′) ≤ g(x∗, y∗).
Therefore, in equilibrium there are exact m receivers who vote for B upon observing s = b, i.e.
q¯ = µ(β|b) = qm.
2.8.2.4 Proof of Observation 4
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities. Under
private persuasion, each receiver observes an independent draw of the signal realization. When a
receiver votes sincerely, he update posterior belief based only on his own observation. As shown
in lemma 1, no receiver votes for B upon observing signal realization s = a. Upon observing
signal s = b, on the other hand, if the tth receiver votes for B, i.e. µ(β|b) ≥ qt, so do all receivers
in {R1, ..., Rt}. The sender’s problem can be formalized as maximizing the probability of t ≥ m
receivers’ observing a favorable signal realization in both states:
max
x,y
g(x, y) = p ·
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
· xj(1− x)t−j + (1− p) ·
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
· yj(1− y)t−j
subject to
y(1− p)
xp+ y(1− p) ≥ qt
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
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First notice that the g(x, y) is continuous in (x, y). The constraint set,
{(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2| y(1−p)xp+y(1−p) ≥ qt} is closed and bounded in R2; thus it is compact. By Weier-
strass’s extreme value theorem, the maximum of the objective function is attainable. We form the
Lagrangian function:
L(x, y;λ1, λx, λy, νx, νy) = g(x, y)−λ1(qt·p·x+(qt−1)(1−p)y−0)−λx·(x−1)−λy ·(y−1)+νx·x+νy ·y
with p ∈ [0, 1];m, t ∈ N,m < t; qt = q(t) ∈ [1− p, 1], q′(·) > 0. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the
above constrained maximization problem yields the following equations and inequalities.
p ·
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
· xj−1(1− x)t−j−1 · (j − tx)− λ1 · qt · p− λx + νx = 0
(1− p) ·
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
· yj−1(1− y)t−j−1 · (j − ty)− λ1 · (qt − 1) · (1− p)− λy + νy = 0
λ1 · (qt · p · x+ (qt − 1)(1− p)y) = 0
λx · (x− 1) = 0
λy · (y − 1) = 0
νx · x = 0
νy · y = 0
λ1, λx, λy, νx, νy ≥ 0
solving the equations and inequalities yields xSIN =
(1−qt)·(1−p)
qt·p , ySIN = 1. In fact, the constraint is
binding, i.e. µ(β|b) = qt.
Notice xSIN is a function of qt, so does the maximum g(xSIN, ySIN). We then have the following
claim:
Claim: There exists a receiver t with threshold doubt qt such that g(xSIN, ySIN) is maximized.
Proof of the claim: First by Envelope Theorem,
d
dt
g(xSIN(t), ySIN; t) =
∂
∂t
g(xSIN(t), ySIN; t)
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where qt is monotone increasing in t. Then we simplify g(xSIN, ySIN) as:
g(xSIN, ySIN) = p ·
t∑
j=m
(
t
j
)
· (xSIN)j(1− xSIN)t−j + (1− p)
= p · (1−
m−1∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
· (xSIN)j(1− xSIN)t−j) + (1− p)
= p · (1−
m−1∑
j=0
Γ(t+ 1)
Γ(j + 1)Γ(t− j + 1)(xSIN)
j(1− xSIN)t−j) + (1− p)
where Γ(t+1) = t! from the property of factorial functions. We need to show that ∂g(xSIN(t),ySIN;t)∂t =
0 for some t with m ≤ t ≤ n.
∂g(xSIN(t), ySIN; t)
∂t
= −p
m−1∑
j=0
(
∂h(t, j)
∂t
(xSIN)
j(1− xSIN)t−j
+h(t, j)
d(xSIN)
k
dt
(1− xSIN)t−j + h(t, j)(xSIN)j d(1− xSIN)
t−j
dt
)
where h(t, j) = Γ(t+1)Γ(j+1)Γ(t−j+1) > 0. For j = 0, h(t, j) =
1
Γ(1) a constant. For j ≥ 1, h(t, j) =
1
j·B(t−j+1,j) =
1
j·∫ 10 νt−j(1−ν)j−1dν from the properties of Beta functions. Thus we have:
∂B(t− j + 1, j)
∂t
=
∫ 1
0
ln ν · νt−j(1− ν)j−1dν < 0
⇒ ∂h(t, j)
∂t
= −∂B(t− j + 1, j)
∂t
· 1
j · (B(t− j + 1, j))2 > 0
Thus the first term in the summation ∂h(t,j)∂t · (xSIN)j(1− xSIN)t−j > 0 where as the last two terms
equal h(t, j)·( (1−p)q′(t)(txSIN−j)
pq2t (1−xSIN) +xSIN ·ln(1−xSIN)) < 0. Hence ∃tˆ such that
d
dtg(xSIN(tˆ), ySIN; tˆ) = 0.
It follows that qm ≤ qtˆ ≤ qn. Thus the sender’s optimal mechanism with sincere receivers under
private persuasion involves convincing tˆ receivers, where m ≤ tˆ ≤ n, to vote informatively.
2.8.2.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities.
Receivers’ strategic voting behavior under private persuasion is characterized by lemma 2. The
sender’s problem is to maximize the probability of at least m − k receivers’ observing s = b of all
r − k receivers who vote informatively:
max
x,y
g(x, y) = p ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· xj(1− x)r−k−j + (1− p) ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· yj(1− y)r−k−j
subject to γ(m− k − 1, r − k) ≤ qk ≤ γ(m− k, r − k + 1) ≤ qr ≤ γ(m− k, r − k)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
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subject to receivers’ posterior beliefs described in lemma 2. First notice that the g(x, y) is continuous
in (x, y). The constraint set, {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2|γ(m− k− 1, r− k) ≤ qk ≤ γ(m− k, r− k+ 1) ≤ qr ≤
γ(m− k, r − k)} is closed and bounded in R2; thus it is compact. By Weierstrass’s extreme value
theorem, the maximum of the objective function is attainable. We form the Lagrangian function:
L(x, y;λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λx, λy, νx, νy) = g(x, y)− λ1 · ( (1− p)y
m−k−1(1− y)r−m+1
pxm−k−1(1− x)r−m+1 + (1− p)ym−k−1(1− y)r−m+1 − qk)
−λ2 · (− (1− p)y
m−k(1− y)r−m+1
pxm−k(1− x)r−m+1 + (1− p)ym−k(1− y)r−m+1 + qk)
−λ3 · ( (1− p)y
m−k(1− y)r−m+1
pxm−k(1− x)r−m+1 + (1− p)ym−k(1− y)r−m+1 − qr)
−λ4 · (− (1− p)y
m−k(1− y)r−m
pxm−k(1− x)r−m + (1− p)ym−k(1− y)r−m + qr)− λx · (x− 1)− λy · (y − 1) + νx · x+ νy · y
with p ∈ [0, 1]; k,m, r ∈ N, k < m < r; 1− p ≤ qk < qr ≤ 1], q′(·) > 0. The Kuhn-Tucker condition
for the above constrained maximization problem yields the following equations and inequalities.
p ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· xj−1(1− x)r−k−j−1(j − (r − k)x)
+λ1 · p · qk · xm−k−2(1− x)r−m((m− k − 1)− (r − k)x)
−λ2 · p · qk · xm−k−1(1− x)r−m((m− k)− (r − k + 1)x)
+λ3 · p · qr · xm−k−1(1− x)r−m((m− k)− (r − k + 1)x)
−λ4 · p · qr · xm−k−1(1− x)r−m−1((m− k)− (r − k)x)− λx + νx = 0
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(1− p) ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· yj−1(1− y)r−k−j−1(j − (r − k)y)
−λ1 · (1− p) · (1− qk) · ym−k−2(1− y)r−m((m− k − 1)− (r − k)y)
+λ2 · (1− p) · (1− qk) · ym−k−1(1− y)r−m((m− k)− (r − k + 1)y)
−λ3 · (1− p) · (1− qr) · ym−k−1(1− y)r−m((m− k)− (r − k + 1)y)
+λ4 · (1− p) · (1− qr) · ym−k−1(1− y)r−m−1((m− k)− (r − k)y)− λy + νy = 0
λ1(−p · qk · xm−k−1(1− x)r−m+1 + (1− p) · (1− qk) · ym−k−1(1− y)r−m+1 − 0) = 0
λ2(p · qk · xm−k(1− x)r−m+1 − (1− p) · (1− qk) · ym−k(1− y)r−m+1 − 0) = 0
λ3(−p · qr · xm−k(1− x)r−m+1 + (1− p) · (1− qr) · ym−k(1− y)r−m+1 − 0) = 0
λ4(p · qr · xm−k(1− x)r−m − (1− p) · (1− qr) · ym−k(1− y)r−m − 0) = 0
λx · (x− 1) = 0
λy · (y − 1) = 0
νx · x = 0
νy · y = 0
λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λx, λy, νx, νy ≥ 0
Although the solving the above conditions yields no close-form expression of x∗, y∗, it can be verified
that 0 < y∗ < 1 and 0 < x∗ < xSIN where xSIN =
(1−qt)·(1−p)
qt·p in proposition 4. Thus the result
follows.
2.8.2.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities. Since
EUS = uS(A, t) + (uS(B, t) − uS(A, t)) · Prob(v = B),∀t ∈ T , to compare the sender’s expected
utilities from the optimal mechanisms in both types of persuasion, we only need to compare the
maximum values of Prob(v = B) under each type of persuasion. Under public persuasion, sender’s
optimal mechanism satisfies x∗PUB =
(1−qm)·(1−p)
qm·p , y
∗
PUB = 1. Then we have:
ProbPUB(v = B) = p · (1− qm) · (1− p)
qm · p + (1− p) · 1
Under private persuasion, the probability of getting the final voting outcome as v = B can be
written as:
p ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j + (1− p) ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (y∗PRI)j(1− y∗PRI)r−k−j
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Since the following always holds:
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (y∗PRI)j(1− y∗PRI)r−k−j < 1
it remains to show that
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j ≤
(1− qm)(1− p)
qm · p
which can be reduced to
(1− (1− qm)(1− p)
qm · p ) ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j
≤ (1− qm)(1− p)
qm · p ·
m−k−1∑
j=0
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j
And since qm+p−1qm·p −
(1−qm)(1−p)
qm·p is a large negative number; the difference between the rest of the
left-hand-side and the right-hand-side is small, we have the above inequality holds. Hence we have
ProbPRI(v = B) < ProbPUB(v = B) and the comparison between the sender’s expected utilities
follows.
2.8.2.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities. All
receivers observe the same n public signal realizations; thus they all have the same posterior belief.
Denote γ(`, n) the posterior belief µβ when there are ` signals s = b out of all n signals. A receiver
i with threshold doubt qi will vote for B when there are more than ` favorable signals (s = b)
out of all n signal realizations if and only if γ(` − 1, n) < qi < γ(`, n). The sender chooses the
mechanism such that exact m receivers are convinced to vote for B when there are more than `
favorable signals, i.e. γ(`, n) ≤ qm ≤ γ(`+ 1, n). Had the sender attempted to convince more than
m receivers to vote informatively, e.g. γ(`, n) ≤ qm+j ≤ γ(` + 1, n), j = 1, 2, ..., x would decrease
and the sender’s objective function, Prob(v = B), would decline, too. The sender’s problem is:
max
x,y
g(x, y) = p ·
n∑
j=`
xj(1− x)n−j + (1− p) ·
n∑
j=`
yj(1− y)n−j
subject to γ(`, n) ≤ qm ≤ γ(`+ 1, n)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
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First notice that the g(x, y) is continuous in (x, y). The constraint set, {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2|γ(`, n) ≤
qm ≤ γ(`+ 1, n)} is closed and bounded in R2; thus it is compact. By Weierstrass’s extreme value
theorem, the maximum of the objective function is attainable. We form the Lagrangian function:
L(x, y;λ1, λ2, λx, λy, νx, νy) = g(x, y)
−λ1 · (qm · p · x`(1− x)n−` − (1− qm)(1− p)y`(1− y)n−` − 0)
−λ2 · (−qm · p · x`−1(1− x)n−`+1 + (1− qm)(1− p)y`−1(1− y)n−`+1 − 0)
−λx · (x− 1)− λy · (y − 1) + νx · x+ νy · y
with p ∈ [0, 1]; l, n ∈ N, 1 − p ≤ qm ≤ 1, q′(·) > 0. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the above
constrained maximization problem yields the following equations and inequalities.
∂g(x, y)
∂x
− λ1 · qm · px`−1(1− x)n−`−1(`− nx)
+λ2 · qm · p · x`−2(1− x)n−`(`− 1− nx)− λx + νx = 0
∂g(x, y)
∂y
+ λ1 · (1− qm) · (1− p)y`−1(1− y)n−`−1(`− ny)
−λ2 · (1− qm) · (1− p) · y`−2(1− y)n−`(`− 1− nx)− λy + νy = 0
λ1 · (qm · p · x`(1− x)n−` − (1− qm)(1− p)y`(1− y)n−` − 0) = 0
λ2 · (−qm · p · x`−1(1− x)n−`+1 + (1− qm)(1− p)y`−1(1− y)n−`+1 − 0) = 0
λx · (x− 1) = 0
λy · (y − 1) = 0
νx · x = 0
νy · y = 0
λ1, λ2, λx, λy, νx, νy ≥ 0
solving the equations and inequalities yields x∗MD =
n
√
(1−qm)(1−p)
qmp
, y∗MD = 1 and ˆ`= n. To see the
latter, notice that ∀` < n, both γ(` − 1, n) and γ(`, n) → 0 as y → 1. Only when ˆ` = n we have
γ(ˆ`, n) = (1− p)/(p · xn + 1− p) ≥ qm while γ(ˆ`− 1, n) < qm.
Plug x∗MD =
n
√
(1−qm)(1−p)
qmp
, y∗MD = 1 into the sender’s objective function, we have:
ProbMD(v = B) = p · (xMD)n + (1− p) · (yMD)n
= p · (1− qm) · (1− p)
qm · p + (1− p) = ProbPUB(v = B)
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2.8.2.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Let x = pi(b|α) and y = pi(b|β) denote the sender’s choice of the conditional probabilities. We
first show that for all p ∈ [0, 1], public persuasion helps the sender to achieve Λ(p) as illustrated in
Figure 2.6. For any given (x, y), let p = 1/(1−x1−y · qm1−qm + 1). We have the following three cases:
Figure 2.6: Attainability of the Λ(p)
Case 1: p ∈ [0, p). Since p < p < 1 − qm, we have qm ≤ µ(b|α) < µ(b|β). This means at least
m receivers vote for B irrespective of the signal realization. Thus the sender gets voting outcome
B with probability 1.
Case 2: p ∈ [p, 1−qm). We have µ(b|α) < qm, µ(b|β) > qm, which means more than m receivers
vote for B on a signal realization b and less than m receivers vote for B on signal realization a. This
yields the sender expected payoffs (1 − p)/qm, which is less than Λ(p), ∀p ∈ [p, 1 − qm). However,
the sender can increase her payoffs by choosing pi(b|α) = pi(b|β). In this way the signal realizations
become completely uninformative and the receivers make decision on the common prior. So the
sender get the payoff as high as her expected payoff without persuasion, when the receivers cast
votes based on their common prior.
Case 3: p ∈ [1 − qm, 1]. Without persuasion, the sender’s expected payoff is always 0. Under
public persuasion, however, the sender chooses {pi(·|t)}t∈T as shown in Proposition 4. The sender
gets
ProbPUB(v = B) = (1− p) · 1
qm
which is the value of Λ(p), ∀p ∈ [1− qm, 1].
From Proposition 7 we know that ProbMD(v = B) = (1− p) · 1qm . Now it remains to show that
the same results holds if the sender is required to generate n correlated, not independent, public
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signal realizations. Denote the conditional joint distributions of the n signal realizations by ηj , ξj ,
where ηj represents the probability that the sender’s persuasion mechanism generates j signal s = b
in state α; ξj represents the probability that the mechanism generates j signal s = b in state β.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 7, there exists cut off number of b signals ` such that
γ(`− 1, n) =
(1− p)∑nj=`−1 (nj)ξj
p
∑n
j=`−1
(
n
j
)
ηj + (1− p)
∑n
j=`−1
(
n
j
)
ξj
< qm
γ(`, n) =
(1− p)∑nj=` (nj)ξj
p
∑n
j=`
(
n
j
)
ηj + (1− p)
∑n
j=`
(
n
j
)
ξj
≥ qm
and the sender’s objective function is
p
n∑
j=`
(
n
j
)
ηj + (1− p)
n∑
j=`
(
n
j
)
ξj
Solving the maximization and we get ProbCRR(v = B) = (1− p) · 1qm , the same expected payoff as
ProbPUB(v = B).
2.8.2.9 Proof of Proposition 9
First we show that under public persuasion the probability that the receivers make decision
errors is not necessarily lower than the one without any persuasion. Assumption 1 implies that
without persuasion ψN = 1− p since all receivers vote for the default alternative A. Under public
persuasion, the probability of decision errors equals the probability that the mechanism generates
a signal s = b in state α plus the probability that the mechanism fails to generate a signal s = b in
state β. Then x∗PUB =
(1−qm)·(1−p)
qm·p , y
∗
PUB = 1 implies:
ψPUB = p · x∗PUB + (1− p) · (1− y∗PUB) = p ·
(1− qm) · (1− p)
qm · p
Hence when qm ≤ p we have ψPUB ≥ ψN , which indicates that the receivers are more likely to
make mistakes under public persuasion than without any persuasion if the mth receiver’s threshold
doubt is less than p.
Next, we show that ψPRI < ψPUB. Notice that under private persuasion with strategic-voting
receivers, the probability of decision errors equals the probability that the mechanism generates at
least m− k favorable signals for {Rk, ...Rr} who vote informatively in state α plus the probability
that the mechanism generates up to m − k − 1 favorable signals in state β. From above we have
x∗PRI <
(1−qtˆ)·(1−p)
qtˆ·p , y
∗
PRI < 1, where tˆ is determined in the proof for proposition 4 . Then the
80
probability of the receivers’ decision
ψPRI = p ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1−x∗PRI)r−k−j + (1− p)
m−k−1∑
j=0
(
r − k
j
)
· (y∗PRI)j(1− y∗PRI)r−k−j
In fact, we have shown earlier that the first component is much smaller than (1−qm)(1−p)/qm·p.
Expand the binomial distribution, we have:
p ·
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j + (1− p)(1−
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (y∗PRI)j(1− y∗PRI)r−k−j)
= (1− p) +
r−k∑
j=m−k
(
r − k
j
)
· (p · (x∗PRI)j(1− x∗PRI)r−k−j − (1− p)(y∗PRI)j(1− y∗PRI)r−k−j)
Since j sums from m − k to r − k, the receiver’s optimal voting strategies described in Lemma
2 ensures that p · (x∗PRI)j(1 − x∗PRI)r−k−j − (1 − p)(y∗PRI)j(1 − y∗PRI)r−k−j < 0. So the second
component of the above expression is negative. Therefore we have the whole expression less than
(1− p) · (1− qm)/qm · p.
Last we show that ψMD = ψPUB. Plugging x
∗
MD, y
∗
MD in proposition 7, we get the probability
of the receivers’ making decision mistakes is:
ψMD = p · (xMD)n + (1− p) ·
`−1∑
j=0
(yMD)
j(1− yMD)n−j
= p · (1− qm) · (1− p)
qm · p = ψPUB
2.8.2.10 Sketch of Proof of Conjecture 1
Suppose under private persuasion with correlated signals, the correlation between observations
becomes stronger, i.e. ηn+η0 → 1 and ξn+ξ0 → 1. A receiver observing s = b (s = a) believes that
other receivers also observes a b (a) signal realization. Thus the receiver’s posterior belief upon
observing s = b (s = a) approaches:
µ(β|a) = ξ0(1− p)
η0p+ ξ0(1− p)
µ(β|b) = ξn(1− p)
ηnp+ ξn(1− p)
As ηn + η0 → 1 and ξn + ξ0 → 1, the sender’s problem reduces to choosing ηn and ξn to maximize
p · ηn + (1− p) · ξn
which gives the same solution as in Proposition 2.3.2.1. Thus the sender’s optimal persuasion
mechanism in this case yields her the same expected payoff as EUSPUB.
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2.8.2.11 Proof of Lemma 3
We follow Duggan and Martinelli’s (Duggan and Martinelli 2001) approach in this proof. Suppose
the voting strategy σi(s) described in Lemma 3 is not a best response for receiver i. Then there
is another σ′i that yields receiver i expected payoff as least as high as the expected payoff from σi.
Specifically, consider two sets
V = {s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) < 0 and σ′i(s) < 1}
W = {s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) > 0 and σ′i(s) > 0}
The difference of expected payoffs between strategy σ′i and σi is∫
V
(σ′i − 1)(p(−qi)P−i(piv|α)pi(s|α)− (1− p)(−(1− qi))P−i(piv|β)pi(s|β))ds
+
∫
W
σ′i(p(−qi)P−i(piv|α)pi(s|α)− (1− p)(−(1− qi))P−i(piv|β)pi(s|β))ds
When s ∈ V,∆(σ−i, s) < 0 and σ′i − 1 < 0, so the first term of the integral is negative. When
s ∈W,∆(σ−i, s) > 0 and σ′i > 0, so the second term is also negative. Thus we get the contradiction,
which indicates that the above specified voting strategy σi is a best response given σ−i.
∆(σ−i, s) is continuous in s. Moreover, Assumption 2 implies that it is strictly decreasing in s.
Thus it follows that there is a unique cutoff signal s¯i for receiver i which solves ∆(σ−i, s) = 0 and
inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0} is a well defined. Therefore, σi being the best response implies that it
is equivalent to the cutoff strategy σˆi.
2.8.2.12 Proof of Lemma 4
Since ∆(σ−i, s) is continuous in qi, so does s¯i. Take any two threshold doubts 0 ≤ qj ≤ qi ≤ 1.
We have
∆(σ−i, s) = P−i(piv|α) · pi(s|α) · qi · p− P−i(piv|β) · pi(s|β) · (1− qi) · (1− p)
∆(σ−j , s) = P−j(piv|α) · pi(s|α) · qj · p− P−j(piv|β) · pi(s|β) · (1− qj) · (1− p)
and the following cutoff strategies for i and j, respectively:
σi(s) =
 1, if s ≥ s¯i0, if s < s¯i
where s¯i = inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0}.
σj(s) =
 1, if s ≥ s¯j0, if s < s¯j
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where s¯j = inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−j , s) ≤ 0}.
Suppose s¯j = s¯i. Since ∆(σ−j , s) is continuous in s and q, there exists  > 0 such that at
s = s¯i−,∆(σ−i, s) > 0, so receiver i will vote for B with probability 0. However, s = s¯i− = s¯j−
and qj < qi implies ∆(σ−j , s) ≤ 0, which indicates that receiver j is not willing to vote for A. The
cutoff strategy σj(s) is not a best response. A contradiction.
Now suppose s¯j > s¯i. Take s ∈ [s¯i, s¯j). Since s ≥ s¯i, we have ∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0, so receiver i is
willing to vote for B with probability 1. Moreover, s < s¯j implies ∆(σ−j , s) > 0, which means
receiver j will vote for A. Nonetheless, qj < qi implies ∆(σ−j , s) < ∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0, which indicates
receiver j is not willing to vote for A. A contradiction. Thus the first part of the lemma follows.
For the second part of the lemma, notice that for each receiver i, s¯i = inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) ≤
0}. Expand the inequality ∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0, we have:
∑
|M|=m−1,i/∈M
(
∏
j∈M
(
∫ 1
0
σi(s)
pi(s|α)p(α)∑
t′∈T pi(s|t′)p(t′)
ds)
∏
j /∈M,j 6=i
(
∫ 1
0
(1− σi(s)) pi(s|α)p(α)∑
t′∈T pi(s|t′)p(t′)
ds))pi(s|α) · qi · p
≤
∑
|M|=m−1,i/∈M
(
∏
j∈M
(
∫ 1
0
σi(s)
pi(s|β)p(β)∑
t′∈T pi(s|t′)p(t′)
ds)
∏
j /∈M,j 6=i
(
∫ 1
0
(1− σi(s)) pi(s|β)p(β)∑
t′∈T pi(s|t′)p(t′)
ds))pi(s|β) · (1− qi) · (1− p)
Denote the ratio of the probability densities as r = pi(s|α)pi(s|β) . As r increases, the LHS of the
inequality increases while the RHS decreases or remain unchanged. In both cases, for some s ∈
[s¯i, 1], ∆(σ−i, s) > 0. Continuity implies that such s′s either satisfy s ∈ [s¯i, s¯i + η] or satisfy
s ∈ [1− ϑ, 1]. Suppose for s ∈ [1− ϑ, 1] we have ∆(σ−i, s) > 0. But this contradicts the definition
of a cutoff strategy. Thus for s ∈ [s¯i, s¯i + η] the value of ∆(σ−i, s) are positive. Hence the value of
inf{s ∈ [0, 1]|∆(σ−i, s) ≤ 0} increases.
2.8.2.13 Proof of Corollary 4
Under public persuasion, the sender chooses a set of conditional distributions (pi(s|α), pi(s|β))
over S = [0, 1] to maximize the probability that s ≥ s¯m:
max
(pi(s|α),pi(s|β))
p · P (s ≥ s¯m|α) + (1− p) · P (s ≥ s¯m|β)
The receivers’ posterior belief after observing a signal realization s ≥ s¯m is:
µ(β|s ≥ s¯m) = (1− p) · P (s ≥ s¯m|β)
p · P (s ≥ s¯m|α) + (1− p) · P (s ≥ s¯m|β)
=
(1− p) · ∫ 1¯sm pi(s|β)ds
p · ∫ 1¯sm pi(s|α)ds+ (1− p) · ∫ 1¯sm pi(s|β)ds
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Having at least m receivers voting for B upon observing s ≥ s¯m requires µ(β|s ≥ s¯m) ≥ qm.
Thus the sender’s expected utility is maximized when the conditional distributions (pi(s|α), pi(s|β))
satisfy:
(1− p) · (1− qm) ·
∫ 1
¯sm
pi(s|β)ds ≥ p · qm ·
∫ 1
¯sm
pi(s|α)ds
and EUS = p · (1−p)(1−qm)p·qm + (1− p) = Λ(p),∀p ∈ [0, 1].
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3.0 AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION ON BELIEF AND
HIGHER-ORDER BELIEF IN THE CENTIPEDE GAMES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies rationality, belief of rationality, and higher-order belief of rationality in the
centipede game experiment. Actual play in centipede experiments seldom ends as backward induc-
tion predicts. Existing literature attributes the departure from backward induction (BI thereafter)
prediction either to players’ lack of rationality, or to players’ inconsistent beliefs and higher-order
beliefs of others’ rationality. In this paper, we evaluate these arguments in a more direct fashion.
We elicit the first mover’s belief about the second mover’s strategy as well as the second mover’s
initial and conditional beliefs about the first mover’s strategy and 1st-order belief. The measured
beliefs help us to infer the conditional probability systems (CPS thereafter) of both players. The
inferred CPS’s and players’ actual strategy choices identify why they fail to reach the BI outcomes.
The first strand of the existing experimental literature focuses on players’ lack of rationality.
It presumes presence of behavioral types who fail to or do not maximize monetary payoffs1. For
example, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) assume that ex-ante a player chooses to not play along the
BI path with probability p. But assuming irrationality before a game starts is restrictive; people
could be right but think others are wrong. In this paper, the inferred CPS and players’ strategies
allow us to directly examine players’ rationality. We define rationality as a player’s strategy best
responding to the measured belief. We find, in all three treatments, the frequency of either player’s
being rational is significantly lower than 100 percent. But in the Constant-Sum treatment, which
excludes the efficiency property as well as any possibility of mutual benefits, the frequency of the
first-mover being rational is significantly higher than those in the other two treatments.
The other strand of literature attributes the experimental anomalies to lack of common knowl-
1See McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Fey et.al.(1996), Zauner (1999), Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012).
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edge of rationality. Two field centipede experiments (Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) and Levitt
et.al (2009)) are in this fashion. Both use professional chess players as experimental subjects;
the authors assume there is always rationality and common knowledge of rationality among chess
players. The authors’ approach is based on Aumann’s (1995) claim2 “if common knowledge of ratio-
nality holds then the backward induction outcome results.” Nevertheless, the notion of “common
knowledge” is not empirically verifiable; one can never ensure the existence of “common knowledge”
among chess-players or the non-existence of it among ordinary laboratory subjects. This suggests
that the knowledge-based approach may have limited explanatory power for the anomalies in the
centipede experiments. Thus in this paper we follow an alternative approach, the belief-based epis-
temic game theory3 to address the notion of common belief of rationality. The measured beliefs,
high-order beliefs, and players’ actual strategy choices help us to identify whether rationality and
common initial belief of rationality and/or rationality and common strong belief of rationality hold.
We find, in fact, that common initial belief of rationality does not always exist in the laboratory.
In all three treatments, the frequency of players’ believing opponents’ rationality is significantly
less than 100 percent. Nevertheless, in the Constant-Sum treatment this frequency is significantly
higher than that in the other two treatments; whereas the frequency in the Baseline Centipede
treatment does not differ significantly form that in the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment, a treatment
that excludes the mutually beneficial outcome but not the efficiency property from the Baseline
game. Moreover, in all treatments the average frequency of the second mover’s initially believing
the first mover’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality is significantly less than 100 percent. This
frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly higher than those in the other two treat-
ments. Also it gradually increases towards 100 percent as subjects gain experience in later rounds
of the experiment; whereas in the other two treatments there is no such increasing pattern as more
rounds are played.
Furthermore, we find that common strong belief of rationality is seldom observed in the lab-
oratory, especially for the second-mover. In all three treatments, the the average frequency of
the second mover’s strongly believing the first-mover’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality is sig-
nificantly less than 100 percent. And this frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment does not
significantly differ from those in the other two treatments. Notice that the second-movers are in-
2For more knowledge-based theoretical discussion on the “backward induction paradox,” see Bicchieri (1988,
1989), Pettit and Sugden (1989), Reny (1988, 1992), Bonanno (1991), Aumann (1995, 1996, 1998), Binmore (1996,
1997).
3See Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Battigalli (1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, 2002), Ben-Porath
(1997), Brandenburger (2007).
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formed that the first-mover has chosen a non-BI strategy for the first stage before being asked to
state their conditional beliefs. Thus our result indicates that once the second-movers observe the
first-movers’ deviating from the BI path, the former can hardly believe that the latter’s rationality
AND higher-order belief of rationality.
Last but not least, let us close this section by emphasizing the difference between this belief-
based approach and the level-k model. The level-k analysis assumes the presence of behavior types
before the game starts: there always exists a level-zero who is the least sophisticated; each player
believes her opponent to be less sophisticated than herself and respond to those types optimally.
Nevertheless, our approach does not impose any presumptions on players’ beliefs and behavior: we
elicit the true patterns of them. We do not assume ex-ante that players best respond to others’
types; nor do we restrict players’ beliefs about their opponents’ degree of sophistication. Strategies
and reported beliefs from our experiment can be used to examine the level-k model, but not vice
versa.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 formally defines players’ beliefs,
rationality, and beliefs of rationality in the centipede game. Section 3.3 presents the experimental
design in detail, with Section 3.3.1 introducing experimental treatments and testing hypothesis
and Section 3.3.2 introducing the procedure and belief elicitation method in the laboratory. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the experimental findings on players’ strategies, players’ beliefs about opponents’
strategies, rationality, and higher-order beliefs of rationality. Section 3.5 reviews related theoretical
literature on backward induction and epistemic game theory and previous experimental studies on
the centipede games. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 DEFINING BELIEF, RATIONALITY, AND BELIEF OF RATIONALITY
We follow Brandenburger’s (Brandenburger 2007) notation of players’ belief types and epis-
temic states throughout this section. Denote the two-player (Ann and Bob) finite centipede game
〈Sa, Sb,Πa,Πb〉 where Si and Πi represent player i’s set of pure strategies and set of payoffs, re-
spectively.
Definition 8. We call the structure 〈Sa, Sb;T a, T b;λa(·), λb(·)〉 a type structure for the players
of a two-person finite game where T a and T b are compact metrizable space, and each λi : T i →
∆(S−i × T−i), i = a, b is continuous. An element ti ∈ T i is called a type for player i, (i = a, b).
87
An elements (sa, sb, ta, tb) ∈ S × T (where S = Sa × Sb and T = T a × T b) is called a state.
We first define rationality using the type-state language:
Definition 9. A strategy-type pair of player i, (i = a, b), (si, ti) is rational if si maximizes player
i’s expected payoff under the measure λi(ti)’s marginal on S−i.
Next, we define a player’s believing an event as:
Definition 10. Player i’s type ti believes an event E ⊆ S−i×T−i if λi(ti)(E) = 1, i = a, b. Denote
Bi(E) = {ti ∈ T i : ti believes E}, i = a, b
the set of player i’s types that believe the event E.
For each player i, denote Ri1 the set of all rational strategy-type pairs (s
i, ti). Thus R−i1 stands for
the set of all rational strategy-type pairs of opponent −i, i.e.
R−i1 = {(s−i, t−i) ∈ S−i × T−i : (s−i, t−i) is rational.}, i = a, b
Now we can define a player’s believing in his or her opponent’s rationality as player i believes an
event E = R−i1 :
Definition 11. Player i’s type ti believes his or her opponent’s rationality R−i1 ⊆ S−i×T−i
if λi(ti)(R−i1 ) = 1. Denote
Bi(R−i1 ) = {ti ∈ T i : ti believes R−i1 }, i = a, b
the set of player i’s types that believe opponent −i’s rationality.
Then for all m ∈ N and m > 1, we can define Rim inductively by
Rim = R
i
m−1 ∩ (Si ×Bi(R−im−1)), i = a, b
And write Rm = R
a
m × Rbm. Then players’ higher order beliefs of rationality is defined in the
following way:
Definition 12. If a state (sa, sb, ta, tb) ∈ Rm+1, we say that there is rationality and mth-order
belief of rationality (RmBR) at this state.
If a state (sa, sb, ta, tb) ∈ ∩∞m=1Rm, we say that there is rationality and common belief of
rationality (RCBR) at this state.
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For a perfect-information sequential move game such as the centipede game, in case the game
situation involves the players not playing the backward-induction path (BI path thereafter), we also
need to describe players’ beliefs of probability-0 events. We use the tool of conditional probability
systems (CPS thereafter) introduced by Renyi’s (Re´nyi 1955). It consists of a family of conditional
events and one probability measure for each of these events. For the centipede game under analysis,
we define player i initially believes event E if i’s CPS assigns probability 1 to event E at the
root of the perfect-information game tree. We denote the set of player i’s types that initially
believe event E as IBi(E), i = a, b. We also define player i strongly believes event E if for any
information set H that is reached, i.e. E ∩ (H × T−i) 6= ∅, i’s CPS assigns probability 1 to event
E. We denote the set of a player’s types who strongly believe event E as SBi(E), i = a, b.
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We experimentally investigate players’ rationality, beliefs and higher-order beliefs about op-
ponents’ rationality. Section 3.3.1 describes the treatments and testing hypothesis. Section 3.3.2
details the laboratory environments, belief elicitation, and other experimental procedures.
3.3.1 Treatments and Hypothesis
Our experiment consists of three treatments, each of which is a three-legged centipede game.
The first treatment, “Baseline Centipede Game” is shown in Figure 3.1. Both the Nash equilibrium
outcome and Subgame Perfect equilibrium outcome involve player A choosing OUT at the first stage
and the two players ending up with a 20− 10 split of payoffs.
Here we emphasize three feature of this baseline game: first, the same as the “backward induc-
tion paradox” discussed in the theoretical literature, the sum of the players’ payoffs grows at each
stage. Had the players not played the BI path, the outcome would yield the players a larger sum
of payoffs. We call this an efficient outcome. Second, had player A played IN at both of his/her
decision stages and had player B played IN at his/her decision stage, the game would end up with
a mutually beneficial 25 − 45 payoff split. This is because 25 is greater than 20, the payoff that
player A gets if he/she plays OUT at the first stage; and 45 is greater than 40, the payoff that
player B gets if he/she plays OUT at the second stage. Third, allowing for probabilistic belief, it
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Figure 3.1: Baseline Centipede Game
is easy to calculate that if player A expects player B to play IN with a probability greater than 13 ,
his/her best response is to play IN for the first stage and OUT for the third stage. As for player B,
if he/she expects player A to play IN at the third stage with a probability greater than 23 , his/her
best response is to play IN for the second stage.
Figure 3.2: Constant-Sum Centipede Game
Our second treatment, the “Constant-Sum Centipede Game,” is shown in Figure 3.2. The sum
of the players’ payoffs at all stages is a constant. This version of the centipede game eliminates the
efficient concern presented in the Baseline Centipede treatment; and similar experimental treat-
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ments without examining players’ beliefs has been conducted by Fey et.al.(1996), Levitt et.al.(2009).
We choose the constant-sum payoff to be 50 because this is the actual average sum of the payoffs
subjects earned in the laboratory in the Baseline Centipede treatment. And we choose the split
of the players’ payoffs at each stage such that the cutoff probabilistic belief for each player is the
same as that in the Baseline Centipede treatment. Namely, if player A expects player B to play IN
with p ≥ 13 , his/her best response is to play IN-OUT; if player B expects player A to play IN at
the third stage with q ≥ 23 , his/her best response is to play IN for the second stage.
Figure 3.3: No-Mutual-Benefit Centipede Game
Notice that the Constant-Sum Centipede excludes both the efficiency property and mutual-
beneficial payoff property from the Baseline Centipede. To further investigate the key driving force
underlying the observed differences between the first two treatments, we conduct a “No-Mutual-
Benefit Centipede” treatment as shown in Figure 3.3. The sum of the players’ payoffs at each stage
remains the same as in the Baseline Centipede; the only change is the 15− 55 split of payoffs had
both players played the IN-IN-IN path. In this case player A’s cutoff probabilistic belief for playing
IN-OUT remains as 13 , whereas player B’s cutoff probabilistic belief for playing IN changes to
2
5 .
Table 3.1 below summarizes the treatments and number of sessions, subjects, and matches of
games for each treatment.
Next, we list the testing hypotheses as comparisons between the treatments, and as comparisons
with theoretical predictions. Our first set of hypotheses are on the players’ strategy choices. In all
three treatments, the Nash equilibrium outcome involves the game ending as player A plays OUT
at the first stage; and the Subgame Perfect equilibrium prescribes both player’s choosing OUT at
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Table 3.1: Experimental Treatments
Treatments # of Sessions # of Subjects Total # of Games
Baseline Centipede 5 60 450
Constant-Sum 5 60 450
No-Mutual-Benefit 3 36 270
each’s decision stage(s). Therefore we have the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. In all three treatments, the frequency of player A’s choosing IN at the first stage
does not differ significantly from 0. Specifically, this frequency in the Baseline Centipede treatment
does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 2. In all three treatments, the frequency of player B’s choosing IN at the second stage
does not differ significantly from 0. Specifically, this frequency in the Baseline Centipede treatment
does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
The second set of hypotheses describes players’ rationality. As defined in Section 3.2, a player
is rational if his or her strategy choice maximizes the expected payoffs given his or her belief. A
fully rational player best responds to both the initial belief and conditional belief with probability
1. In Appendix 3.7.1 we demonstrate the following hypotheses by proving five observations.
Hypothesis 3. If player A is rational, then in all three treatments, the frequency of A’s strategy
best responding to A’s belief does not significantly differ from 1. Specifically, this frequency in the
Baseline Centipede treatment does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 4. If player B is rational, then in all three treatments, the frequency of B’s strategy
best responding to B’s belief does not significantly differ from 1. Specifically, this frequency in the
Baseline Centipede treatment does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
We then move to players’ belief about the opponents’ rationality and common belief of ratio-
nality. As defined in Section 3.2, a player believes one’s opponent being rational if he/she assigns
probability 1 to all the states (s−i, t−i) in which opponent −i’s strategy best responds to the belief
in that state. For player A, this probability is the one he/she states before the game starts. For
player B, the probability he/she assigns to A’s strategy-belief pair at the root of the game tree is the
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initial belief, while the probability he/she assigns once called upon to move at the second stage (if
observed) is the conditional belief in the definition of “strong belief” in Section 3.2. Thus we have
the following hypotheses. In Appendix 3.7.1 we prove them by demonstrating five observations.
Hypothesis 5. If rationality and common strong belief of rationality holds, then in all
three treatments, the frequency of A’s believing B’s choosing IN at the second stage does not signifi-
cantly differ from 0. Specifically, this frequency in the Baseline Centipede treatment does not differ
significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 5 comes from the fact that rationality common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR)
implies that player A’s believing in B’s rationality, believing in B’s (initially and conditionally)
believing A’s rationality, and so on. Thus as shown in Section 3.7.1, there is no state that involves
player A’s believing player B’s choosing IN satisfying RCSBR.
Hypothesis 6. If common belief of rationality holds, then in all three treatments, the frequency
of B’s believing A’s rationality does not significantly differ from 1. Specifically, this frequency in the
Baseline Centipede treatment does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 7. If rationality and common initial belief of rationality holds, then in all three
treatments, the frequency of B’s initially believing in A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality does
not differ significantly from 1. Specifically, this frequency in the Baseline Centipede treatment does
not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 8. If rationality and common strong belief of rationality holds, then in all
three treatments, the frequency of B’s conditionally believing in A’s rationality and 2nd-Order
rationality does not differ significantly from 1. Specifically, this frequency in the Baseline Centipede
treatment does not differ significantly from that in the Constant-Sum treatment.
Hypothesis 6 comes from the fact that common belief of rationality implies player B’s (both
initially and conditionally) assigning probability 1 to the event of A’s rationality. Hypothesis 7
comes from the fact that rationality and common initial belief of rationality implies player B’s
assigning probability 1 to A’s rationality AND A’s believing B’s rationality at the root of the game
tree. Hypothesis 8 is from the fact that rationality and common strong belief of rationality
implies player B’s still assigning probability 1 to A’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality even after
observing A has chosen IN for the first stage.
93
3.3.2 Design and Procedure
All sessions were conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Lab (PEEL) in Spring
2013. A total of 156 subjects are recruited from the undergraduate population of the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh who have no prior experience in our experiment. The experiment adopts
between-subject design, with 5 sessions for the Baseline Centipede treatment, 5 sessions for the
Constant-Sum treatment, and 3 sessions for the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment. The experiment is
programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Upon arrival at the lab, we seat the subjects at separate computer terminals. After we have
enough subjects to start the session4, we hand out instructions and then read the instruction aloud.
A quiz which tests the subjects’ understanding of the instruction follows. We pass the quiz’s answer
key after the subjects finish it, explaining in private to whomever have questions.
In each session, 12 subjects participate in 15 rounds of one variation of the centipede game.
Half of the subjects are randomly assigned the role of Member A and the other half the role of
Member B. The role remain fixed throughout the experiment. In each round, one Member A is
paired with one Member B to form a group of two. The two members in a group would then play
the centipede game in that treatment. Subjects are randomly rematched with another member of
the opposite role after each round.
For the aim of collecting enough data, we first use strategy method to elicit the subjects’ strategy
choice5. We ask the subjects to specify their choice at each decision stage had it been reached.
Then the subjects’ choice(s) are carried out automatically by the programme and one would not
have a chance to revise it if one’s decision stage is reached.
After the subjects finish the choice task, they enter a “forecast task” phase which is to elicit
their beliefs about opponent’s choices. Member A is asked to choose from one of the two statements
which he/she thinks more likely6: “Member B has chosen IN” or “Member B has chosen OUT.”
Member A’s predictions are incentivized by a linear rule: 5 points if correct, 0 if incorrect. Member
B is informed that his/her partner A has made a selection of choices for stage 1 and 3, AND have
4Each session has 12 subjects. We over-recruit as many as 16 subjects each time. By arrival time, from the 13th
subject on, we pay them a $5.00 show-up fee and ask them to leave.
5Another advantage of the strategy method is to exclude subjects’ incentives to signal, hedge, or bluff their
opponent. Had we not adopted this method, in the baseline treatment we would have observed an even higher
frequency of player A’s choosing IN for the first stage. Player A might find it optimal to “bluff opponent” if player
B is tempted by the efficient and mutually beneficial payoff split in the Baseline Centipede treatment AND B would
not strongly believe A’s rationality after observing A’s choosing IN for the first stage.
6Since in all treatments player A’s cutoff probabilistic belief is 1
3
, which is smaller than 50 percent, the point
prediction Member A is making here is without loss of generality.
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chosen a statement about Member B’s choice. Then Member B’s are asked to enter six numbers as
the percent chance into a table, each cell of which represents a choice-forecast pair that Member A
has chosen. For example, as shown in the table below, the upper-left cell represents the event that
Member A has chosen OUT for the 1st stage and “Statement I.”
Table 3.2: Member B’s Estimation Task
Statement I 
Statement O
1st Stage Out, 3rd In or Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage In
If B’s decision stage is reached (which means his/her partner Member A has chosen IN), he/she
will be asked to make a second forecast about the percent chance for each possible outcome of A’s
choices. Member B’s predictions are incentivized by the quadratic rule:
5− 2.5× [(1− βij)2 +
∑
kl 6=ij
β2kl]
where βkl stands for Member B’s stated percent chance in row k column l of the table, and i, j
represents that row i column j is the outcome from Member A’s choices7.
At the end of the experiment, one round is randomly selected to count for payment. A subject’s
earning in each round is the sum of the points he/she earn from the choice task and the forecast
task(s). The exchange rate between points and US dollars is 2.5 : 1. A subject receivers his/her
earning in that selected round plus the $5.00 show-up fee.
3.4 EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
3.4.1 Players’ Strategy Choices
Our first set of results compares the frequency of players’ strategy choices with that predicted
by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium. We first state the result addressing Hypothesis 1, then move
7Palfrey and Wang (Palfrey and Wang 2009) and Wang (Wang 2011) have discussed eliciting subjects’ beliefs
using proper scoring rules. This is the major reason we adopt a quadratic scoring rule. We are also aware of the
risk-neutrality assumption behind the quadratic rule and the possibility to use an alternative belief elicitation method
proposed by Karni (Karni 2009). But concerning the complexity of explaining Karni’s method to the subjects, we
adopt the quadratic rule which is simpler in explanation.
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to the result addressing Hypothesis 2.
Result 1. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of A’s choosing IN at the first stage is
significantly higher than 0. (2) The average frequency of A’s choosing IN at the first stage in the
Constant-Sum treatment is significantly lower than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 1 addresses Hypothesis 1. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player
A’s choosing IN at the first stage across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment
is significantly lower than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of them are significantly higher
than 0, the Subgame Perfect equilibrium prediction.
Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of A’s choosing IN predicted by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium
(blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency from the
Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit
treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.4: Average Frequency of A’s Strategy Choice, Across Periods
It is natural to ask what these player A’s would play given that they had deviated from the equi-
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librium path. Namely, what is the frequency of choosing strategy IN-OUT versus the frequency of
choosing IN-IN? Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player A’s choosing strategy
IN-IN. It is interesting to note that the frequency in all three treatment is not significantly different
from 0; and there is no significant difference across treatments. Notably, this is true even for the
Baseline Centipede treatment. In other words, despite the efficiency property and mutual benefit
property of the Baseline Centipede, actual plays seldom end up with the “mutually beneficial”
25− 45 payoff split. Conditional on the third node being reached, almost all player A’s optimally
choose OUT for the third stage.
Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of A’s choosing IN at the first stage and IN at the third stage
predicted by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment
(purple curve), and the frequency from the Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the
average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.5: Average Frequency of A’s Choosing IN-IN at Both Decision Stages, Across Periods
Result 2. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of B’s choosing IN at the second stage
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is significantly higher than 0. (2) The average frequency of B’s choosing IN at the second stage in
the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly lower than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 2 addresses Hypothesis 2. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player B’s
choosing IN at the second stage across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment
is significantly lower than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of them are significantly higher
than 0, the Subgame Perfect equilibrium prediction.
Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s choosing IN predicted by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium
(blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency from the
Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit
treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.6: Average Frequency of B’s Strategy Choice, Across Periods
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3.4.2 Rationality
In this section we present comparison results on players’ rationality across treatments. We first
examine the frequency of A’s best responding to his/her stated belief. Notice that there are two
data points from A’s strategy-belief choices that can be identified as “rational.” Either player A
chooses strategy IN-OUT and believes that B has chosen IN, or chooses OUT for the first stage
and believes that B has chosen OUT. We sum up the frequencies from the two cases as we calculate
the overall frequency of A’s being rational.
Result 3. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player A’s being rational is signif-
icantly lower than 1. (2) The average frequency of player A’s being rational in the Constant-Sum
treatment is significantly higher than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 3 addresses Hypothesis 3. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player
A’s being rational across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly
higher than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of them are significantly lower than 1 as
required by the notion of rationality.
We then investigate the frequency of B’s best responding to his/her stated belief. From B’s
stated belief, if the probability he/she assigns to A’s choosing strategy IN-IN is greater than his/her
cutoff probabilistic belief, it is rational for B to choose IN for the second stage; otherwise, it is
rational to choose OUT for the second stage. We sum up the frequencies from the two cases as we
calculate the overall frequency of B’s being rational.
Result 4. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player B’s being rational is signif-
icantly lower than 1. (2) The average frequency of player B’s being rational in the Constant-Sum
treatment is not significantly different from that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 4 addresses Hypothesis 4. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player B’s
being rational across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment is not significantly
higher than that in the Baseline treatment; and both of them are significantly lower than 1 as
required by the notion of rationality.
3.4.3 Belief of Rationality and Higher-Order Belief of Rationality
In this section we present comparison results on players’ belief of rationality and higher-order
belief of rationality across treatments. We first examine the frequency of A’s believing B’s choosing
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Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of A’s best responding to his/her stated belief if A is rational
(blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency from the
Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit
treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.7: Average Frequency of A’s Best Responding to Own Belief, Across Periods
IN for the second stage.
Result 5. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player A’s believing B’s choosing
IN is significantly higher than 0. (2) The average frequency of player A’s believing B’s choosing IN
in the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly lower than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 5 addresses Hypothesis 5. As shown in Section 3.3.1, if rationality and common strong
belief of rationality holds, in all states player A should not believe that B would ever chosen IN
for the second stage. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player A’s believing B’s
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Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s best responding to his/her own belief if B is rational (blue
curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency from the Constant-
Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment
(green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.8: Average Frequency of B’s Best Responding to Own Belief, Across Periods
choosing IN across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly lower
than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of them are significantly higher than 0 as required by
the notion of RCSBR. The comparison of player A’s belief accuracy across treatments is included
in Appendix 3.7.2.
We then examine player B’s believing A’s rationality. If player B’s stated belief assigns a sum of
probability 1 to the two cases in which player A is rational (either A chooses strategy IN-OUT and
believes B has chosen IN, or A chooses OUT for the first stage and believes B has chosen OUT),
we say that player B believes A’s rationality.
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Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of A’s believing B’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality if
RCSBR holds (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency
from the Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-
Benefit treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.9: Average Frequency of A’s Believing B’s Choosing IN, Across Periods
Result 6. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player B’s believing A’s rationality
is significantly lower than 1. (2) The average frequency of player B’s believing A’s rationality in
the Constant-Sum treatment is significantly higher than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Result 6 addresses Hypothesis 6. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player
B’s believing A’s rationality across all periods. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment is
significantly higher than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of them are significantly lower
than 1 as required by the notion of common belief of rationality. It is also worth noting that in the
Constant-Sum treatment this frequency increases towards 1 gradually as more rounds are played.
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Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s believing in A’s rationality if common belief in rationality
holds (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency from the
Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-Benefit
treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.10: Average Frequency of B’s Believing A’s Rationality, Across Periods
Next we examine player B’s believing A’s rationality AND believing A’s believing B’s rationality
(2nd-Order rationality). If player B’s initial belief assigns probability 1 to the event that player
A chooses OUT for the first stage and believes B has chosen OUT, we say that player B initially
believes A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality.
Result 7. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player B’s initially believing A’s ra-
tionality and 2nd-order rationality is significantly lower than 1. (2) The average frequency of player
B’s initially believing A’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality in the Constant-Sum treatment is
significantly higher than that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
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Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s believing A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality if
RCIBR holds (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency
from the Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-
Benefit treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.11: Average Frequency of B’s Believing A’s Rationality and 2nd-Order Rationality, Across Periods
Result 7 addresses Hypothesis 7. Figure ?? depicts the treatment-average frequency of player
B’s believing A’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality across all periods. This frequency in the
Constant-Sum treatment is significantly higher than that in the Baseline treatment; but both of
them are significantly lower than 1 as required by the notion of rationality and common initial belief
of rationality. It is also worth noting that in the Constant-Sum treatment this frequency increases
towards 1 gradually as more rounds are played.
Last we look into player B’s strongly believing A’s rationality AND 2nd-Order rationality con-
ditional on A has chosen IN for the first stage. If player B’s conditional belief assigns probability
1 to the event that player A chooses strategy IN-OUT and believes B has chosen IN, we say that
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player B strongly believes A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality.
Result 8. (1) In all three treatments, the average frequency of player B’s strongly believing A’s ra-
tionality and 2nd-order rationality is significantly lower than 1. (2) The average frequency of player
B’s strongly believing A’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality in the Constant-Sum treatment is
not significantly different from that in the Baseline Centipede treatment.
Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s believing in A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality if
RCSBR holds (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the frequency
from the Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the No-Mutual-
Benefit treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.12: Average Frequency of B’s Strongly Believing A’s Rationality and 2nd-Order Rationality, Across Periods
Result 8 addresses Hypothesis 8. Figure ?? depicts the across-period treatment-average fre-
quency of player B’s strongly believing A’s rationality and 2nd-order rationality conditional on B is
informed that A has chosen IN for the first stage. This frequency in the Constant-Sum treatment
is not significantly different from that in the Baseline treatment; and both of them are significantly
105
lower than 1 as required by the notion of rationality and common strong belief of rationality. In
other words, once player B observes player A’s deviating from the equilibrium path, B hardly
believes A’s being rational AND A’s believing B’s rationality.
3.5 RELATED LITERATURE
McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1992) seminal centipede game experiment shows individuals’ behavior
inconsistent with standard game theory prediction. Neither do they find convergence to subgame
perfect equilibrium prediction as subjects gain experience in later rounds of the experiment. The
authors attribute such inconsistent behavior to uncertainties over players’ payoff functions; specif-
ically, the subjects might believe a certain fraction of the population is altruist. They establish
a structural econometric model to incorporate players’ selfish/altruistic types, error probability in
actions, and error probability in beliefs. If most of the players are altruistic, the altruistic type
always chooses PASS except on the last node while the selfish type might mimic the altruist for the
first several moves as in standard reputation models. As pointed out, the equilibrium prediction of
this incomplete information game is sensitive to the beliefs about the proportion of the altruistic
type. In our design we try to avoid this complication by allowing sorting.
Subsequent experimental studies on centipede games tend to view this failure of backward
induction as individuals’ irrationality. Fey et.al.(1996) examine a constant-sum centipede game
which excludes the possibility of Pareto improvement by not backward inducting. Among the non-
equilibrium models, they find that the Quantal Response Equilibrium, in which players err when
playing their best responses, fit the data best. Zauner (1999) estimates the variance of uncertainties
about players’ preferences and payoff types and makes comparison between the altruism models and
the quantal response models. Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) offer an alternative explanation for the
deviations in centipede games adopting level-k analysis. They claim that the level-k model provide
good predictions for the major features in the centipede game experiment without the complication
to incorporate incomplete information on “types.” Nagel and Tang (1998) investigate centipede
games in a variation of the strategy method: the game is played in the reduced normal form,
which is considered as “strategically equivalent” to the extensive form counterpart, but precisely to
identify “learning.” They examine behavior across periods according to learning direction theory.
They show significant differences in patterns of choices between the cases when a player has to split
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the cake before her opponent and when she moves after her opponent.
Consequently, other research tries to restore the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome by pro-
viding the subjects with aids in their decision-making processes. Bornstein et. al.(2004) show that
groups tend to terminate the game earlier than individual players, once free communication is al-
lowed within each group. Maniadis (2010) examines a set of centipede games with different stakes
and finds that providing aggregate information causes strong convergence to the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome. However, after uncertainties are incorporated into the payoff structure, the
effect of information provision shifts in the opposite direction. Rapoport et. al.(2003) study a
three-person centipede game. They show that when the number of players increases and the stakes
are sufficiently high, results converge to theoretical predictions more quickly. But when the game
is played with low stakes, both convergence to equilibrium and learning across iterations of the
stage game are weakened. Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) cast their doubt on average people’s
full rationality by recruiting expert chess players to play a field centipede. Strong convergence to
subgame perfect prediction is observed.
3.6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper explores people’s beliefs behind non-backward induction behavior in laboratory
centipede games. We elicit the first mover’s belief about the second mover’s strategy as well as
the second mover’s initial and conditional beliefs about the first mover’s strategy and 1st-order
belief. The measured beliefs help me infer the conditional probability systems of both players.
The inferred CPS’s and players’ actual strategy choices identify why they fail to reach the BI
outcomes. First, we examine whether the player’s strategies are best response to the stated beliefs.
In both the Baseline Centipede treatment and the Constant-Sum treatment, the frequency of
players’ best responding to own beliefs is significantly lower than 1. Specifically, the frequency in
the Constant-Sum treatment is higher than that in the Baseline treatment; and the frequency in
the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment is not significantly different from that in the Baseline treatment.
Second, we investigate players’ belief of opponents’ rationality and higher-order belief of rationality.
In all treatments, both the frequency of players’ believing in others’ rationality and the frequency
of higher-order belief of rationality are significantly smaller than 1. Nevertheless, the frequency in
the Constant-Sum treatment dominates that in the Baseline and the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment.
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Third, when it comes to the second mover’s conditional beliefs once the first-mover has chosen a
non-BI strategy, the frequency of the second movers’ strongly believing the first movers’ rationality
is very low; and there is no significant different across treatments.
3.7 APPENDIX
3.7.1 Proofs and Calculations
This section demonstrating the hypotheses specified in the main text by proving five observa-
tions. The first observation is about B’s belief of A’s rationality. The rest four observations identify
the states that satisfy RCIBR and RCSBE. In summary, when the strategy choices and inferred
CPS’s constitute a state that satisfies rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR
henceforth), players do not fail to reach the backward induction (BI henceforth) outcome in this
state. But the reverse is not true. It is possible that Role A’s strategy choice leads to the BI
outcome, but Role B’s strategy and belief are not consistent with RCSBR. Moreover, there exists
a state in which Role B’s strategy and belief are consistent with the BI outcome but Role A’s are
not. There also exists a state in which neither player’s strategy and belief are consistent with the
BI outcome, but a weaker notion of common belief in rationality, rationality and common initial
belief of rationality, still holds.
For the east of demonstration, we alter the notations of the players’ moves slightly, as shown in
Figure 3.13. Since we shall prove the following observations for all three treatments, we use (xj , yj)
to represent the players’ payoffs associated with each terminal node. And uA represents Statement
OUT, tA represents Statement IN in the instruction.
Observation 6. From the measured initial belief of player B, if β11 + β22 = 1, player B initially
believes player A’s rationality.
From the measured conditional belief of player B, if γ22 = 1, player B strongly believes player
A’s rationality and 2nd-Order rationality.
Observation 7. If the following data point is observed, the players’ strategies and beliefs constitute
a state that satisfies RCSBR:
- Role A chooses Out and statement uA
- Role B chooses Out and the measured beliefs take the form:
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Figure 3.13: The Centipede Game
Table 3.3: Measured Initial Belief of Player B
uA β11 β12 β13
tA β21 β22 β23
Out Down Across
Table 3.4: Measured Conditional Belief of Player B
uA γ12 γ13
tA γ22 γ23
Down Across
Observation 8. If the following data point is observed, Role B’s strategy and belief are not
consistent with RCSBR. Nevertheless, the BI outcome still obtains.
- Role A chooses Out and statement uA
- Role B chooses In and the measured beliefs take the form:
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Table 3.5: RCSBR Beliefs
uA 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
tA 0[0] 0[1] 0[0]
Out Down Across
Note: The first number in each cell represents Role B’s belief in task (2). The second number in
[] represents Role B’s revised belief in task (3).
Table 3.6: Backward Induction without RCSBR Beliefs
uA 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
tA 0[0] 0[0] 0[1]
Out Down Across
Note: The first number in each cell represents Role B’s belief in task (2). The second number in
[] represents Role B’s revised belief in task (3).
Remark: 1st-order strong belief of rationality of both players because Role B’s measured belief
indicates that he does not strongly believe Role A’s rationality. However, since Role A chooses
Out at the first node, the BI outcome still obtains. Although RCSBR does not hold in this state,
a weaker notion, rationality and common initial belief of rationality (RCIBR), still holds. RCIBR
only requires the belief consistency given the root of the game tree.
Observation 9. If the following data point is observed, Role B’s strategy and belief are consistent
with the BI outcome. But the BI outcome does not obtain.
- Role A chooses Down and statement tA
- Role B chooses Out and the measured beliefs take the form:
Remark: In this state there is no 1st-order strong belief of rationality, nor 1st-order initial belief
of rationality because Role A’s measured belief indicates that she does not strongly, nor initially
believe Role B’s rationality. Since Role A chooses Down and Role B chooses Out, the BI outcome
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Table 3.7: Player B’s Strong Belief of Rationality in Non-BI Outcome
uA 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
tA 0[0] 0[1] 0[0]
Out Down Across
Note: The first number in each cell represents Role B’s belief in task (2). The second number in
[] represents Role B’s revised belief in task (3).
does not obtain. The game ends at the second node by Role B’s playing Out.
Observation 10. If the following data point is observed, neither player’s strategy and belief is
consistent with the BI outcome. The BI outcome does not obtain. Nevertheless, the strategies and
beliefs constitute a state that satisfies rationality and common initial belief of rationality.
- Role A chooses Down and statement tA
- Role B chooses In and the measured beliefs take the form:
Table 3.8: No RCSBR and Non-Backward-Induction Outcome
uA 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
tA 0[0] 0[0] 0[1]
Out Down Across
Note: The first number in each cell represents Role B’s belief in task (2). The second number in
[] represents Role B’s revised belief in task (3).
Remark: In this state there is no 1st-order strong belief of rationality of both players because (1)
Role B’s measured belief indicates that he does not strongly believe Role A’s rationality, and (2)
Role A’s measured beliefs indicates that she believes Role B’s rationality in response to his belief,
but she does not believe that Role B believes her rationality. Since Role A chooses Down and
Role B chooses In, the BI outcome does not obtain. The game ends at the last node by Role A’s
choosing Down.
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Compare observation 8 and 10. Role B’s inferred CPS is the same, which assigns probability
0 to Role A’s rationality if Role B’s decision node is reached. Therefore, whenever Role B does
not believe Role A’s rationality conditional on a zero-probability event, Role A can attain a higher
payoff by playing Down instead of Out. Both states satisfy rationality and common initial belief
of rationality, but not rationality and common strong belief of rationality.
3.7.1.1 Proof for Observation 7 and 9
The inferred CPS’s of both players are as follows:
Table 3.9: Proof for Observation 7 and 9
λa(ta)
T b tb 0 1
Out In
Sb
λa(ua)
T b tb 1[0] 0[1]
Out In
Sb
λb(tb)
T a
ua 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
ta 0[0] 0[1] 0[0]
Out Down Across
Sa
We are going to show:
1. The state (Out, ua,Out, tb) satisfies both RCIBR and RCSBR
2. The state (Down, ta,Out, tb) satisfies neither RCIBR nor RCSBR
First notice that the strategy-type pair (Out, ua) and (Down, ta) are rational for player Ann.
The strategy-type pair (Out, tb) is rational for player Bob. For the initial belief we have:
IBa(Rb1) = {ua}, IBb(Ra1) = {tb},
then we have:
Ra2 = R
a
1 ∩ (Sa × IBa(Rb1)) = {(Out, ua)}
Rb2 = R
b
1 ∩ (Sb × IBb(Ra1)) = {(Out, tb)}
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Inductively, we have Ram{(Out, ua)} and Rbm = (Out, tb), ∀m ∈ N. Therefore we have:
∩∞m=1Rm = (Out, ua,Out, tb)
and (Down, ta,Out, tb) /∈ ∩∞m=1Rm
As for strong beliefs, at the second node of the game, Bob’s information set
H = {Ann would play “Down” or “Across”}. Thus
H × T a = {(Down, ta), (Down, ua), (Across, ta), (Across, ua)}
Bob’s type tb is the only type who assigns probability 1 to any event E s.t. E ∩ (H × T a) 6= ∅. So
we have SBb(Ra1) = {tb}.
At the first node of the game, H = ∅ for Ann. So Ann’s strong beliefs at this node are degenerate.
At the third node of the game, Ann’s information set H = {Bob played “In”}. Both Ann’s type
assigns probability 1 to any event E s.t. E ∩ (H × T a) 6= ∅. So we have SBa(Rb1) = {ta, ua}.
Inductively we have:
Ra2 = R
a
1 ∩ (Sa × SBa(Rb1)) = Ra1
Rb2 = R
b
1 ∩ (Sb × SBb(Ra1)) = {(Out, tb)}
Iterate one more level, we have:
SBb(Ra2) = SB
b(Ra1) = {tb}
SBa(Rb2) = {ta ∈ T a : ∀H s.t. Rb2 ∩ (H × T b) 6= ∅, λa(ta)(Rb2) = 1}
= {ua}
and
Ra3 = R
a
2 ∩ (Sa × SBa(Rb2)) = {(Out, ua)}
Rb3 = R
b
2 ∩ (Sb × SBb(Ra2)) = {(Out, tb)}
Then we have SBb(Ra3) = {tb} and SBa(Rb3) = {ua}. For any m ≥ 3, we have Ram = {(Out, ua)}
and Rbm = {(Out, tb)}. Thus:
∩∞m=1Rm = {(Out, ua,Out, tb)}
Therefore, the only state that satisfies rationality and common strong belief of rationality is (Out, ua,Out, tb).
The results are summarized in the following table:
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Table 3.10: Summary for Proof for Observation 7 and 9
State RCIBR RCSBR
(Down, ta,Out, tb) × ×
(Out, ua,Out, tb)
√ √
Table 3.11: Proof for Observation 8 and 10
λa(ta)
T b
ub 0 0
tb 0 1
Out In
Sb
λa(ua)
T b
ub 1[0] 0[0]
tb 0[0] 0[1]
Out In
Sb
λb(tb)
T a
ua 1[0] 0[0] 0[0]
ta 0[0] 0[0] 0[1]
Out Down Across
Sa
3.7.1.2 Proof for Observation 8 and 10
The inferred CPS’s of both players are:
We are going to show:
• Both states (Down, ta, In, tb) and (Out, ua, In, tb) satisfy RCIBR but not RCSBR.
We first identify strategy-type pairs that are rational. For player Ann, it is easy to show that
strategy sa = Down maximizes type ta’s expected payoff and strategy sa = Out maximizes type
ua’s expected payoff. For player Bob, strategy sb = In maximizes type tb’s expected payoff. Thus
we have:
Ra1 = {(Down, ta), (Out, ua)}
Rb1 = {(In, tb)}
Initial beliefs:
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Both Ann’s type ta and uaassign probability 1 to (In, tb), so we have IBa(Rb1) = {ta, ua}. Bob’s
type tb assigns probability 1 to (Out, ua) ∈ Ra1, so we have IBb(Ra1) = {tb}.
Then we have:
Ra2 = R
a
1 ∩ (Sa × IBa(Rb1))
= {(Down, ta), (Out, ua)} ∩ ({Out,Down,Across} × {ta, ua})
= Ra1
Similarly, Rb2 = R
b
1, and R
a
3 = R
a
2 ∩ (Sa × IBa(Rb2)) = Ra2 = Ra1. Mathematical induction gives:
Ram = R
a
m−1 = R
a
1 ⇒ Ram+1 = Ram = Ra1
Similar result for Bob. Therefore we have
Rm = R
a
m ×Rbm = Rm−1
⇒ ∩∞m=1Rm = Ra1 ×Rb1
= {(Down, ta, In, tb), (Out, ua, In, tb)}
Thus both states satisfy rationality and common initial belief of rationality.
Strong beliefs:
At the second node of the game, Bob’s information setH = {Ann would play “Down” or “Across”}.
Thus
H × T a = {(Down, ta), (Down, ua), (Across, ta), (Across, ua)}
Bob’s type tb assigns probability 0 to (Down, ta) ∈ Ra1, but assigns probability 1 to
(Across, ta) /∈ Ra1. So we have SBb(Ra1) = ∅. Thus ∩∞m=1Rm = ∅. No state belongs to ∅. Hence
neither state satisfies RCSBR.
The results are summarized in the following table:
Table 3.12: Summary of Proof for Observation 8 and 10
State RCIBR RCSBR
(Down, ta, In, tb)
√ ×
(Out, ua, In, tb)
√ ×
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3.7.2 Other Figures and Tables
Note: Figure on top compares the average frequency of B’s best responding to his/her stated conditional belief if B
is conditionally consistent (blue curve), the frequency from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the
frequency from the Constant-Sum treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the average frequency from the
No-Mutual-Benefit treatment (green curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.14: Average Frequency of B’s Best Responding to Own Conditional Belief, Across Periods
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Note: Figure on top compares the average accuracy of A’s belief if RCBR holds (blue curve), the actual accuracy
from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the actual accuracy from the Constant-Sum treatment
(yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the actual accuracy from the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment (green curve), to
the comparison.
Figure 3.15: Accuracy of A’s Belief, Across Periods
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Note: Figure on top compares the average accuracy of B’s initial belief if RCIBR holds(blue curve), the actual
accuracy from the Baseline Centipede treatment (purple curve), and the actual accuracy from the Constant-Sum
treatment (yellow curve). Figure at bottom adds the actual accuracy from the No-Mutual-Benefit treatment (green
curve), to the comparison.
Figure 3.16: Accuracy of B’s Belief, Across Periods
118
3.7.3 Laboratory Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this experiment. This experiment studies decision-making
between two individuals. In the following one hour or less, you will participate in 15 rounds of
decision making. Please read the instructions carefully; the cash payment you earn at the end of
the experiment may depend on how well you understand the instructions and make your decisions
accordingly.
Your Role and Decision Group
Half of the participants will be randomly assigned the role of Member A and half will be assigned
the role of Member B. Your role will remain fixed throughout the experiment. In each round, one
Member A will be paired with one Member B to form a group of two. The two members in a group
make decisions that will affect their earnings in the round. Participants will be randomly rematched
with another member of the opposite role after each round.
Your Choice Task(s) in Each Round
In each round, each group will face the three-stage decision task shown in Figure ??. The nodes
represent choice stages, the letters above the nodes represent the member who is going to make a
choice, and the numbers represent the points one will earn, with A’s points on top and B’s points
at bottom.
• In the 1st stage A must decide between two options: Out or In. If A chooses Out, the task ends
with A receiving 20 and B 10 points. If A chooses In, the task proceeds to the 2nd stage.
• In the 2nd stage B must decide between two options: Out or In. If B chooses Out, the task
ends with A receiving 10 and B 40 points. If B chooses In, the task proceeds to the 3rd stage.
• In the 3rd stage A must choose again between two options: Out or In. If A chooses Out, A will
receive 40 and B 30 points. If A chooses In, A will receive 25 and B 45 points.
Member A’s Choice Task
You will be asked to specify your choices for both stage 1 and 3 through a computer interface. For
each stage, you can choose one and only one option. Note that you will be making your choices at
the same time your partner B is making his or her choice. So you don’t know what B chooses.
The choices you make here will be carried out automatically by the computer later on. You will
not have an opportunity to revise them.
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Figure 3.17: The Decision Task
Member B’s Choice Task
You will be asked to specify your choice for stage 2 through a computer interface. You can choose
one and only one option. Note that you will be making your choice at the same time your partner
A is making his or her choices. So you don’t know what A chooses. The choice you make here will
be carried out automatically by the computer later on. You will not have an opportunity to revise
it.
Forecast Tasks in Each Round
Besides having the opportunity to earn points in the choice task, you will also be given the oppor-
tunity to earn extra points by making forecast(s).
Member A’s Forecast Task
Your partner, Member B, has made a choice for stage 2. Please select the statement that you
believe is more likely:
- Statement I: Member B has chosen In.
- Statement O: Member B has chosen Out.
You will earn 5 points if your forecast is correct (i.e. if Member B chooses In and you select
Statement I, or B chooses Out and you select Statement O). You will earn nothing otherwise.
Member B’s Forecast Task(s)
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Your partner, Member A, has made choices for both stage 1 and 3; also, he or she is selecting
between Statement I and Statement O, each of which is a statement about the choice you just
made for stage 2. Which choices do you think your partner A has made for his or her stages, and
which statement do you think your partner A is selecting?
Notice that A’s selections can be expressed in the table below. The column represents A’s
selection of statement, the row represents A’s choices for 1st and 3rd stages. So each cell represents
an outcome of A’s choices and statement. For example, the upper-left cell represents the outcome
that A has chosen Out for 1st stage, In or Out for 3rd stage, and Statement I.
Statement I 
Statement O
1st Stage Out, 3rd In or Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage In
Your first forecast task
Your first task is to forecast the percent chance that each of the six outcomes happens. A percent
chance is a number between 0 and 100, where 100 means that you are certain that such outcome is
the correct one, and 0 means that you are certain that such outcome is not the correct one. Enter
the percent chance of each outcome into the corresponding cell. If you leave any cell as blank it
will be viewed as 0. Make sure the six numbers sum up to 100.
You will earn 5 points if your forecast exactly coincide with your partner A’s statement and
choices. If your forecast does not exactly coincide with your partner A’s choice and statement, you
will receive 5 points minus 2.5 times a penalty amount. The penalty amount is the sum of squared
distances between each of the six numbers you entered and the correct answer, i.e. the outcome
from A’s selection.
Example: Suppose you believe that with 80 percent chance A has chosen to play In for 1st
and Out for 3rd stage, and has selected Statement I ; with 15 percent chance A has chosen to
play In for 1st and Out for 3rd stage, and has selected Statement O ; with 5 percent chance A has
chosen to play In for 1st and In for 3rd stage, and has selected Statement O, you should enter the
numbers as below:
Statement I 0 80 0
Statement O 0 15 5 
1st Stage Out, 3rd In or Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage Out 1st Stage In, 3rd Stage In
Now suppose your partner A has chosen In for 1st and In for 3rd stage, and has selected
statement O. The penalty amount is (100/100 − 5/100)2 + (0 − 80/100)2 + (0 − 15/100)2 = 1.54.
So you earn 5− 2.5 ∗ 1.54 = 1.15 from this forecast.
Your second forecast task
After the computer carries out your partner’s and your choices, you will be informed if your partner
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A has chosen In for stage 1. Now you have a chance to make a second forecast. A four-cell table will
be presented to you. (The first column of the table in your first forecast task is removed because
A has chosen In for stage 1.) Please make a percent chance forecast again. Your penalty amount
and earning point are calculated in the same way as in your first forecast task.
Final Comments
At the end of this experiment one round will be randomly selected to count for payment. Your
earning in each round is the sum of the points you earn from the choice task and the forecast
task(s). The exchange rate between points and US dollars is 2.5 : 1. Your cash payment will be
your earning in US dollars plus the $5 show-up fee.
Your decisions and your payment will be kept confidential. You have to make decisions entirely on
your own. Please do not talk to others. If you have any question at any time, raise your hand and
the experimenter will come and assist you individually. Please turn off your cell phone and other
electronic devices.
If you have any question, please raise your hand now. Otherwise we will proceed to the quiz.
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